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ReconsideRing UK commUnity  
development finance
nef is an independent think-and-do 
tank that inspires and demonstrates real 
economic well-being.
We aim to improve quality of life by 
promoting innovative solutions that 
challenge mainstream thinking on 
economic, environmental and social issues. 
We work in partnership and put people and 
the planet first.
nef (the new economics foundation) is a registered charity founded in 1986 by the leaders of The Other Economic Summit (TOES), 
which forced issues such as international debt onto the agenda of the G7/G* summit meetings. It has taken a lead in helping establish 
new coalitions and organisations such as the Jubilee 2000 debt campaign; the Ethical Trading Initiative; the UK Social Investment 
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Since its establishment in 1986, nef has become the leading think-and do-tank 
focusing on economic well-being. We aim to build a new economy based on social 
justice, environmental sustainability and collective well-being.
Tackling issues of financial exclusion and access to finance has been central to nef’s 
agenda for almost a decade. nef helped to establish the Social Investment Task 
Force and is a founder of the Community Development Finance Association. Small is 
Bankable, published in 1998, proved a seminal report in raising awareness of community 
development finance and its role in enterprise development and local economic 
renewal. nef also published the first analysis of this industry: The State of Community 
Development Finance 2001. This report is a continuation of that work and an integral part 
of nef’s commitment to tackling exclusion and increasing access to finance
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nef (the new economics foundation) helped to introduce CDFIs to the UK as a 
model for bringing investment into some of our most disadvantaged communities. 
Now, at this critical phase in the evolution of CDFIs, it is necessary to take stock and 
to evaluate what CDFIs have achieved. 
Approximately 80 CDFIs have been established across the UK. The sector has 
achieved a high degree of diversity, ranging from the provision of small personal 
loans of £50 to social enterprise loans of £1 million. It is active in urban inner cities 
as well as in remote rural communities. Micro-enterprise is a key market for CDFIs, 
with half of the organisations focused on this activity. This study focuses on the 
enterprise-lending activities of CDFIs.
The future of the sector is uncertain. Government policy-makers question whether 
CDFIs have measured up to initial expectations. In this context, nef conducted 
a comprehensive review of enterprise-lending CDFIs in the UK to identify which 
policies are effective in bringing about social change. We evaluated the strengths 
and weaknesses of enterprise-lending CDFIs in relation to exclusion and 
disadvantage. We also identified the policies and operating conditions that affect 
CDFI outcomes. Our research addressed the following key questions:
P	 Have CDFIs in the UK effectively addressed issues of access to finance?
P	 Can CDFIs be sustainable? What size of organisation is appropriate for the 
communities they serve? Are expectations for the sector appropriate?
P	 What are the implications of the current direction of policy for CDFIs? How do 
they fit within the broader approach to enterprise and regeneration?
P	 What do the lessons from CDFIs in other countries tell us about future policy 
choices for the UK? 
We conducted an in-depth survey, interviewing over half of all UK CDFIs, as well 
as banks, policy-makers and funders. We also looked to Europe and to the US to 
identify lessons that could be applicable to the UK. CDFIs have had a significant 
impact on some of our most disadvantaged communities, leveraging in millions of 
pounds of investment. However, few CDFIs have become sustainable, or reached 
a scale that allows them to fulfil their potential. Our research found that much more 
could be done at the policy level to support these vital outposts in some of the 
most disadvantaged communities. 
Our research found that:
P	 80 per cent of survey respondents believe that ‘CDFIs have a positive impact on 
disadvantaged communities’, and that the enterprises they support ‘can make a 
real difference to revitalise disadvantaged communities’. 
P	 96 per cent believe that ‘with the right support, CDFIs could be big enough to 
executive summary
Community Development Finance Institutions (CDFIs) have 
emerged over the past ten years to provide loans to people and 
enterprises excluded from mainstream finance. They were designed 
to create a positive cycle of investment, redevelopment and 
opportunity for disadvantaged communities by providing much-
needed capital. 
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have a significant impact on enterprise in disadvantaged communities’.
P	 72 per cent of CDFIs do not believe that they are able to access funding that 
would support increased outreach and growth.
P	 Only 4 per cent of CDFIs believe that Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) 
provides effective finance for CDFIs.
P	 Over half of CDFIs believe that the devolution of oversight for the sector to 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) has had a negative impact.
Together with evidence from the US and from Western Europe, we found that if their 
potential is to be realised:
P	 Government should establish an ongoing fund to support the further 
development of CDFIs. Their social purpose means that many cannot be, and 
never will be, completely sustainable.
P	 Donors should make funding available over a long-term timeframe to enable 
CDFIs to grow and to increase their impact.
P	 Banks should implement a formal strategy of engagement with CDFIs to 
promote referrals, knowledge transfer and investment. 
P	 CDFIs should be more transparent about their operations in order to demonstrate 
their effectiveness.
P	 RDAs should facilitate the development of partnerships between CDFIs and 
other agencies to encourage a more joined-up approach to enterprise finance 
and support. 
P	 The Community Development Finance Association (CDFA) should continue 
its work on the development of common standards for CDFIs through the 
performance framework.
Key findings
P	 Evidence of continued under-investment in disadvantaged communities 
indicates that access to finance is an ongoing problem for small and micro-
enterprises. CDFIs have a key role to provide investment in partnership with 
other bodies, such as housing associations, development trust associations, 
local authorities and RDAs.
P	 Expectations of the performance of CDFIs – in terms of potential growth and 
their ability to become sustainable – have determined the form and manner of 
funding and support provided to the sector. Not all expectations have been met. 
Initial optimism for the sector’s ability to achieve these expectations, and the 
subsequent disappointment, have overshadowed the real achievements of CDFIs.
P	 There is a strong conviction that CDFIs have a positive impact on disadvantaged 
communities and that they play a critical role in providing access to finance. 
Our policy survey confirmed the belief that enterprises supported by CDFIs can 
make a real difference in revitalising disadvantaged communities.
P	 Most CDFIs remain small and are growing slowly. Their impact on disadvantaged 
communities is hampered by their limited scale and resources.
P	 In the face of current challenges, the sector is not achieving its full potential. 
P	 Although it is clear that there are weaknesses in the current capacity of CDFIs, 
there are differences in the performance of individual organisations. There are 
currently no performance standards for the sector and few CDFIs are able to 
demonstrate their full impact on either individual clients or the communities 
they serve. This lack of transparency is a problem that CDFIs have to address 
urgently. 
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P	 CDFIs acknowledge that sustainability is an important long-term objective; but it 
is currently not achievable for most. Sustainability may only be possible for those 
CDFIs that provide larger, secured loans for property or social enterprises. As 
such, sustainability must be seen as just one of a broader set of objectives.
P	 High initial expectations of CDFIs have resulted in some disillusionment with the 
sector among donors, policy-makers and investors.
P	 Government policy has not provided CDFIs with the support that they need 
to fulfil their potential. Government funding has been short term and patchy. 
Support from the financial sector has also been inconsistent and often limited. 
P	 Limited funding, a short-term outlook and inflexible policy mechanisms have 
stunted the development of CDFIs. As a result they are at risk of becoming 
victims of the ever-shifting policy cycle.
Overall, we found that CDFIs are at a critical juncture. Without renewed support 
the sector will become increasingly fragmented and weak. CDFIs could wither and 
many may disappear, providing another set-back to disadvantaged communities. 
With the right support from government, regional agencies, funders and banks, 
however, CDFIs could play a major role in addressing issues of access to finance in 
the UK.
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In 2005, 11.4 million people in Great Britain lived in households that were below the 
low-income threshold. With increasing wealth has come greater inequality. Poverty 
is now concentrated in specific geographic areas, where disadvantage is intensified 
by low skills, joblessness, and underemployment. In 2005, there were 2.3 million 
people who wanted to be in paid work but were not. Among the many factors 
contributing to the decline of disadvantaged neighbourhoods are limited access 
to finance and appropriate business support. Financial services institutions often 
withdraw from low-income communities. Language barriers, poor credit history 
and lack of collateral further contribute to limit access to finance. Enterprise and 
entrepreneurial activity are stifled in this context.
CDFIs have emerged in the past ten years to address financial exclusion and 
problems with access to finance for enterprises. Originally developed as agents of 
regeneration, creating both employment and empowerment through the provision 
of finance to local enterprises, CDFIs were designed to create a positive cycle 
of investment, redevelopment and opportunity by seeding change through the 
provision of capital. This, in turn, would support disadvantaged individuals and 
facilitate the development of local enterprise, employment and wealth creation. 
CDFIs were intended to show that the unbanked and marginalised were bankable, 
and that by providing a portfolio of loans a sustainable model of operation could 
eventually emerge. This model relied on a virtuous cycle of increasing scale built on 
high rates of repayment, realism in setting appropriate interest rates, and sufficient 
high-quality referrals. 
Ambitions for the CDFI sector are rooted in the potential to address the problem 
of under-investment that affects areas of disadvantage. People living in areas, 
characterised by financial deprivation, poor public services, low-quality housing 
and limited infrastructure, are more likely to be isolated and without opportunities. 
These ‘neglected neighbourhoods’ are often constrained from responding to 
economic stagnation and decline due to problems of poor skills and economic 
inactivity, compounded by bank branch closure and the lack of available finance for 
enterprise. As nef’s Small is Bankable report put it in 1998 ‘the neighbourhoods that 
have the most telling need for capital… have least access to it’.1 The report went on 
to outline the benefits that CDFIs could bring to local communities.  
The Social Exclusion Unit (SEU), established by the Prime Minister in 1997, emerged 
from the Government’s desire to tackle issues of social exclusion relating to 
poverty and disadvantage. The resultant work by Policy Action Teams 3 and 14 on 
enterprise finance and personal financial exclusion guided UK policy to support 
community finance initiatives, including CDFIs, credit unions and the provision of 
basic bank accounts by retail banks. The subsequent Social Investment Task Force 
(SITF) envisaged CDFIs as a means for ‘entrepreneurial value creation’ in deprived 
communities. Inspired by international experience, notably in the US, community 
finance initiatives were championed as pioneering approaches to enterprise-led 
regeneration. The influence of the more developed Community Development 
Finance (CDF) sector in the US served as a benchmark for the aspirations of 
introduction
The UK has experienced an unprecedented period of sustained 
economic growth over the past 14 years, with the fastest rise in GDP 
per capita of all G7 economies since 1997. Despite the increasing 
wealth of British society – which has made many better off – there 
remains a persistent group of socially excluded individuals who are 
living in poverty. 
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stakeholders. Policymakers anticipated that CDFIs could operate sustainably and 
achieve the scale to have a meaningful impact on social deprivation. 
Policy support for the sector resulted in the provision of funding to enterprise-
lending CDFIs through the Phoenix Fund, the establishment of the CDFA and the 
CITR credit for investment. These measures have brought us to a point where, 
according to the CDFA’s 2005 report, Inside Out, CDFIs have financed over 18,000 
businesses and people.2 CDFIs have created 11,000 jobs and sustained another 
88,000, while the finance provided has levered £285 million of funds from other 
sources. Approximately 80 CDFIs have been established across the UK, and the 
sector has achieved a high degree of diversity.
Government policy is increasingly focused on the effectiveness of CDFIs. While 
the experience of some individual CDFIs has been examined, a general review 
of the sector has not yet been carried out. It is timely to assess the current state 
of enterprise-lending CDFIs; the withdrawal of the Phoenix Fund and the shift of 
responsibility from central government to RDAs suggest a change in policy. Further 
developments, such as the proposed revision of CITR and the Commission for 
Unclaimed Assets’ plans for a Social Investment Bank, are also significant for CDFIs.
The relatively small scale of CDFIs and issues of sustainability have contributed to 
a policy atmosphere that questions whether they have the capacity to achieve all 
that has been hoped for. Attention has increasingly focused on whether CDFIs can 
capably deliver cost-effective services, reach target groups, and distribute loans at 
the scale required to create social change. Funding streams are increasingly tied 
to targets, which are viewed as a test of whether the sector can realise its potential. 
There are very high expectations for the sector; it is still young and has been 
faced with short-term funding sources and diverse policy objectives. In addition, 
CDFIs take a variety of legal forms, thus complicating regulation and performance 
measurement. In light of these changes, the direction of policy for enterprise-
lending CDFIs is not clear.
This report focuses on the enterprise-lending activities of CDFIs. At an 
organisational level there is blurring between personal, enterprise and social-
enterprise lending, with many CDFIs engaged in multiple activities. With support 
from the Growth Fund, CDFIs are increasingly moving towards the provision of 
personal lending. The original intention, however, was that CDFIs would act as 
catalysts for enterprise in deprived areas through community-based entrepreneurs 
who had been overlooked by mainstream finance providers.
The object of this report is to review the state of community development in 
the UK in order to document what policies are effective in bringing about social 
change. We assess the current state of enterprise-lending CDFIs to determine 
how these organisations are faring in light of their original development as a tool 
for regeneration. We focus our analysis on the policy level and operating context 
shaping CDFI outcomes. At this critical phase in the evolution of CDFIs, it is 
necessary to take stock and evaluate what CDFIs have achieved. 
We consider the strengths and weaknesses of CDFIs and draw upon international 
experience to outline the current challenges and opportunities for the UK sector. 
Policy to develop the UK community finance sector has regularly drawn upon 
international examples. Community finance in the US and Western Europe is 
reviewed to determine effective models and lessons relevant to the UK sector. 
Our research addresses the following key questions:
P	 Have CDFIs in the UK effectively addressed issues of access to finance?
P	 Can CDFIs be sustainable? What size of organisation is appropriate for the 
communities they serve? Are expectations for the sector appropriate?
P	 What are the implications of the current direction of policy for CDFIs? How do 
they fit within the broader approach to enterprise and regeneration?
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P	 What do the lessons from CDFIs in other countries tell us about future policy 
choices for the UK? 
Section 1 reviews the broader UK context of the sector and its origins, focusing 
particularly on regeneration, enterprise policy and housing factors that impact 
CDFIs. Section 2 considers the current state of the UK community finance sector, 
including findings from interviews and an in-depth policy survey. Section 3 
considers lessons learned from the international experience of community finance 
in the US and Europe. Section 4 presents our conclusions and recommendations. 
This report provides a timely contribution to the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
CDFIs. The need for a review is particularly relevant as CDFIs are at an important 
stage in their development.
Our findings have implications for future policy recommendations and the broader 
understanding of the impact of the CDFI sector. 
Research method
We completed this report with support from the Hadley Trust, using a variety of 
research methods. The findings are a product of extensive secondary research on 
the UK and international context. To further inform our UK findings, we completed 
in-depth interviews with 19 CDFIs. We carried out a policy survey seeking the views 
of a wider group of CDFI practitioners as well as other significant stakeholders in the 
sector, including policy-makers, banks and related financial institutions, charitable 
foundations, and government representatives. We distributed this survey to 143 
organisations in the UK community finance sector and received a 38 per cent 
response rate. 
We also conducted a review of the US and Western European community finance 
sectors, interviewing selected US and European organisations. These interviews 
incorporated first-hand experience of the local operating environments and helped 
to identify the issues or practices that were particularly effective and relevant to 
this analysis. In total, we carried out over 40 interviews with UK, US and European 
CDFIs, with 8 to 10 interviews in each region.
We have included ten case studies of community finance initiatives in the US 
and Western Europe to highlight the different features of community finance 
organisations, their target groups and core activities in order to identify those 
aspects of their operation integral to creating successful interventions in deprived 
communities. 
We enlisted the support of the Woodstock Institute, a Chicago-based think tank 
with significant experience of the sector, to carry out a review of the US community 
finance sector. In addition, with the CDFA, we visited over 30 US-based CDFIs in 
Chicago and New York in October 2006 to explore the current themes and issues 
relevant to this sector. The findings of these in-depth, face-to-face interviews have 
been incorporated into our analysis.
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The effectiveness of CDFIs is influenced by a range of other factors that have 
direct impact on disadvantaged individuals, including social exclusion, enterprise 
policy, social housing, and benefits payment. We review aspects of these issues 
that shape the operating context and outcomes that CDFIs achieve in low-income 
communities. 
social exclusion in the UK
Social exclusion in the UK results from multiple factors that create a lack of 
opportunity for individuals. Unemployment, poor skills, economic inactivity, low 
income, family breakdown, crime, weak institutions, poor infrastructure, and 
limited services together restrict options and isolate residents of disadvantaged 
communities. In the early 1990s, these problems were exemplified by 
unemployment rates in excess of 10 per cent, the highest teenage pregnancy rate 
in Europe, and rising crime and inequality. In 1997, when Labour came to power, 4.8 
million adults were suffering from multiple factors of disadvantage – including low 
income, low educational attainment, dependency on benefits, and poor mental or 
physical health. 
Because of the increasing problems of unemployment and child poverty, the Labour 
Government launched the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) in 1997. This broad approach 
was adopted to begin to tackle issues of neighbourhood decline, educational 
failure, and poor skill development. Housed at the former Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the SEU adopted a cross-cutting approach to policy solutions, before being 
replaced by the Social Exclusion Task Force (SETF) in June 2006. 
The policy focus on social exclusion has meant that the situation in the UK has 
moderately improved. Child poverty has fallen by 800,000 individuals since 1997. 
The number of people living in households below the low-income threshold has 
dropped by 2.5 million. The proportion of low-paid workers, the number of young 
people failing to reach educational standards, and the number of people who want 
to be in paid work but are not have all fallen in the last decade. 
However, problems of multiple deprivation continue to exist. Pockets of disadvantage 
and poverty are concentrated in certain geographic areas, notably urban inner city 
centres, coastal and selected rural communities. Inequalities associated with class, 
income or deprivation are pervasive and can be found in all aspects of health, from 
infant death to the risk of mental illness. The most recent child poverty figures for 
2005/6 show that 2.8 million children live in low-income households, an increase of 
100,000 over the previous year. The UK has a higher proportion of its population in 
relative low income than most other EU countries: only six have a higher rate than the 
UK. One-third of all people in low-income households are now working-age adults 
without dependent children (3.5 million people).3
The Government objective to address social exclusion has resulted in a number of 
policies to target deprivation in communities.
1. the broader context: regeneration, enterprise  
policy and housing in the UK
In this section, we present the wider issues shaping the context 
in which CDFIs operate. CDFIs have evolved to address problems 
of limited access to finance for enterprise in disadvantaged 
communities. Access to finance, however, represents just one issue 
contributing to decline and under-investment.
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enterprise-led regeneration
The Government’s commitment to reducing social exclusion has resulted in policies 
to promote entrepreneurship in disadvantaged communities across the UK. Policy-
makers have focused on enterprise as a way of increasing national productivity, 
securing full employment, and narrowing the gap in economic wealth between 
different regions. The current Government views enterprise as a means of achieving 
sustainable economic development, growth and regeneration in deprived areas. 
Enterprise policy seeks to address pronounced gaps in entrepreneurial activity, as 
well as higher failure rates for businesses based in disadvantaged areas. A strategy 
of promoting new businesses was designed to create economic opportunities and 
jobs; and to contribute to innovation, growth and productivity. 
UK policy on enterprise development in disadvantaged areas has evolved from the 
ideas of Professor Michael Porter of Harvard Business School. Porter established the 
Initiative for a Competitive Inner City in 1994 to spark the revival of inner cities by 
bringing market-based approaches to economic development in these distressed 
areas. A focus on enterprise through Enterprise Zones and support for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) was promoted as an alternative model in areas of 
industrial decline. Policies that build on this concept in the UK include the City 
Growth strategy and a retail-led approach to regeneration. 
Enterprise-led regeneration often focuses on the stimulation of scalable high-
growth enterprises. This policy supports a range of finance initiatives, such as 
the Small Firms Loan Guarantee, regional venture capital funds, and enterprise 
capital funds. These initiatives were intended to improve access to finance for 
small to medium-sized growth businesses. Development of a national Business 
Link support network was also part of a strategy to support growing businesses 
in order to create jobs and to promote a thriving economy. However, it has not 
necessarily resulted in enterprises that remain rooted in communities, create 
local opportunities, provide training, and generate a positive cycle of regeneration 
through local procurement. 
The benefits of enterprise-led regeneration can be seen as wider than job creation. 
They include improving local service provision, building supply chains, and creating 
local economic multipliers that increase the local tax base, improve the physical 
environment, invest in the community and build social capital. For individuals, 
enterprise creation can mean enhanced income, improved job satisfaction and 
a better quality of life. While many small-scale start-up enterprises fail in the first 
one to three years, the resultant skill development, empowerment and business 
experience can significantly improve an individual’s employability.
Experiences of enterprise-led regeneration have revealed the problem of how to 
target the disadvantaged effectively and the need to think beyond employment as 
a simple target. Narrow ambitions for regeneration based on employment creation 
and enterprise growth fail to capture the full benefit that targeted interventions can 
bring through skill development, training and business support. The need for the 
development of skills, networks, training and social infrastructure is reflected in the 
work of CDFIs.
In disadvantaged areas, enterprise should be understood as a micro-level activity. 
The enterprises most in need of support are not likely to be high-growth; they 
are more likely to remain local, with benefits accruing accordingly. Enterprise and 
entrepreneurship in the context of disadvantage are not likely to fit the classic 
concept of high-flying entrepreneurs. They are, rather, a reflection of the need of 
disadvantaged people to work, to control their income, to build skills and to move 
away from dependence and vulnerability.
enterprise for all
Enterprise policy also focuses on expanding economic opportunity for 
disadvantaged individuals and under-represented groups. The policy of ‘Enterprise 
for all’ is used by the Government to address gaps in enterprise creation that exist 
between different regions, as well as between men and women, and individuals of 
different minority groups.
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This latter focus is relevant to disadvantaged areas, particularly in inner cities, 
where there may be higher proportions of ethnic minorities. Policies such as the 
Local Enterprise Growth Initiatives (LEGI), the establishment of Women’s Enterprise 
Units, and the Ethnic Minority Business Forum reflect concern to ensure equality of 
opportunity and to address market failures in enterprise start-up.
As the Enterprise for All Coalition has suggested, enterprise encompasses 
businesses with social missions, entrepreneurial not-for-profits, and low or 
no-growth lifestyle businesses rather than just high-growth ventures.4 This 
policy approach understands enterprise more broadly to include other forms 
of entrepreneurial activity, including self-employment and social enterprise. 
Entrepreneurship is seen as the ability to take action, to seize opportunities and to 
marshal resources to achieve positive outcomes. 
Individuals in disadvantaged communities may engage in enterprise in the 
absence of preferable employment alternatives. This form of entrepreneurship can 
be described as a will to make things happen and to take initiative to improve 
one’s well-being, something not addressed by a high-growth and job-focused 
regeneration policy.
The perception that economic activity in disadvantaged areas is simply restrained 
assumes a broad capacity and a latent desire for entrepreneurship. While there is 
significant entrepreneurial potential in disadvantaged communities, in reality there 
are multiple barriers to enterprise creation that perpetuate inequality. In addition to 
problems of access to finance, the following factors have been identified:5
P	 There is a relatively poor climate for entrepreneurship in the UK.
P	 Many people have a poor and limited understanding of enterprise in its various 
forms.
P	 Certain groups, individuals or areas are unable to access appropriate support to 
enable start-up and development.
P	 Internal barriers exist, such as language, confidence, cultural background.
P	 Start-up can take a long time, and requires appropriate support and funding
It is clear that the availability of appropriate and high-quality business development 
services, amongst other non-financial services, is critical in this context. Effective 
interventions may require tailored, individual support that is both intensive 
and costly. In this respect, CDFIs are not simply providers of capital to micro-
entrepreneurs; they can also generate human capital appropriate to the context of 
disadvantage.
Under-investment in deprived communities
Significant attention has been paid to the challenge of under-investment in 
disadvantaged communities. Problems experienced by both existing and start-
up enterprises in low-income neighbourhoods in accessing finance are well 
documented. There is a clear need for alternative sources of finance to combat 
the failure of the market to meet the needs of ethnically diverse, self-employed 
or start-up enterprises. These businesses often lack equity and collateral, as well 
as management expertise or the financial savvy to deal confidently with bank 
employees. For minority entrepreneurs this may be exacerbated by a difference 
in culture and language. As banks increasingly withdraw from disadvantaged 
communities, there is further aversion to financing start-ups and enterprises in 
these areas, which are viewed as unprofitable and more risky. 
Micro and small firms represent a substantial contribution to the UK economy. 
Almost 73 per cent of UK businesses are sole traders with no employees. 
They generated £190 billion of combined turnover in 2004. Together with small 
businesses (0 to 49 employees) these enterprises represent 99 per cent of the UK 
business stock, employ almost half of the working population, and represent 37 per 
cent of total turnover.6
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Because of their importance to the economy, the Bank of England monitors the 
level of commercial bank lending to small businesses.7 These annual reports 
indicate that lending to small firms nationally has improved since the 1990s, 
suggesting that access to finance is not of great concern for small businesses 
generally. Changes within the banking sector, however, have made it more difficult 
for businesses in disadvantaged communities to access bank credit. 
Increasing competition and a growing drive for profitability have resulted in 
consolidation in the UK banking sector, reducing the number of regional and local 
institutions. The drive to maximise profits has meant that relatively low-margin 
activities, such as lending, are de-emphasised. Banks are reluctant to finance very 
small business loans given the high transaction costs of appraising and securing 
such loans. Banks increasingly use credit-scoring techniques for small-scale loans 
and new clients. Customers thought to be risky, such as those based in deprived 
areas, are more likely to be denied credit or forced to pay higher interest rates. A 
Bank of England report confirms that businesses in deprived areas represent a 
greater credit risk on average, based on the number of accounts in unauthorised 
overdraft. The margin on small business lending in deprived areas is higher that of 
lending to small business generally across Britain.8
Lending to small businesses in deprived areas was £1.97 billion at June 2006, 
representing 4.4 per cent of the national total.9 The deprived postcodes represent 
5 per cent of total sectors in Britain. They are largely concentrated in urban areas, 
where one might expect a higher level of business activity. However, the total 
number of loans and overdrafts in deprived areas decreased to 55,856 in 2006, 
down from 56,841 in 2003. While the value of term loans increased year on year 
from £836 million in 2000 to £1.7 billion in 2006, the value of overdrafts has 
remained relatively static at approximately £300 million since 2000. Similarly, the 
number of business accounts in deprived areas has increased by just 26,000 since 
2000. In the year ending June 2006, bank lending to small businesses in deprived 
areas grew by less than the total lending to small businesses across Britain. 
Further, these figures do not provide an indication of the problems experienced in 
accessing finance for individuals without capital or credit history, issues for many 
start-up businesses in deprived communities.
Another issue of access to finance is branch closures. Banks are distancing 
themselves from disadvantaged communities. Many banks no longer have a 
physical presence in low-income areas, making loan application and assessment 
increasingly difficult for local entrepreneurs. Branch networks of both banks and 
building societies have been in continuous decline since the 1980s. Research 
published by the University of Nottingham found that Britain’s least affluent inner 
cities and traditional manufacturing areas have lost more local high street branches 
than any other area since 1995.10 Lack of availability of bank branches has clear 
negative consequences for low-income customers and local businesses. Britain’s 
poorest communities have been the hardest hit.
Small enterprises and start-ups in deprived communities are often lifestyle or family 
businesses. These businesses are typically not high-growth enterprises, and may 
lack detailed accounts and knowledge of mainstream banking practices. The Bank 
of England found that income from self-employment is lower among businesses 
based in deprived areas than elsewhere. Fewer self-employed people in deprived 
areas have personal current accounts, and of those that do, fewer have a separate 
business account.11 Small-business owners from deprived areas are less likely to 
own their own homes, and if they do, these properties are likely to be worth less. 
The Bank of England report surveyed bank managers who confirmed that these 
factors are likely to have a negative impact on the ability of a business to access 
bank finance. These micro-enterprises may be on the margins of mainstream 
finance, requiring intensive support and training prior to being investment-ready. 
These businesses are most likely to have financing needs that can be best met 
through CDFIs.
According to research carried out by nef in 2003, micro-enterprises, both registered 
and unregistered, experience the largest access to finance gap.12 They are less 
likely to seek external finance than small businesses, and face higher failure rates 
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when approaching banks. Informal-sector micro-enterprises provide income for 
some of the poorest families in the UK, including immigrant families. While small 
businesses are increasingly better banked, banks still decline a significant number. 
These could be bankable through the more relationship-driven and risk-tolerant 
approach to business lending adopted by CDFIs. In addition, ethnic-minority-owned 
businesses, particularly Afro-Caribbean and Bangladeshi, along with women-owned 
businesses face particular difficulties when it comes to raising bank finance. 
Finally, there is a significant market for CDFIs among the unemployed interested 
in starting a business. Based on the proportion that seek out the self employment 
option under the New Deal, nef estimates that 10 per cent of unemployed people 
are interested in starting their own business. This suggests that of those 2.3 million 
people who wanted to be in paid work in 2005, but were not, an estimated 230,000 
could be potential micro-entrepreneurs if they were given support to develop a 
business idea. These micro-enterprises are niche markets for CDFIs. There is a clear 
need for more effective and targeted business support combined with access to 
higher-risk loans.
community finance and enterprise
Evidence of under-investment in disadvantaged communities indicates that 
access to finance is a critical problem for a selected group of small and micro-
enterprises. A large body of evidence points to bank withdrawal from disadvantaged 
communities; an absence of targeted business support; and a high-growth-focused 
enterprise policy as reasons why small or minority-owned businesses miss out. In 
this context, CDFIs, in partnership with other institutions, have a key role to play.
CDFIs in the UK are diverse. They offer a range of products, have different target 
clients, and take a variety of organisational and legal forms. The trade association for 
CDFIs, the CDFA, defines these entities as ‘sustainable, independent organisations 
which provide financial services with two aims: to generate social and financial 
returns’. It describes their purpose as two-fold: ‘providing capital and support to 
individuals or organisations’, and ‘to develop and create wealth in disadvantaged 
communities or underserved markets’.13 This definition reflects the current and 
potential role of CDFIs, including the growing emphasis on personal financial 
inclusion. 
The initial goals set out for CDFIs focus on their potential to spark entrepreneurial 
regeneration. This enterprise focus is central to the recommendations of SITF: 
’The CDFIs considered in this report focus specifically on financial services for 
businesses and social economy organisations rather than personal use….The 
primary activity of a CDFI is lending or investing in community revitalisation.’14 
Government funding from the Phoenix Fund, as well as the creation of CITR, also 
centred on the objective of CDFIs to promote enterprise creation and to develop 
business skills. Initial membership of the CDFA also reflected this enterprise-lending 
focus, with over 80 per cent of CDFIs specialising in enterprise lending, whether to 
micro businesses, SMEs or social enterprises. 
CDFIs were originally developed as models for local enterprise lending. The 
approach that this entails has led CDFIs to provide training and skills to micro-
entrepreneurs. The provision of business-support services is crucial to the CDF 
sector as it is a key enabler of micro-entrepreneurs who are often in need of highly 
tailored training and skills. The expense of such provision and the relationship it 
involves is an impediment to the mainstream banking sector providing credit to this 
sector.
We explore the current state of the sector in Section 2, and review how CDFIs have 
evolved in light of the initial expectations and the policy context.
the role of housing and property for community finance
The social housing sector, a key institution in many disadvantaged communities, 
is important to the activities of CDFIs. Both organisations have beneficiaries in 
common and share objectives to promote financial inclusion, skill development, and 
the regeneration of low-income communities; 84 per cent of financially excluded 
households are either housing association or council tenants.15 The activities of 
CDFIs overlap with the housing sector on several fronts. Improving financial literacy, 
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personal money management and limiting predatory lending are addressed by 
many housing associations that seek to control rent arrears. Some CDFIs provide 
affordable loans to facilitate housing repair, such as home-improvement loans 
or equity-release schemes, which help to improve the local housing stock.16 
CDFIs may also offer financing for social housing through small or co-operative 
associations. In this respect, the objectives of CDFIs overlap with those of housing 
associations, providing a strong basis for collaboration and collective action. This 
is underscored by the formation of Communities England, a new housing and 
regeneration agency that brings together delivery of these services. 
CDFIs in the UK have been limited in the extent to which they can expand to 
finance housing and property. The Government has applied restrictions to property 
investment through the CITR tax credit, prohibiting accredited CDFIs from investing 
these funds in residential accommodation. There are also restrictions on the amount 
of investment that an accredited CDFI can make in non-residential property with 
CITR funds. For example, CDFIs are restricted from investing in certain types of 
property development. CDFIs may, however, be involved in lending for property 
purchase to facilitate asset building by charities or social enterprises. As such, 
they can play a key role in fostering community asset building. Purchase of a non-
residential property by a charity for redevelopment and community use has proven 
to be an important lending area, particularly for larger national CDFIs. 
Credit for home-building, mortgages and property redevelopment have been key 
drivers for the CDFI sector in the US. While expectations of the potential of CDFIs 
in the UK have rested on the scale of the US sector, the importance of housing 
in developing sustainable lending models has often been overlooked. Strategic 
partnerships and diversification of products and services through property are 
potential avenues for increasing impact and the availability of finance to CDFIs. 
Partnering with social landlords provides new sources of funding and positive 
opportunities to reach target groups. Increasing the financing of property by CDFIs 
allows for secured lending, product diversification, higher average loans sizes, and 
reduced portfolio risk. It expands opportunities for income generation, thereby 
encouraging sustainability. Other potential product areas include loans to housing 
associations, financing of property development or re-development, mortgages, and 
lending for asset transfer.
CDFIs in the UK are likely to remain limited in the extent to which they engage in 
property finance. Since the 1988 Housing Act, housing associations are primarily 
financed through private financial institutions on a commercial basis to buy and 
develop property, suggesting a limited role for CDFIs in this area. Yet it is clear 
that new forms of property investment could enhance the strength of CDFI loan 
portfolios, allowing them to achieve higher rates of operational self-sustainability. 
Attempts to exploit the complementary aspects of CDF and housing are increasingly 
being explored.
supporting institutions: development trust associations,  
local authorities, and Rdas
The communities that CDFIs target are served by a range of institutions seeking 
to support enterprise, local economic development and regeneration. CDFIs are 
independent organisations that form part of a network of stakeholders with common 
objectives. Development trust associations (DTAs), local authorities, and RDAs 
are key institutions that overlap with CDFI activities, whether to provide funding, 
technical support, referrals, or strategic oversight. The links between CDFIs and 
these organisations vary in the degree of collaboration, as well as the effectiveness 
of partnership. It is clear that these institutions, particularly local authorities 
and RDAs, will play an increasing role in the future direction of the sector as 
responsibility for funding and support is devolved to local level. In light of this trend, 
CDFIs are likely to enhance partnerships with local or regional institutions.
As community-owned and led organisations, DTAs are well-placed to work in 
partnership with CDFIs to develop enterprise, to build local assets and to enhance 
community prosperity. There are 385 DTAs in the UK involved in the economic 
and social regeneration of communities through the provision of investment and 
support. These organisations are independent and not-for-profit, and are funded 
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through a mix of grants and earned income. Activities of DTAs include property 
development, provision of managed workspace, development of community 
businesses, community transport, employment training, and building restoration. 
Over half of all DTAs are based in rural or semi-rural environments, such as market 
or coastal towns or former coal-mining areas. However these associations are 
also found in inner cities, housing estates, and urban communities. In facilitating 
enterprise development, community asset transfer, and redevelopment, DTAs 
regularly work in partnership with CDFIs to secure funding. An example of this 
collaboration is the Adventure Capital Fund (ACF), a CDFI set up in partnership with 
the DTA.
RDAs play an increasing role in the funding and strategic management of 
CDFIs, particularly following the post-Phoenix Fund devolution of responsibility 
for CDFIs from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in April 2006. There 
are currently nine distinct RDAs in England whose objectives are to further 
economic development and regeneration; to promote business efficiency and 
competitiveness; to enhance employment skills; to improve job creation; and 
to contribute to sustainable development. RDAs have been tasked with funding 
CDFIs and promoting a region-wide strategic framework for community finance. 
The level of engagement of RDAs with CDFIs varies across each region, resulting 
in inconsistent commitment to funding, technical assistance and long-term 
development. We examine the implications of RDA oversight for CDFIs further in 
Section 2. It is clear, however, that the current policy context encourages RDAs to 
tHe Benefits tRap
The Government commitment to ‘Welfare to Work’ encourages the unemployed and those who receive state benefits 
to empower themselves through employment; it considers work to be the best route out of poverty. The ‘Make Work 
Pay’ agenda is a move to focus on employment as opposed to state aid as the solution to poverty and exclusion. 
Benefits become in-work tax credits, income support is dependent on job-seeking, and policy seeks to avoid the 
creation of a dependency culture at all costs. 
Unfortunately, getting people back into work and reducing poverty can be conflicting aims. The integration of state 
aid into the earnings and tax system has an unwelcome outcome: the benefits trap. The policy of gradual reduction 
in benefits as earned income rises reduces not only income support, but housing and council tax benefit, and even 
school meals provision. For some individuals, moving into work or better pay can mean the loss of these important 
sources of assistance. This discourages employment by eroding a large part of the increase in earnings. This benefits 
trap, exacerbated by low pay, affects the unemployed, those in low-paid work, and those in the informal economy.
Evidence on the effectiveness of a ‘Welfare to Work’ policy, such as through the Working Family Tax Credit, indicates 
that only small increases in employment have resulted. Meanwhile, for some low-income groups at high risk of poverty 
and exclusion, the cost of employment or better-pay has become higher because of the reduction in support.
CDFIs share the objective of increasing employment and income through enterprise and are therefore subject to the 
benefits trap challenge. They seek to reduce dependency on the benefits system through increased employment 
and reduction of informal, insecure work. Evidence suggests that choosing to work or starting an enterprise can be 
inhibited by the fear that the transition will require a costly sacrifice: the security of benefits. The employment options 
on offer tend to be low-paid and insecure, and the process of getting back on benefits when work dries up can be 
slow and uncertain. CDFIs are trying to encourage entrepreneurs to start up new businesses. Yet new enterprises 
frequently begin with risky and fluctuating returns. Benefits are an important form of ‘insurance policy’ for risky 
transitions into work or self-employment.
CDFIs can play an important role in building the bridge between welfare and work. Employment policy has a big 
impact on the effectiveness of CDFIs; the tax and benefit systems can discourage individuals from enterprise. General 
employment policy and the job-seekers system do not emphasise self-employment and enterprise in the way CDFIs 
do, despite the Government’s conviction that entrepreneurialism in disadvantaged communities is an important factor 
in regeneration. 
CDFIs are an element of the ‘Welfare-to-Work’ approach, providing a bridge for those who want to use self-employment 
to overcome exclusion. The support and close relationships provided by CDFIs are important to the success of their 
borrowers. This level of support can help individuals to overcome and manage concerns about loss of benefits. 
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play a larger role in determining future funding, and in supporting and promoting 
partnerships with CDFIs. The individual strategies of each RDA will have significant 
impact on the context in which CDFIs operate.
As local authorities are responsible for local services and economic development 
they play a key role in co-ordinating with CDFIs. They increasingly fund CDFIs 
that deliver key services as part of a LEGI or as part of other strategies to foster 
regeneration, enterprise development or financial inclusion. As leadership continues 
to devolve to local councils, the role of local authorities in funding local initiatives 
and public-service delivery continues to expand. CDFIs may increasingly look to 
local sources of funding and support, through referrals, partnerships, and service 
agreements. While this will act to further integrate CDFIs with their community, these 
relationships may prove complex for larger CDFIs seeking to enhance scale when 
their activities range across different local authorities. In addition, the strength of 
partnership with local authorities can vary significantly, depending on the priority 
given to developing this relationship. 
Partnership with local and regional institutions will become increasingly important 
for CDFIs. With diminishing national sources of funding, CDFIs must look to regional 
or local agencies for support. The effectiveness of CDFIs is likely to improve with 
strong links to local networks and integration with local development initiatives. 
CDFIs may seek out formal partnerships or service delivery agreements to 
increase their scale and impact. Better connection to local institutions can improve 
awareness and marketing of CDFI services, increase referrals and generate 
opportunities to share resources. 
In this section we considered the wider issues that shape the community finance 
sector. The effectiveness of enterprise-lending CDFIs is influenced by a range of 
other factors and institutions that impact the lives of disadvantaged individuals. 
These include social exclusion, enterprise policy, social housing, and benefits 
payments. These issues form part of the operating context and outcomes that 
CDFIs are likely to achieve in low-income communities. We also reviewed how 
enterprise-led regeneration and the policy of ‘Enterprise for all’ have shaped the role 
of CDFIs. 
Evidence of under-investment in disadvantaged communities indicates that access 
to finance is an ongoing problem for small and micro-enterprises. In this context, 
CDFIs have a key role to play in partnership with other institutions, such as housing 
associations, DTAs, local authorities and RDAs.
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At the same time, the CDFI sector has increasingly developed a mix of 
organisational models, providing a widening range of services. The policy focus has 
shifted from enterprise to personal financial exclusion. The funding environment 
reflects this change, with the Phoenix Fund, a key source of funding for enterprise-
lending CDFIs, closing in March 2006. CDFIs are beholden to the changing policy 
environment and funding patterns as the sector is still young and has not yet 
achieved financial independence. Many are trying to adapt by preparing for private 
investment, by forming new partnerships, or by expanding into other areas of 
service provision. A specialist focus on niche markets is essential to enable CDFIs 
to realise future growth.
In light of this changing context, we review the current state of CDFI operations 
and their effectiveness. The diversity of the sector makes it important to examine 
a range of experiences and perspectives. The strengths and weaknesses of 
CDFIs are examined to determine the implications of the current direction of policy 
and assess how CDFIs are responding. We address a range of issues including 
sustainability, scale, funding, and regulation, as the sector reaches a critical stage in 
its development. Our objective is to review of the state of CDFIs in the UK in order to 
begin to document what policies are effective to bring about social change.
expectations
Initial backing for CDFIs was based on their role of supporting enterprise 
development and creating economic opportunity for disadvantaged communities. 
While disadvantaged areas suffer concentrations of poverty and inequality that 
discourage private investment, they are also home to enterprising individuals with 
significant potential but without access to capital and management expertise. 
CDFIs were viewed as key instruments in bringing loan capital to those unable 
to access mainstream finance or those excluded from high street banks. By 
promoting enterprise creation, CDFIs were designed to tap into the latent initiative 
of disadvantaged communities, resulting in entrepreneurship, empowerment and 
wealth creation. 
At a policy level, certain factors are considered key to the objectives of CDFIs, 
namely to address poverty and exclusion. These expectations are the basis on 
which the effectiveness of CDFIs is judged and stem from a belief in the capacity of 
enterprise to empower the excluded and to drive economic regeneration.
Expectations of the performance of CDFIs – in terms of potential growth and their 
ability to become sustainable – have determined the form and manner of funding 
and support provided to the sector. Not all expectations have been met. Initial 
optimism for the sector’s ability to achieve these expectations, and the subsequent 
disappointment, have overshadowed the real achievements of CDFIs. 
A key expectation for CDFIs, based on international experience, was their ability 
to become sustainable, to finance their operations through income generated 
2: community finance in the UK
The CDFI sector has reached a critical juncture. Government policy 
is increasingly focused on whether the CDFI sector is effective. 
Issues of sustainability, funding, scale, regulation, performance 
measurement, and professional capacity are relevant in this context. 
Expectations of scale and sustainability regularly shape funding 
decisions. 
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on loans. CDFIs that diversify their portfolios and limit default rates could, it was 
assumed, move towards sustainability.17 Expectations of sustainability guided 
the decisions of key funders, including the Government, banks and charitable 
foundations, and formed the basis for assumptions about future financing of 
the sector. As part of the conditions of funding, CDFIs were often expected to 
demonstrate sustainable business plans.
Additional motives exist for encouraging a business-like approach and targeting 
sustainability. Apart from financial discipline, the autonomy that sustainability 
permits was viewed as an important mechanism to overcome a ‘culture of over-
dependence’. It was feared that excessive reliance on charitable giving and public 
funding would stifle entrepreneurialism and crowd out other finance.
While the possibility of achieving sustainability is open to debate, it is clear that the 
sector is not yet there. In 2005, the CDFA developed a ratio of operational self-
sustainability (OSS) to measure the amount of an organisation’s costs covered 
from earned revenue, which indicated that the average level of sustainability for the 
sector was 36 per cent.18 CDFIs demonstrated a range of sustainability rates based 
on loan portfolio and range of services provided. The OSS ratio in 2005 included 
sustainability levels ranging from a low of 0.22 per cent to a high of 123 per cent, 
but nearly half of CDFIs had ratios of less than 20 per cent. Similarly, in 2004, a 
nef analysis of rates for CDFIs providing micro-loans showed that most had limited 
outreach and were not covering their operating costs.19 A recent review carried 
out by Small Change for the South East Enterprise Development Agency (SEEDA) 
confirmed a wide variance in sustainability rates in CDFIs based in the South East, 
with only the largest social enterprise lenders achieving this objective.20 Neither 
enterprise lenders nor personal lenders have achieved more than 60 per cent 
operational sustainability according to best-case outcomes. In reality, CDFIs with 
smaller loan portfolios are likely to have operational sustainability of less than  
20 per cent.21
Many CDFI business models will not achieve sustainability. Certain lending models 
and activities preclude this objective. Small personal and micro-enterprise loans are 
costly to administer and generate less interest income. CDFIs are social enterprises 
that target a client group that banks find unprofitable. These clients require costly 
business support and training for which they are unable to pay. 
Key expectations foR tHe sectoR:
P	 access to finance: CDFIs can provide a relationship-based lending model to address demand for finance from 
those excluded from mainstream banks.
P	 enterprise for regeneration: CDFI lending will stimulate enterprise development to promote the regeneration 
of deprived areas.
P	 sustainability: CDFIs should achieve sustainable business models within a reasonable timeframe, allowing 
them to cover the cost of operations and to reduce the need for grant funding.
P	 scale: CDFIs should grow lending operations to a sufficient scale to have a meaningful impact. 
P	 capacity building: CDFIs should develop into robust and well-managed organisations in order to ensure a 
professional and efficient approach to finance provision.
P	 private investment: CDFIs should move to private sources of finance in order to achieve scale and limit grant 
dependence.
P	 social impact: CDFIs should develop appropriate measures of their performance and social outcomes.
P partnership: CDFIs should link to a larger network of institutions (public and private) that contribute to efforts to 
overcome exclusion and disadvantage.
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A business approach to lending should not mean that CDFIs are expected to 
become sustainable at the cost of their social mission. International evidence 
indicates that many US and Western European community finance organisations 
have yet to become independent of grant support. Sustainability is determined by 
a number of different factors, not simply organisational form and ethos but also the 
markets served, the type of loans offered, and the organisational size and maturity. 
Sustainability may only be a possible for those organisations that engage in larger 
or secured loans for property or social enterprises. Cross-subsidy from fees or 
revenue on other activities, such as consulting services or attracting well-off clients, 
might support this objective. Fundamentally CDFIs serve hard-to-reach clients and 
provide a social service. They continue to require grant funding to carry out many 
aspects of their operations.
current state of the sector
The role of CDFIs is increasingly complicated by a changing policy context and 
different funding priorities. The basis for measuring outcomes, originally focused on 
the role of CDFIs as agents of enterprise and regeneration, has shifted to personal 
finance. CDFIs are involved in more than the provision of credit to micro-entrepreneurs 
and social enterprises. They are further diversifying to include personal lending, home 
improvement loans, development of community property trusts, equity investments, 
and in selected cases, savings accounts. CDFIs are leveraging front- and back-office 
services and are providing non-financial services, such as training and business 
development. Money advice and budgeting support, bill payment, debt counselling, 
and management of rent arrears are also being offered.    
Much of the CDFI sector is still new and varied. According to the CDFA’s 2005 
Inside Out report, over 40 per cent of CDFIs have been financing for less than two 
years. The report estimates that CDFIs have financed more than 9,500 businesses 
and individuals, leveraging an estimated £160 million in funds that have together 
sustained in excess of 85,000 jobs and created more than 10,000 new jobs since the 
sector’s emergence. As of September 2005, CDFI loan portfolios had grown to £181 
million. The coverage of CDFIs in the UK is by no means complete, and community 
finance is not yet of a scale to lend to all those who could benefit from it.
Several distinct trends are emerging in CDFI lending. the CDFA’s most recent sector 
report indicates an increase in the absolute value of lending across all markets with 
the exception of lending to medium-sized businesses (50–249 employees). While 
CDFI lending has traditionally been dominated by loans to micro-enterprises, this 
is diminishing. In 2004, 61 per cent of lending was to micro-enterprises (less than 
10 employees) whereas by 2005 it had dropped to 50 per cent. CDFIs are partly 
diversifying into loans to individuals, while loans to social enterprises are falling as 
a proportion of total business. While micro- and social-enterprise lending remains a 
core business for CDFIs, the proportion providing personal lending may soon double. 
A picture of a still-maturing sector emerges. The bulk of CDFIs are either less than 
two-years-old or between two- and five-years-old. In 2003 and 2004, CDFI start-
ups represented over 15 per cent of the sector but by 2005 there was only one 
start-up organisation. The proportion of CDFIs focusing on a single market fell from 
80 per cent in 2004 to 60 per cent in 2005. One motive for this diversification is the 
desire to operate in a more sustainable fashion. The data regarding sustainability 
has already been presented; however it is useful to recall the wide range of 
sustainability rates that was revealed. 
As CDFIs are responding to a new policy context, it is useful to consider briefly the 
policy context that shaped development of the sector.
policy context
Support for CDFIs emerged from the Government’s objective to reduce social 
exclusion. As part of this, Gordon Brown launched SITF in February 2000 to 
encourage private investment in enterprises in deprived communities. The specific 
remit of SITF was: ’To set out how entrepreneurial practices can be applied to 
obtain higher social and financial returns from social investment, to harness new 
talents and skills to address economic regeneration and to unleash new sources 
of private and institutional investment.’23  A practical framework for investment in 
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disadvantaged communities was proposed, promoting the establishment of the 
CDFA, the CITR, and the Bridges Community Development Venture Capital Fund.
The policy steps outlined in Table 1 helped to build the CDFI sector. The Phoenix 
Fund has since closed, and DTI oversight has been transferred to RDAs. In 
February 2006, HM Treasury agreed an additional £11 million of interim support 
for the sector. The CDFA and its supporters have emphasised the importance of 
this government funding.24 Since then, however, no new sources of government 
funding for enterprise lending have been committed and the future of support for 
enterprise lending remains uncertain. 
UK interview findings
This analysis captures the range experience of enterprise-lending CDFIs. nef 
carried out interviews to address a number of factors affecting CDFIs, from 
operational challenges to how they are affected by the funding and policy 
context. These interviews provide a snapshot of the current strengths and 
weaknesses of CDFIs in their efforts to support disadvantaged communities.  
We completed interviews with 19 CDFIs in the UK, selecting them on the basis 
of their ability to represent experiences typical to the sector while ensuring a 
sufficient breadth to reflect its diversity. A full description of our interview method 
is available in the appendices.
summary findings
The comments of CDFI representatives point to the changing nature of the 
policy context. CDFIs recognise that the sector has reached a crossroads and 
are uncertain about its future direction. A variety of issues were raised as critical 
to the operating environment and future development of the sector. 
P	 CDFIs identified instability of funding as one of the main challenges they 
face.
P	 There is general agreement among CDFIs that the sector has failed to 
communicate the value of its impact on disadvantaged communities.
P	 Most CDFIs feel that the policy environment is not conducive to their success, 
and that Government support has been unstable and too short-term.
P	 CDFIs acknowledge that sustainability is important but argue that it is not 
fully achievable for many organisations. Given the social outcomes CDFIs 
deliver, full sustainability may not always be possible, or desirable.
table 1: policy steps that helped to build the cdfi sector.
1997 The Government’s social exclusion Unit (SEU) is established to address poverty issues.
1999 policy action teams (PATs) on enterprise finance and financial exclusion make recommendations leading to 
development of the sector.
2000 The phoenix fund bidding rounds are initiated to channel finance to enterprise-lending CDFIs.
The social investment task force (SITF) is established.
2002 The community development finance association (CDFA) is established.
Bridges community development venture capital fund is launched.
community investment tax Relief (CITR) is enacted to channel investment to CDFIs.
2003 Over £42 million is awarded to 63 CDFIs in Phoenix Fund bidding rounds.
2005 17 CDFIs are accredited for CITR; £38 million is raised by 11 CDFIs.22
2006 The Phoenix Fund is discontinued; £11 million is made available for transition.
The responsibility for oversight and provision of funding to CDFIs devolved to Regional development 
authorities (RDAs).
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P	 CDFIs feel that the transfer of funding from government to RDAs has not 
been accompanied by a reasonable level of strategic understanding of the 
sector; some RDAs lack knowledge and understanding.
P	 CDFIs that provide business support agree that such support is not profitable, 
but view it as essential in ensuring the success of their clients.
P	 CDFIs believe that the quality and depth of existing business support 
services are inadequate because most providers have a limited 
understanding of the needs of their target markets.
P	 CDFIs have found it difficult to fund capacity building; external funding for this 
purpose is very limited.
P	 Though most CDFIs consider commercial funding central to their future 
growth, only a limited number felt able to attract and administer it.
P	 All CDFIs agree that there are no common measures or definitions and 
performance frameworks across the sector.
P	 Operational challenges noted by many CDFIs include achieving good deal 
flows, recruiting and retaining quality personnel, and generating enough 
income to achieve mission.
P	 CDFIs consider accessing sufficient funding for revenue and capital and 
resolving the uncertainty about the policy environment to be the two principal 
challenges facing the sector over the next five years.
To reflect the range of issues addressed, we have grouped the interview findings 
according to specific themes: strength of demand, business support, funding, 
impact and performance measurement, regulation, the engagement of banks, 
sustainability, and policy. 
Strength of demand
P	 Demand for enterprise lending is lower than expected.
P	 Other factors determine demand for loans, in particular the investment 
readiness of applicants and the provision of business support training.
P	 Relationships with other stakeholders, private or public, are key to generating 
referrals and improving demand.
P	 CDFIs use a variety of marketing tools, but strategies are limited by restricted 
availability of funding.
CDFIs have found that demand for enterprise lending is less than anticipated. 
The level of demand varies depending on geographic location, intensity of 
marketing, levels of competition, and the type of product offered; with personal 
loans achieving higher demand than business loans. CDFIs are keen to point out 
that the level of demand obscures the degree of development work involved to 
convert the desire for enterprise lending into viable loans. 
Some organisations receive a high number of enquiries and applications, but 
investment readiness (business support) is a key constraint for loan conversion. 
Many indicated that referrals from partner institutions are also crucial to the 
quality of demand. Other factors are important, such as competition from other 
lenders (including sub-prime lending); lack of awareness of community finance; 
and the ubiquity of credit card lending. CDFIs that convert higher proportions of 
queries into loans include training with the provision of finance. Increasing the 
scale of lending operations requires a commitment to providing non-lending 
services. One CDFI argued that ‘you will not get a steady deal flow (of enterprise 
loans) without providing support’.
CDFIs use a variety of marketing tools, but strategies are limited by restricted 
availability of funding. The use of websites detailing product offering and 
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application procedures, referrals from public and private organisations, and 
participation in relevant fairs and events are some of the marketing tools 
commonly used. However, most referrals have been achieved through informal 
relationships with key individuals in relevant institutions and not through formal 
agreements. 
Business support 
P	 Training and business support are important for the viability and effectiveness 
of community finance.
P	 Support to borrowers is critical but its expense limits sustainability for CDFIs. 
P	 Other forms of existing business support are often inappropriate to the needs 
of clients.
CDFIs consider non-lending services to be a fundamental part of access 
to finance. Over half of the organisations interviewed provide free business 
support services. CDFIs describe business support as critical in addressing poor 
financial literacy, limited business skills and lack of investment readiness. The 
manner in which training and development is achieved varies greatly. Of the 
CDFIs that do not provide business support, all have a referral mechanism in 
place for clients. CDFIs believe that other existing training and support providers 
lack understanding of the target markets they serve because of the highly 
specific needs of female or minority entrepreneurs, informal businesses and 
micro entrepreneurs. Some argue that the quality and depth of existing public 
business support services are insufficient.
Whether to provide non-lending services highlights the challenge that CDFIs 
face in allocating scarce resources. Are lending services unaffordable, or 
can CDFIs not afford to operate without them? The conversion of demand 
into lending can be improved by the provision of training. CDFIs that provide 
business support agree that while it is not profitable, it is essential in ensuring 
the success and sustainability of their clients. Explicit funding for this is very 
limited. Organisations that provide business support fund it either from their core 
funding or with a grant subsidy. CDFIs often lack the capability to demonstrate 
the cost and the value of business support provision and wrap such services 
into the overall cost of lending. 
Funding 
P	 CDFIs find the current funding climate unstable and short-term in its outlook.
P	 CDFIs have identified a lack of stable funding as one of the main challenges 
they face; this impacts their ability to grow and achieve sustainability.
P	 The closure of the Phoenix Fund is considered a backward step.
P	 Few CDFIs feel ready for private funding in their current state.
CDFIs face a funding environment marked by inconsistency; it is short-term and 
has unrealistic expectations. Most CDFIs feel that funders and policy-makers 
lack a true understanding of the products, services and methodologies they use 
to reach target markets. CDFIs have identified a lack of stable funding coupled 
with a supportive policy as one of the main challenges they face; this impacts 
their ability to grow and achieve sustainability. 
CDFIs believe that the sector is in ‘policy flux’. The Phoenix Fund represented 
one of the most important sources of funding for most enterprise-lending 
organisations. Its closure has given rise to considerable unease, due to the 
devolution of responsibility for funding and the absence of a clear replacement. 
CDFIs feel that the transfer of funding from government to RDAs has not been 
accompanied by a reasonable level of strategic understanding about the sector. 
The transition is seen by some organisations as weakening national CDFIs and 
imposing new costs on local and regional CDFIs, which must now build new 
relationships with RDAs.  
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CDFIs are aware that some of the funding problems they face are related to their 
own capacity limitations, such as a failure to communicate their achievements. They 
have found it difficult to fund capacity building, as external funding for this purpose 
is very limited. Most CDFIs find that there is little money from operations that can be 
used for this purpose.
CDFIs look to private sources of funding as their ultimate goal. Banks have provided 
grants, credit and loans that have ranged from commercial rates to interest-free. 
While some CDFIs have solicited private investment as part of a strategy to scale 
up, most felt that commercial lending terms were inappropriate to their needs, 
not just in terms of affordability but also due to their own limited ability to manage 
these obligations. Although most organisations agreed that commercial funding 
plays a pivotal role for their growth, some noted that they do not have the capability 
to absorb it, or that banks would not lend to them. Some CDFIs have diversified 
revenue sources by providing services that generate management fees. 
CDFIs point to the instability of public policy, suggesting that the Government 
abandoned a ’road that was two-thirds built‘, forcing practitioners to ’take their foot 
off the gas‘ prior to reaching maturity. Many cite the lack of government funds as 
evidence of a dwindling commitment to enterprise-lending CDFIs. Practitioners who 
argued that the Phoenix Fund closure was not very damaging developed a strategy 
to diversify their pool of funders; in particular through relationships with regional 
actors and the provision of personal loans. 
Inadequate funding to develop capacity is a source of frustration for CDFIs. They 
feel compelled to keep adapt to shifting policy contexts and changing priorities 
without support. The Phoenix Fund played a crucial role in enabling institutional 
development, but funding for capacity building is no longer easily accessed. CDFIs 
valued the simple reporting requirements of the Phoenix Fund, which gave them the 
ability to adapt and grow as their needs required. They contrasted this with a more 
fragmented current funding environment that has limited their capacity to meet their 
clients’ needs.
Impact and performance measurement
P	 CDFIs would like to see a common performance measurement framework.
P	 The absence of information on the impact of CDFIs means that there is a lack of 
transparency regarding their role in disadvantaged communities.
There is widespread disappointment at the sector’s inability to communicate the 
social outcomes achieved by CDFIs. Evaluation of the performance of CDFIs is 
limited by the absence of agreed measures and standards. The principal measures 
that are used include the number of businesses supported and the number of jobs 
created or sustained. Additionally, measures of financial leverage, enterprise survival 
rates and the level of repeat borrowing are utilised. Few practitioners have been 
able to engage in more formal, social impact evaluations. 
A consensus exists among CDFIs that common measurement frameworks are 
needed, but this is difficult to achieve due to their diversity and the limited resources 
that organisations can devote to this endeavour. All CDFIs agree that no common 
measures or frameworks of performance exist for the sector and that something 
must be done to tackle this. The work of the CDFA to build a performance 
framework was welcomed as much needed. Many practitioners indicated that any 
evaluation is often on an ad hoc basis driven by specific funder requirements. 
Importantly, our policy survey found high levels of agreement that CDFIs have a 
positive impact on disadvantaged communities. This was corroborated by non-
practitioners, supporting the conclusion that CDFIs make a significant impact 
through their work. Without appropriate performance measurement, however, they 
lack the capacity to demonstrate this. Figures 1 and 2 highlight these responses. 
Respondents emphasised the importance of CDFIs to disadvantaged communities 
(Figure 1). Non-practitioners agreed with the positive impact of CDFIs. However, 
they were more cautious in their level of agreement with this statement, perhaps 
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reflecting the uncertainty of available performance information. This speaks to the 
effectiveness of CDFIs, while confirming the need for better measures of outcomes 
achieved.
Similarly, CDFIs and non-practitioner groups are confident that the enterprises 
CDFIs support help to revitalise disadvantaged communities (Figure 2). Both 
groups gave a positive assessment of the impact of enterprises that CDFIs target to 
overcome disadvantage.
Regulation
P	 CDFIs are anxious that a one-size-fits-all regulatory regime would over-burden 
the sector and fail to account for the diversity of organisations.
P	 Non-CDFI representatives believe a regulatory framework would provide more 
strength and stability to the sector.












































































figure 2: Response to question ‘the enterprises cdfis support can make a real difference to revitalise 
disadvantaged communities’.
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P	 CDFIs are largely content with the current ‘light-touch’ approach. 
P	 CDFIs accept the need to improve the transparency of their operations and to 
increase the rigour of reporting procedures.
A difficult balance is required of a regulatory regime that can encompass the 
whole CDFI sector. Currently CDFIs are not monitored by one regulatory body. They 
take a variety of legal forms, commonly either an Industrial and Provident Society 
or a Company Limited by Guarantee. As such they file their results with different 
bodies. CDFIs are ambivalent about proposed changes to the way in which they 
are regulated. They are concerned about how regulation could be adapted to fit 
with their diverse character. Most are happy with the current legal and regulatory 
requirements they face and are concerned about whether a single legal status for 
CDFIs would be appropriate to such a mixed sector. 
No clear agreement is evident in their suggestions for an appropriate regulatory 
mechanism. CDFIs are anxious about burdening the sector through over-regulation 
at a premature stage of development. They recognise the need to build credibility in 
the eyes of backers and clients, but hope it would operate with a ‘light touch’. They 
are broadly supportive of the CDFA’s efforts to guide the debate on best practice 
and appropriate regulation. CDFIs largely favour a model of self-regulation in order 
to maintain the flexibility necessary to meet the needs of their target markets. A 
typical sentiment expressed by one CDFI was, ’we would not want to be over-
regulated. What is needed are benchmarks and best practice standards.’
The idea that regulation could over-burden the sector is less evident among non-
practitioners. This suggests that non-CDFI representatives believe a regulatory 
framework would provide more strength and stability to the sector. Unlike most non-
practitioners, CDFIs agree strongly with the statement that ’Guidelines exist on good 
governance and management of CDFIs to generate needed credibility’ Comments 
from non-practitioners emphasise that ’CDFIs are financial institutions and require 
regulation’. There is a divergence in expectations between the CDFIs and other 
stakeholders in the sector.
Figure 3 indicates that all groups consider the existence of guidelines on good 
governance to be an important factor for the credibility of CDFIs. However, non-
practitioner groups are less confident that these guidelines exist. This divergence 







































figure 3: Response to question ‘guidelines exist on good governance and management of cdfis to 
generate needed credibility’.
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CDFIs accept the need to improve the transparency of their operations and to 
increase the rigour of reporting procedures, in order to ’give comfort to funders‘. 
Most organisations agreed that either there are not enough standards for regular 
reporting or standards are not systematic enough. At the moment no common point 
of public disclosure for CDFIs exists. While most CDFIs believe that the CDFA is 
reasonably effective at reviewing and reporting on the performance of its members, 
it is faced with the challenge of a highly heterogeneous membership.
Currently there is no common understanding of best practice in the sector. 
The need for standards is tempered by the difficulty of imposing a single set of 
regulations on a young and diverse sector. An anticipated key benefit of agreed 
performance indicators is greater ease in reporting of key data. The uncoordinated 
reporting requirements of funders are very complex. 
Bank engagement
P	 The commitment of banks to the sector and their level of engagement are 
considered inadequate.
P	 CDFIs would like to see more systematic and long-term backing from banks, 
not just in terms of investment but also in terms of capacity support and referral 
relationships.
Many CDFIs are frustrated with local banks; they feel banks could do considerably 
more to engage with CDFIs, at little cost to themselves. This frustration is 
heightened by the failure of banks to implement commitments to partner with 
CDFIs. Comments indicate that, ’Banks are doing precisely as little as they can in 
order to satisfy the policy-makers’. In the absence of formal commitments to provide 
referrals, CDFIs feel constrained by the low investment readiness of applicants.
The relationships that CDFIs develop with other stakeholders are crucial to the 
quality of applications. Where CDFIs build effective referral relationships with local 
banks or other institutions they benefit from a better flow of viable applications. 
Referrals typically come from specific individuals in partner organisations rather than 
from formal agreements. 
CDFIs would like greater engagement from banks through an integrated approach, 
rather than intermittent funding and support. Several CDFIs were positive about 
the performance of individual banks in providing support to community finance. 
However, the majority of CDFIs were critical of their approach to disadvantaged 
communities. Banks are viewed as inconsistent. Even where positive relationships 
exist they are not replicated or formalised. CDFIs would like Community Banking 
Services to be part of a broader strategy and not just a subset of the Corporate 
Social Responsibility team. Most CDFIs believe that this requires some form of 
legislative obligation on banks, such as the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 
the US, to facilitate greater investment in disadvantaged communities. 
The most pessimistic finding of our policy survey concerns the contribution of 
banks to community finance. CDFIs and other stakeholders all gave a negative 
assessment of banks’ current engagement. Responses focused on how banks 
could contribute to provision of universal financial services to all members of 
society. These include development of a fair lending law; a CRA-style intervention; 
funding and stronger partnerships with CDFIs and business support agencies; and 
the alteration of banks’ risk criteria to minimise exclusion. Banks need to increase 
their support of the CDFA. They should cultivate robust relationships with CDFIs 
to invest for the long term, make referrals, and improve their capacity to support 
communities that banks themselves are unable to serve.
Figure 4 shows the high ranking of the importance of banks’ support, and a 
negative ranking (averaging below 2.5) for the current level of commitment from 
banks. This indicates that there remains a continuing gap in the extent to which 
banks are supporting and engaging with community finance.
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Sustainability 
P	 CDFIs emphasise the importance of sustainability to the long-term viability and 
effectiveness of community finance.
P	 For most CDFIs, however, sustainability is not achievable. 
P	 CDFIs believe that sustainability should not be used as the principal measure of 
performance.
P	 Scale is the preferred strategy of CDFIs to improve sustainable operation.
CDFIs are convinced of the importance of sustainability as a long-term goal. At the 
same time, most agree that sustainability is not achievable. CDFIs have to perform 
a balancing act between the financial pressures of operational sustainability 
and realising their social mission. For most CDFIs, the markets they target make 
it challenging for them to achieve sustainability given the high transaction 
costs involved; the intensity of business support; the required follow-up; and in 
some cases the cost of stimulating latent demand. As such, the value of using 
sustainability as an indicator of performance is questionable. 
The sustainability of most CDFIs depends on a host of wider issues. Most consider 
the presence of good deal flows as a crucial factor: this relies on effective 
stakeholder relationships with public and private institutions. The nature of a CDFI’s 
target market can determine how sustainable its operations can be. The operational 
capacity of a CDFI is critical to maintaining control of delinquencies and losses 
and relies on the presence of good quality management and staff. Continued 
external funding and support, especially in initial phases, is felt to be a key factor 
for sustainability. Long-term support is considered crucial to developing a strong 
presence in target markets.
Many CDFIs feel that the high interest rates or restricted client selection that 
sustainability would require conflicts with their social purpose. Even CDFIs that 
consider sustainability an achievable goal caution against an excessive focus 
on this outcome. Operational sustainability as an end point for the entire sector 
might render CDFIs indistinct from for-profit businesses, limiting their social value. 
CDFIs resist being measured by their level of sustainability because their mission 
necessitates lending with high transaction costs. CDFIs recognise this as inevitable, 





































figure 4: Response to question ‘commercial banks and other traditional financial intermediaries are 
committed to cdf and to the development of this market’.
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There is no consensus on whether sustainability is achievable and desirable. 
Targeting sustainability provides significant benefits apart from financial discipline; it 
also helps to preserve organisational independence, to increase the credibility of an 
organisation and to reduce vulnerability to changing policy priorities. 
There is also a lack of consensus among CDFIs about the provision of business 
support. Those CDFIs that provide support view it as a critical part of sustainability. 
It is considered essential to building the skills and credit-worthiness of borrowers 
and in so doing fulfils their mission and improves their loan portfolio. One CDFI 
explained that ’without this provision, there is no sustainability’. CDFIs that do not 
provide business support consider it important but impossible to provide without 
compensation or dedicated funding. In this case it is viewed as an additional cost 
that drags down the level of sustainability. One CDFI explained that ’in the long 
term it would reduce our capacity to be sustainable’. These CDFIs nevertheless 
recognise the need within their target group for business support, but feel that they 
cannot afford to provide it.
CDFIs are implementing strategies to increase their sustainability but struggle to 
overcome the constraints outlined above. Two factors mentioned are critical to this 
effort. The first is the potential to scale-up operations. Many CDFIs see enlarging 
operations as a means of developing cost efficiencies through increased loan 
volume, diversification of products, and the development of strategic partnerships. 
Scale is also a strategy to fulfil social mission by allowing CDFIs to maximise their 
outreach and impact. There are risks attached to this strategy, however. Greater 
scale poses a threat to maintaining local knowledge that ensures the quality of a 
CDFI’s loan portfolio. The skills deficit of the target market suggests that the cost 
savings of scaling-up operations may not materialise as expected. Economies of 
scale may not exist when carrying out intensive, relationship-based loan provision. 
The second factor considered crucial for sustainability is the policy environment. 
CDFIs feel that their credibility is affected by policy instability. It deters the 
establishment of appropriate partnerships, capacity building, and funding required 
to achieve sustainability. CDFIs question whether sufficient Government support 
exists to enable CDFIs to develop further, much less to achieve sustainability. Even 
those that believe the Government is sufficiently engaged with the sector perceive 
a shortfall in understanding of the specifics of their operating environment. Many 
believe that Government and funder expectations are unrealistic, diminishing the 
capacity of CDFIs to fulfil their mission by imposing inappropriate goals.
Policy context
P	 Support from Government has been unstable and too short-term. 
P	 There is widespread fear of Government disengagement from the sector and a 
loss of valuable policy expertise in the transfer of responsibility to RDAs.
P	 CITR in its current form is considered inflexible and unlikely to achieve sufficient 
investment for community finance.
P	 CDFIs are supportive of the CDFA but are concerned about whether it has the 
resources to confront all of the challenges the sector faces.
P	 CDFIs worry that they have lost credibility in the eyes of policy-makers.
Most CDFIs believe that the current policy context indicates a withdrawal of public 
support for community finance. Most feel that, at present, the policy environment is 
not conducive to community finance. Support from Government has been unstable 
and too short-term. 
Transfer of funding and strategy to the RDAs is perceived as a sign of 
disengagement. CDFIs lack confidence in the knowledge and expertise present 
at regional level. Comments tended to be critical. One CDFI argued that ’national 
government has walked away and the regions are without strategic support’. 
Another described policy for the sector right now as ’static, stagnant; there is no 
policy environment’.
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The low take-up of CITR was presented by CDFIs as evidence of policy-makers’ 
need to engage more effectively with the sector. While viewed as, ’a good and well-
intentioned idea in principle‘, its design currently renders it of limited relevance; it 
fails to meet the need of the broad range of smaller CDFIs. CITR is described as too 
restrictive and its requirements as onerous. CDFIs do not believe that investors are 
sufficiently aware of CITR, or that CDFIs are of a scale to make the return attractive.
Funding is considered too short-term. Too often, public funders fail to continue 
supporting a CDFI after a one-off contribution. They are focused on employment, 
revenue and financial measures to the detriment of assessing impact. CDFIs feel 
that these limitations derive from a policy approach that is too politically driven, one 
that is far removed from the challenges facing the sector. 
CDFIs are conscious of a credibility deficit: only a minority believe that funders and 
policy-makers perceive them as effective organisations. The reasons suggested for 
this negative perception are the absence of operational sustainability, low deal flows 
and a failure of the sector to communicate its impact. CDFIs feel that they and the 
CDFA should do more to improve the Government’s understanding of community 
finance; they believe that expectations of policy-makers are misguided, particularly 
with respect to sustainability. Respondents pointed out that the Government has 
’unrealistic expectations that the sector will be sustainable right away with some 
help, although no one is really measuring it’. 
When asked, most organisations expressed mixed views about the effectiveness 
of the CDFA. They noted its success in securing transition funding, but expressed 
concern about whether it will be able to advocate for greater long-term funding and 
changes to CITR. Some organisations fear that the CDFA may not have enough 
capacity to tackle all of the issues. Concern centres on whether the CDFA has the 
resources to develop engagement at both regional and national level, and whether 
it can provide sufficient strategic input to policy-makers. There is general agreement 
that the CDFA has the ’huge task‘ of advocating for policy. CDFIs acknowledge 
that the CDFA has taken significant strides to resolve problems of communicating 
impact through its efforts to build a performance framework for the sector. Remarks 
included, ’The CDFA is doing an excellent job.’ It was frequently noted that the 
CDFA is ’doing a good job and is getting better‘, in particular with the Inside Out 
publication and the survey that it undertakes.
The current policy environment has challenges. CDFIs proposed several 
interventions. CDFIs want to see policy-makers lift the emphasis on geographical 
deprivation and incorporate CDFIs into broader policies for social inclusion, 
including personal finance, social housing and insurance. Other suggestions 
included an appropriate national guarantee facility to foster investment in CDFIs  
and a UK equivalent of the CRA to stimulate more involvement from commercial 
banks.
policy survey findings
We developed the policy survey tool to seek the views of a wider group of CDFIs as 
well as other stakeholders in the sector, including: policy-makers, banks and related 
financial institutions, charitable foundations, and government representatives. The 
survey supports the interview findings as it draws upon a broader stakeholder group 
to highlight differences in opinion and areas of consensus on issues affecting the 
sector. 
We sent the survey to 143 individuals and received a response rate of 38 per cent 
with 54 respondents. Survey respondents comprised 22 non-practitioners and 32 
CDFIs. Of the non-practitioners seven were drawn from the banking sector, two 
from Government, four from charitable foundations, and nine from other supporting 
institutions. Through the interview and survey process, we have collected the views 
of representatives from 43 different CDFIs.
The results of the survey have been presented to reveal the views of CDFIs and 
other stakeholders on the sector, noting particularly where opinions diverge. To 
reveal the gap, if any, between the current reality of an issue and its relevance 
to the sector, the survey asked respondents to rank the importance of issues as 
compared to the current state of the sector. By grouping these findings by the type 
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of respondent a picture emerges of where expectations have not been met. It also 
permits examination of the difference in opinion between different stakeholder 
groups. 
The questions posed in the survey are available in Appendix D.
The analysis presents the rankings of agreement and importance for each question. 
The available responses for each question were: ‘Disagree’, ‘Somewhat Disagree’, 
‘Neutral’, ‘Somewhat Agree’ and ‘Agree’. We converted these to rankings, 1 to 5, 
which we used to generate radar diagrams. The diagrams compare the ranking of 
agreement with the ranking of importance for each question. The average ranking 
of agreement is represented by a blue line. The average ranking of importance 
for each question is presented as a blue area on the same graph. The gap 
between the shaded area, ‘Agreement’, and the blue line, ‘Importance’, provides an 
illustration of how far the current context falls short of stakeholders’ expectations. 
summary findings
P	 On most issues there is consistency in how CDFIs and other stakeholders (non-
practitioners) responded to the questions. 
P	 A divergence in opinion between CDFIs and other stakeholders was evident 
over the need for regulation of the sector. Those outside the sector felt a greater 
urgency for a regulatory structure. 
P	 CDFIs are thought to be effective institutions; 80 per cent of respondents 
emphasised their positive impact, critical role in tackling access to finance and 
importance in disadvantaged communities.
P	 The effectiveness and impact of CDFIs is hampered by their small scale. This 
means that CDFIs are not as effective as they could be.
P	 Although it is clear that there are weaknesses in the current capacity of CDFIs, 
there are differences in the performance of individual CDFIs.
P	 CDFIs are dissatisfied with the quality of ongoing government support and the 
current policy situation.
P	 There is ongoing concern that the Government will lose interest in the sector 
and withdraw funding.
P	 There is consensus on the importance of sustainability, but it is felt that this must 
be balanced against social outcomes.
P	 The mainstream financial sector is viewed as one of the key potential sources 
of funding for the expansion of the CDFI sector. The most vivid disappointment 
among respondents is the lack of engagement of the banks. 
P	 Over 70 per cent of CDFIs consider banks to be failing both the CDFI sector and 
its clients.
P	 The pattern of funding for CDFIs is fragmented; it lacks a clear strategic basis 
and is currently not measuring up to what is necessary.
P	 CITR was described by 77 per cent of respondents as ineffective and suffering 
from design flaws.
P	 Changing political cycles reduce the focus on CDFIs as important mechanisms 
for enterprise lending.
The findings of the policy survey are grouped according to the issues addressed: 
Vision, Policy, Effectiveness, CDFIs, Sustainability, Regulation, Government, Banks 
and Funding.
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Vision
P	 CDFIs and other stakeholders agree that CDF is not recognised as an important 
part of the financial system.
P	 There is a continued lack of awareness of CDFIs and the challenges they face.
P	 CDFIs can be effective mechanisms to bring about change in disadvantaged 
communities by addressing access to finance issues, but there is still some way 
to go to realise this potential. 
This section of the survey focused on the strategic vision of key actors and 
their understanding of the sector (Figure 5). The term ‘key actors’ refers to CDFI 
representatives, policy-makers, funders, regulators and sector representatives. 
Confidence in the current level of strategic vision and engagement with the sector 
is limited. CDFIs feel that while key actors may be familiar with CDFIs, this does 
not result in appropriate action to support and advance the sector. Numerous 
comments from respondents highlighted a continued lack of awareness of CDFIs 
and the challenges they face. One individual noted, ’The role of CDFIs is probably 
insufficiently appreciated.’ Another observed, ’The community finance message is 
still below the radar screen, and it is not well communicated.’ Some questioned 
whether stakeholders really grasp the needs and difficulties of the market that 
CDFIs serve: ’I am not convinced that everyone recognises the difficulty that a small 
proportion of entrepreneurs have in accessing finance.’ Respondents highlighted 
that despite the rhetoric, supportive policy often fails to materialise. 





























Q1 Community Development Finance (CDF) is recognised 
as an important part of the UK financial system.
Q6 Key actors use common standards for measuring CDF 
performance.
Q2 CDF is recognised as an effective means to address 
access to finance and bring about regeneration and  
local development.
Q7 Key actors recognise the importance of the diversity of 
CDFIs in order to respond to local market conditions.
Q3 CDFIs are viewed as social enterprises balancing their 
social mission and business activities.
Q8 Key actors recognise the need for a balance between 
economies of scale and the ability to retain genuine 
local/community links.
Q4 Key actors understand that entrepreneurs in deprived 
areas want and need rapid, simple access to financial 
and non- financial services.
Q9 Key actors recognise that business support, along 
with finance, is a key component in ensuring a CDFI’s 
success in achieving its mission.
Q5 Key actors recognise that the socially and financially 
excluded are good clients, repaying their loans on time.
Reconsidering community finance 31
Policy
P	 CDFIs are more negative about the current policy climate than other 
stakeholders.
P	 CDFIs are ambivalent about whether interest rates should be set high enough to 
cover the costs of loan provision.
P	 Only 4 per cent of CDFIs agreed that CITR is well designed to generate 
more finance and investment; 77 per cent of all respondents viewed CITR as 
ineffective and suffering from design flaws.
Survey questions examined the significance of the policy context and its 
effectiveness (Figure 6). Respondents were asked how the CDFA, the CITR, and 
broader public policy, such as the benefits system, impacted outcomes of the 
community finance sector. 
The survey findings are not positive about the current policy environment. CDFIs 
provide a particularly negative assessment. This is evident in their dissatisfaction 
with the quality of government support. One individual noted, ’The demise of the 
Phoenix Fund and devolution to RDAs has led to an inconsistent approach to 
funding the CDFI sector.’ Another observed, ’I think the Government is supportive, 
but it has now moved on to the next new and interesting thing.’ In some areas, 
such as CITR and employment policy, non-practitioners shared CDFIs’ negative 
perception. Some comments reflect this. ’The CITR does not help achieve 
sustainability.’ ’There are complexities in its operation which can be discouraging.’ 
’CITR is a valuable tool, but for a comparatively mature sector.’ CDFIs are more 
supportive of the CDFA as a ’strong trade association‘ than non-practitioners. 
The findings also indicate a limited willingness among CDFIs to charge ’interest rates 
needed to cover the high costs of making small loans‘ (Q7). This finding provoked 
CDFIs to comment that ’passing on high interest rates defeats the purpose of 
assisting the target market‘ and, separately, that there is ’no point the CDFI just being 
a loan shark!’ This frustration concurs with the interview findings, which suggest that 
CDFIs believe many key actors have a limited appreciation of their social mission.





























Q1 The UK policy environment is supportive of CDF. Q5 The Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) is well 
designed to provide finance to CDFIs.
Q2 CDFIs, their goals, diversity of structures and  
finance delivery mechanisms are well understood  
by policymakers.
Q6 The CITR helps CDFIs to achieve sustainability.
Q3 The CDFA is a strong trade association that 
effectively represents its members’ interests.
Q7 CDFIs can and are willing to charge the interest rates 
needed to cover the high costs of making small loans.
Q4 Appropriate tax treatment is provided to encourage 
the development of CDF.
Q8 The structure of the benefits system facilitates 
the work of CDFIs to encourage disadvantaged 
individuals to engage in enterprise.
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Effectiveness
P	 CDFIs are believed to have a positive impact on disadvantaged communities, 
are critical institutions in addressing access to finance, and support enterprises 
that can make a difference, as emphasised by 80 per cent of respondents. 
P	 Only one in three CDFIs agreed that they are now ’of a scale to make significant 
impact on enterprise within disadvantaged communities’.
P	 The overall impact of CDFIs is hampered by their small scale. CDFIs are not as 
effective as they could be.
This section considers whether those involved in the sector believe the contribution 
of CDFIs to be an important part of the regeneration of disadvantaged communities. 
CDFIs are considered effective institutions. Their positive impact, critical role in 
tackling access to finance and importance to disadvantaged communities was 
emphasised by 80 per cent of respondents. However, findings indicate that the 
effectiveness and overall impact of CDFIs is hampered by their small scale. CDFIs 
are not as effective as they could be. 
Concerns emerged about whether current CDFIs can build a sector that is effective 
and of a scale to make a significant impact. Comments emphasised the youth of 
the sector, warning that ’some CDFIs are trying to run before they can walk‘. ’CDFIs 
are growing but they are still very new in their history, their reserves and their ability 
to be sustainable.’ The diversity of CDFIs was highlighted to suggest that most are 
’too small, scattered and worried about their own survival and meeting the terms of 
their funders to be focused on the most effective way of tackling financial exclusion‘. 
Other stakeholders echoed these concerns, some of whom suggested that ’there 
are too many CDFIs that do not have sufficient critical mass for sustainability.’ There 
was also concern about the immaturity of loan portfolios and the comparatively 
narrow product range on offer. Others were more critical, stating ’Generally CDFIs 
are badly managed, inefficient, non-professional. Unsurprising in a young sector, but 
aspirations are not set high enough.’ However, another pointed out, ’Most CDFIs in 
the UK will need more funding assistance to develop.’ And ultimately, ’CDFIs remain 
the last point of call for communities susceptible to financial exclusion.’

























Q1 CDFIs are effective institutions for the provision of 
finance and non-financial services to enterprises in 
disadvantaged areas.
Q4 The enterprises CDFIs support can make a real 
difference to revitalise disadvantaged communities.
Q2 CDFIs have a positive impact on disadvantaged 
communities.
Q5 CDFIs have strong links to their local communities.
Q3 CDFIs are critical institutions to address financial 
exclusion.
Q6 CDFIs are now of a scale to make significant impact on 
enterprise in disadvantaged communities.
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CDFIs
P	 There are weaknesses in the current capacity of CDFIs, particularly in 
establishing and meeting financial and operational standards.
P	 The diversity of organisations makes a general assessment of CDFI operations 
difficult. There are differences in the performance of individual CDFIs.
This section examined whether CDFIs are operating in the best manner. The 
capacity, growth and operational standards of CDFIs were considered to determine 
how effective these factors are (Figure 8).
The capacity of CDFIs is considered insufficient, both by CDFIs and a broader 
range of stakeholders. Respondents agreed that as CDFIs develop they need to 
offer a wider range of services to their target markets. Although it is clear that there 
are weaknesses in the current capacity of CDFIs, respondents found it difficult to 
generalise about the organisational performance of the sector. 
There is wide variance in the performance of individual CDFIs making a general 
assessment of CDFI operations difficult. ’There are varying levels of achievement.’ 
One respondent noted, ’Some CDFIs have moved into the norming stage of 
development, and a very few are beginning to perform.’ Another confirmed, ’Some 
CDFIs will be exemplars of good practice, but there are equally many that do 
not attain such standards.’ Respondents highlighted that the quality of boards 
of directors can vary significantly, with many individuals acting in the capacity of 
volunteers. 





























Q1 Board members of CDFIs have the vision, capacities 
and clarity needed to support CDFIs in becoming strong 
institutions with significant reach and impact.
Q6 CDFIs that are not able to meet the industry standards for 
successful operation stop their activities.
Q2 CDFIs are scaling-up and are mobilising resources to 
develop the sector.
Q7 The CDFI sector has a strong core group of institutions 
that represent best practice.
Q3 CDFIs are strengthening their institutional capacity 
and are training their staff to build a business-like 
organisational culture.
Q8 As CDFIs develop they offer a wider range of services to 
their target markets.
Q4 CDFIs have agreed common financial & operational 
performance standards that serve as the criteria for 
government and donors in providing financial support.
Q9 CDFIs serving high-risk entrepreneurs have built 
organisations and loan-delivery systems that enable 
profitable operations.
Q5 CDFIs have agreed common social impact standards 
that serve as the criteria for government and donors in 
providing financial support.
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Sustainability
P	 Sustainability is a long-term goal for community finance in the UK.
P	 However, 90 per cent of CDFIs believe that, ’sustainability should be judged 
against social outcomes, which may justify some level of use of grants and 
subsidies.’
The interview findings show that there is disagreement about sustainability (Figure 
9). This set of questions examined how significant sustainability is as an issue and 
whether grants to CDFIs are still considered legitimate. The importance of scale to 
sustainability and impact was also raised.
The importance of sustainability was widely shared. However, there is still significant 
debate on this topic. The complexity of the issues was highlighted: ’Although scale 
is crucial to sustainability, scale does not result in sustainability.’ ’Sustainability will 
not be able to be achieved in certain markets.’ Another noted, ’Sustainability of any 
finance provider is essential, however penalising the target market with high interest 
rates increases the potential for failure and bad debts.’
Though there is belief in sustainability, it is felt that this must be balanced against 
social outcomes. One bank representative argued that while CDFIs need to be 
large enough to generate income to cover operating expenses, the nature of their 
work means that ’it is wholly acceptable that public sector grant funding is used to 
subsidise this area of work‘. Others agreed that ’grants could be used to improve 
customer training and business skills’.
Disagreement centred on the extent to which sustainability is an appropriate aim. 
Some comments identified the need for sustainability to insulate CDFIs from shifts 
in the political climate. It was also argued that there is a need for CDFIs to further 
diversify their activities. Others considered grant finance to be essential and justified 
as it reflects the social benefits that CDFIs provide: ’Given the nature of their work 
to engage with vulnerable people in society, it is wholly acceptable that public grant 
funding is used to subsidise activities.”  





















Q1 With the right support, CDFIs could be of a scale to 
make significant impact on enterprise in disadvantaged 
communities.
Q4 A CDFI’s sustainability should be judged against its 
social outcomes, which may justify some level of use of 
grants and subsidies.
Q2 Greater scale is critical to achieving a higher degree of 
sustainability.
Q5 In the future CDFIs will increasingly adopt non-grant 
forms of finance.
Q3 It is important for CDFIs to achieve operational 
sustainability.
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Regulation
P	 Stakeholders feel a greater need than CDFIs for a common regulatory structure 
to be put in place.
P	 CDFIs should be more transparent about their operations in order to demonstrate 
their effectiveness.
P	 CDFIs fear regulation that would over-burden the sector.
As the sector matures, there is growing demand for a single regulatory regime to 
cover CDFIs. This section examines how the current regulatory requirements for 
CDFIs are viewed; and whether they are considered appropriate and effective. 
The survey findings indicate overall dissatisfaction with the current level of 
regulation (Figure 10). Stakeholders, such as funders and policy-makers, advocate 
a stricter regulatory system. However, CDFIs feel a more stringent regulatory 
regime would pose significant risks. They commented that guidelines seeking 
to encompass the needs of different CDFIs would be problematic, risking ’over-
burdening‘ the sector, whereas a ’light touch…has to be right at this stage‘. CDFIs 
are anxious that it would reduce their adaptability to local needs.
Stakeholders disagree. They indicated that the credibility of CDFIs is in question and 
that transparency is limited. ’If CDFIs are to attract private finance then a credible 
regulatory framework together with good governance are required.’ One bank 
commented that the onus has to be on CDFIs to develop greater transparency and 
rigour in their operational procedures, a fact recognised by CDFIs in the interviews. 
Others were blunt in their assessment, arguing that as financial institutions 
CDFIs ’require regulation‘. A key practical obstacle remains the diversity of the 
sector, though it was acknowledged that this is largely a product of the different 
characteristics and needs of target markets. 





















Q1 Legal and regulatory structures exist to ensure 
soundness and stability of CDFIs. 
Q4 Guidelines exist on good governance and management 
of CDFIs to generate needed credibility.
Q2 A self-regulating legal system for CDFIs would be 
appropriate.
Q5 The legal and supervisory framework for CDFIs 
responds well to the different sizes and structures of the 
organisations.
Q3 There are sufficient and appropriate reporting 
requirements for the CDFI sector.
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Government
P	 Over half of CDFIs believe that the devolution of oversight for the sector to RDAs 
has had a negative impact.
P	 Stakeholders are concerned about the Government’s ongoing commitment to 
the sector.
This section examined how effectively the Government has supported the sector 
and whether specific policies have had a positive impact on community finance.
Findings for the role of Government reveal a difference in opinion between CDFIs 
and other stakeholders over the Phoenix Fund and the shift to RDAs (Figure 11). 
CDFIs were much more supportive of the Fund, considering it well designed and 
effective at meeting the needs of the sector. 
CDFIs were far less convinced than other stakeholders that devolution to RDAs will help 
the sector. ’The jury is still out on the devolution of funding to RDAs.’ Only one comment, 
from a supporting institution, welcomed the transfer of responsibility to RDAs because it 
would place oversight closer to the communities in which CDFIs operate.
However, there was a large gap between the importance given to government 
policy and the extent to which respondents felt that it was supportive. One 
respondent noted that ’government policy appears to be back-tracking, having 
achieved success with the Phoenix Fund.’ Another argued that ’most interventions 
have been poorly designed, forcing CDFIs to lend out money within a very short 
time limit to match government budget cycles.’ 
There is significant concern about the future commitment and direction of policy. 
CDFIs are disillusioned with government support, as they also indicated in the 
interviews. There is ongoing concern that the Government, ’will lose interest in the 
sector and reduce funding’. The short-term nature of funding and other support was 
highlighted. Respondents observed that ’the best thing the Government could do 
for the sector is to actively promote and support it in the long term.’

























Q1 Government bodies responsible for financial sector 
policy-making assist CDFIs by providing supportive 
policies and financial resources.
Q5 The Growth Fund is well designed and effectively meets 
the needs of the sector.
Q2 Government funding of CDF has been positive and 
effective.
Q6 The devolution of oversight to RDAs has been a positive 
step and will improve the sector’s ability to address 
problems of access to finance.
Q3 
Q4
Government has given appropriate attention to  
increasing the institutional capacity of CDFIs.
The Phoenix Fund was well designed and effectively  
met the needs of the sector.
Q7 In building policies, regulations and incentives for 
CDFIs that serve the financially excluded, policymakers 
encourage a wide range of institutions to build sound, 
responsive financial services for the financially excluded.
Reconsidering community finance 37
Banks
P	 Over 70 per cent of CDFIs consider banks to be failing both the CDFI sector 
and its clients.
P	 The mainstream financial sector is viewed as one of the key potential 
sources of funding for the expansion of the CDFI sector. The most vivid 
disappointment among respondents is the lack of engagement of the banks. 
The mainstream financial sector is viewed as one of the key sources of funding 
that could build the CDFI sector to sufficient scale. This section of the survey 
considered the role of banks and whether they are fulfilling their potential to 
engage with the sector (Figure 12).
The lack of support from banks is a disappointment. ‘As profit driven 
organisations we can only really expect window dressing from banks, which is 
what we get.’ Banks ’make the right noises‘ but provide little actual funding. In 
addition, banks are cited as ’disclosing nothing‘ about activities in disadvantaged 
communities, while ’excluding the majority of our clients from opening a bank 
account’. Commercial banks are also cited as being ’poor at referral of potential 
CDFI clients’. A greater obligation upon banks to CDFIs is favoured by the 
findings of the survey. This area of enquiry showed the highest gap between the 
importance of an issue and its current status. 
CDFIs did identify the positive relationships that some banks have cultivated. 
’Some banks have recognised the need to develop clear strategies for assisting 
CDFIs to meet their target markets.’ However, a frequent complaint was that 
the rhetoric of commercial banks’ involvement is ’significantly at odds‘ with the 
reality, particularly in terms of providing funding, developing appropriate and 
systematic referrals mechanisms and disclosure of lending. Comments by 
other stakeholders echoed the disappointment in the commitment of banks 
and cited the CRA in the US as a potential mechanism to improve the current 
situation. ’The US community finance movement benefited from the Community 
Reinvestment laws. Unfortunately there is no such legislation in the UK. This is a 
major problem.’

























Q1 Commercial banks and other traditional financial 
intermediaries are committed to CDF and to the 
development of this market.
Q4 Commercial banks are proactive in seeking to partner 
with CDF initiatives.
Q2 Traditional financial institutions increasingly recognise 
CDF as a potential market, and try to serve it.
Q5 Commercial banks provide significant funding and 
support to the CDF sector.
Q3 Commercial banks have undergone the significant 
changes in attitudes, organisation and lending 
technologies that enable them to play major roles in CDF.
Q6 Commercial banks keep and disclose sufficient 
information about the markets they serve.
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Funding
P	 Survey respondents are critical of the current funding climate.
P	 Practitioners are pessimistic over the capacity of funders to provide resources 
according to the needs of CDFIs.
P	 Just 10 per cent of CDFIs agree that funders ’have in place cost-effective, non-
bureaucratic mechanisms that enable support for institutions’.
CDFIs are adapting to the winding up of the Phoenix Fund, previously the single 
most important source of funding. This section examined how stakeholders believe 
CDFIs should respond to this situation, and what forms of funding should be 
promoted. It also considered how well funders are supporting the sector.
According to a majority of respondents, the pattern of funding lacks a clear 
strategic basis and is currently not measuring up to what is necessary. A picture 
of fragmented and uncoordinated funding emerged. Funders are described as ’in 
withdrawal‘ and CDFIs are increasingly pessimistic about future funding. CDFIs’ 
major complaints focused on funding being too short-term and on the onerous 
reporting requirements. One CDFI indicated that ’as much as 15 per cent of staff 
time can be devoted to dealing with funders, particularly overly bureaucratic 
reporting.’ 
However, CDFIs did indicate that classing all funders together is not appropriate. 
Some individual funding organisations have been very supportive. ’On the whole 
grant funders have been pretty good and generous with the CDFI sector in the UK.’ 
Also some major private charitable funders were cited as ’having their act together‘ 
with better understanding of the nature of the market, the ability of local CDFIs to 
deliver, and the risks that are involved early in their development. But a coordinated 
approach remains necessary. 

























Q1 Funders see that CDF is about long term investment in 
people and institutions, rather than short-term projects.
Q4 Funders understand that many different methodologies 
and legal structures provide effective CDF services to the 
financially excluded.
Q2 CDFIs are able to access appropriate funding to allow 
increased outreach and growth.
Q5 Funders have in place cost-effective, non-bureaucratic 
mechanisms that enable support for institutions.
Q3 CDFIs are now moving towards non-grant forms of 
finance.
Q6 Funders provide financial and other support in a form that 
fosters increased institutional capacity.
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conclusion
The shortfall between expectations for the sector and its development to date 
poses risks. The findings support the effectiveness of CDFIs in disadvantaged 
communities. Despite this, the relative youth of the sector along with its limited 
scale and sustainability threatens to undermine the policy and funding commitment 
to further development. Public support for grant funding will dwindle if the outcomes 
of CDFIs are not evident. CDFIs are increasingly expected to attract private 
investment funds. 
CDFIs are facing new challenges. The devolution of oversight to RDAs and the end 
of the Phoenix Fund have been problematic. Policy incentives are changing. The 
Growth Fund is an example of new priorities which require CDFIs to demonstrate 
sustainability as part of a business plan.25 CDFIs are suffering from the short-term 
nature of policy cycles, which mean that they are no longer at the top of the agenda. 
Changing political emphasis reduces the focus on CDFIs as important mechanisms 
for enterprise lending. There is the additional concern that funders are applying a 
time horizon that is too short to allow CDFIs to realise their objectives. Operational 
challenges related to limited capacity also exist. Funding for capacity building and 
technical development is scarce and not consistently provided. Staff training and 
retention, IT infrastructure, and management training are important parameters that 
influence the effectiveness of CDFIs and should not be overlooked. 
The level of ongoing commitment from the Government is a key concern for 
the sector. Support for community finance from key actors, such as funders and 
policy-makers, is vital to ensure further development. In addition, the measures 
by which success or failure are evaluated need to be based on legitimate goals 
and timelines. Sustainability as a prerequisite of the operation of CDFIs needs 
to be judged against social impact. Sustainability may not be a realistic goal for 
many organisations. Without additional grant support, these CDFIs will very likely 
disappear.
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community development finance in the Us
The CDFI industry in the US has emerged in the past three decades as public 
and private sector institutions responded to gaps in access to financial resources 
in distressed lower-income and minority urban and rural markets. As mainstream 
financial institutions failed to serve these communities, CDFIs developed as niche 
institutions serving very specific markets and needs. They specialise in developing 
products and services that provide access to retail bank accounts, affordable 
housing finance, and small business capital while placing a strong emphasis 
on building the capacity of the markets they serve through high levels of hands-
on financial-literacy training, housing counselling, and entrepreneurial technical 
assistance.  
summary findings
The US has been a point of reference for development of the UK community finance 
sector. It has been in existence for much longer and achieved greater size, scale 
and diversity of products. In general, CDFIs in the US are better integrated with 
strategies and institutions for regeneration of low-income communities. Despite its 
success, community finance in the US continues to struggle with issues of capacity, 
sustainability and scale. There are key lessons to be learned from community 
finance in the US:
P	 Although the CDFI industry in the US is dwarfed by the mainstream financial 
services industry, the sector plays a significant role in filling gaps in access to 
financial resources to underserved markets.
P	 The bulk of CDFI dollars loaned go to housing-related activities, such as 
affordable housing development and mortgage lending.
P	 In its early years, the CDFI industry in the US was largely capitalised with 
government or foundation resources, which have continued to play a key role to 
support the sector.
P	 The CRA served as an incentive for banks and thrifts to provide low-cost loans 
and investments to CDFIs, which were able to leverage these resources to 
finance activities that mainstream institutions found too risky.
P	 CRA regulation has played a significant role in developing a robust commitment 
from banks. The CRA has provided the foundation for investment and 
partnership of banks with CDFIs in the US.
P	 Another key factor was the federal government’s establishment of the CDFI Fund 
3: lessons from international experience 
This section focuses on the experience of community finance in 
the US and in Europe. The UK community finance sector has drawn 
from examples from other foreign contexts, particularly the US. For 
this reason, we review community finance in the US and in Europe 
to determine effective models and lessons relevant to the UK 
sector. We review international case studies to outline the current 
challenges and opportunities facing these sectors, and what this 
tells us about future policy choices for the UK. 
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in 1994 in the Department of Treasury. The Fund provides financial grants and 
technical assistance awards to CDFIs.
P	 Recently, sources of capital have been a particular concern. Government funding 
for the CDFI industry has been consistently threatened in recent federal budgets. 
Foundation support has waned and become increasingly competitive.
P	 Banks increasingly provide CDFIs with additional competition for markets and 
resources. Many mainstream lenders are focusing resources on lower-income 
and minority markets.
P	 CDFIs have specialised in and focused on different niche markets to maximise 
impact and realise growth through specific expertise.
P	 The industry has moved to better use data and standardised systems of 
evaluation to document the state and impact of the industry and of specific 
CDFIs.
P	 A key challenge for the CDFI industry going forward is the issue of scale and 
sustainability. Many CDFIs that serve hard-to-reach populations are not fully 
sustainable, and continue to rely on grant funding.
structure of the sector
The CDFI industry is made up of a diverse set of institutions that to varying degrees 
provide a mix of financial products, services and capacity building to disadvantaged 
communities. The four basic types of US CDFIs are:
1. Community development banks
2. Community development credit unions
3. Loan funds 
4. Venture capital funds
Community development banks and credit unions are regulated financial institutions 
with the ability to take deposits and offer loan products. Community development 
banks are for-profit entities whose focus is to provide targeted lending and 
investment geared towards the redevelopment of distressed communities. The 
main source of capital for community development banks is deposits received from 
individuals and institutions and government grants, deposits, and investments. 
Community development credit unions (CDCUs) are non-profit co-operatives that 
provide affordable financial services to individuals without traditional bank accounts 
and help these individuals develop assets. CDCUs specialise in providing low-cost 
deposit accounts in communities not served by mainstream financial institutions 
and often extend credit at more flexible terms. CDCUs are primarily capitalised by 
member deposits, but also receive capital investments from other sources, such 
as mainstream financial institutions. CDCUs offer consumer loans, vehicle loans, 
mortgages, and small business loans to distressed markets and often lead the way 
in product innovation. CDCUs were among the first institutions to offer low-cost, 
short-term consumer loan products to compete with high-cost payday lending 
operations.  
Community development loan funds are not depository institutions, but are non-
profit organisations that leverage investments by outside sources such as banks, 
corporations, and government agencies to provide lending for small business 
development, housing, micro-enterprise, or community facilities in distressed 
markets. These loan funds also provide significant levels of technical assistance 
to their clients. Such assistance can include training in property management, 
bookkeeping, or developing a business plan. This technical assistance not only 
builds the capacity of loan fund clients, but also is felt to help improve loan 
performance.  
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Community development venture capital funds (CDVCs) are for-profit entities that 
also leverage investments from outside sources, such as foundations, mainstream 
financial institutions, and the federal government to provide equity investments 
or equity-like loans for business development in distressed communities. Equity 
investments are direct infusions of cash that rapidly growing businesses with limited 
regular cash flow need to expand. Venture capital firms provide such investment 
in exchange for a portion of ownership in the business. Venture capital funds often 
have a high level of expertise in the industry in which they invest and provide 
extensive hands-on assistance and knowledge to help the growing business. In 
the US, CDVCs try to achieve a double bottom line that looks at both the financial 
performance and the social impacts of investments.   
size of the sector
Although the CDFI industry in the US is dwarfed by the mainstream financial 
services industry, the sector plays a significant role in filling gaps in access to 
financial resources to underserved markets. In 2004, community development 
banks averaged $105 million in assets, while the average size of community 
development loan funds was just under $6 million. Venture capital funds had 
an average size of $5.4 million, and CDCUs had an average asset size of $2.3 
million.  Despite their modest size, these institutions effectively target underserved 
markets. In 2004, 70 per cent of CDFI clients were low-income. Roughly 58 per 
cent were minority, and 61 per cent were women. The bulk of CDFI dollars loaned 
out go to housing related activities such as affordable housing development and 
mortgage lending. In 2004, 56 per cent of CDFI financing outstanding, or $1.9 
billion, went to the housing sector. The second-largest sector served was lending 
for small business development, which accounted for 17 per cent of total CDFI 
financing dollars outstanding, or $571 million. The third-largest sector was consumer 
lending which includes loans to individuals for such purposes as health care, debt 
consolidation, or automobile finance. These loans accounted for 15 per cent of CDFI 
financing outstanding, $512 million.26    
the role of property in Us community finance – a model for the UK?
Lending for housing has long been an integral part of the community finance sector in the US. A variety of community 
development corporations, loan funds, and community banks are involved in financing property purchase and 
redevelopment for community benefit. Credit for home-building, mortgages and other property-related financial 
services have been key drivers of CDFI development. CDFIs’ property lending in the US amounted to $6.8 billion, or 
roughly £3.5 billion, in 2004, forming a major component of the lending portfolios of CDFIs. CDFI financing for housing 
was 56 per cent compared to just 17 per cent for business financing. Property lending and investment forms the 
backbone of the CDFI sector in the US. The provision of property finance enhances the security and return of CDFIs’ 
asset portfolios. 
Given the structure of the UK social housing market, including its ownership, financing methods and government 
policy, the UK inhabits a different context. The total lending of CDFIs in the UK as of 2005 was £53 million. Average 
loan sizes are smaller, and tend to be focused on enterprise development or personal finance needs. 
Unlike the US, the UK lacks a government-sponsored facility such as Freddie Mac to provide support to development 
of housing for low- and moderate-income groups. Freddie Mac operates in the wholesale market to increase the 
provision of affordable rental housing and mortgages to low-income individuals. 
CDFIs in the UK may be able to benefit by innovating in the housing market. A small but growing number of CDFIs 
offer home improvement loans. But the structure of the UK mortgage market renders it unfeasible for CDFIs to benefit 
from providing typical housing finance products as they would have to compete with private financial institutions. But 
a secondary market could be created, for example, in the equity of affordable homes, so as to facilitate investment in 
the renovation of housing in disrepair. Other creative measures, such as the creation of real estate investment trusts 
(REITs) open to housing associations and CDFIs could facilitate further investment in the renovation of low-income 
housing and development of community housing solutions. This area of CDFI innovation needs stronger policy 
support to enable further diversification. 
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In its early years, the CDFI industry in the US was largely capitalised with 
government or foundation resources, but changes in government policy and 
the financial services industry have led to shifts in the sources of financial 
support. Originally, mainstream financial institution participation was limited and 
typically involved participation in loan pools for affordable housing development 
and mortgage lending. The CRA was passed in 1977 to promote lending and 
investment by depository financial institutions in low- and moderate-income 
markets. In its early years, however, the CRA’s effectiveness was limited largely 
by weak regulatory enforcement. Substantial changes to CRA regulation in 
1995 altered the way banks were monitored for their community reinvestment 
performance. As related to CDFIs, the updated CRA regulation added specific 
components that examined banks for their levels of community development 
lending and investments and grants. In this form, CRA regulation has played a 
significant role in developing a robust commitment from banks to support the 
community finance sector. The CRA has provided the foundation for investment 
and partnership of banks with CDFIs in the US.
This change served as an incentive for banks and thrifts to provide low-cost 
loans and investments to CDFIs which were able to leverage these resources to 
finance activities that mainstream institutions found too risky to finance directly. 
In FY 2004, banks, thrifts, and credit unions were the largest contributor to CDFI 
capitalisation, making up over 37 per cent of all CDFI debt capital compared to 
6 per cent for foundations and 4 per cent for the federal government. Depository 
financial institutions were even more significant contributors to community 
development loan funds where they accounted for 56 per cent of debt capital. In 
FY 2004, foundations and the federal government were major supporters of the 
CDVCs contributing 45 per cent and 21 per cent respectively to their overall debt 
capital.27  
In addition to direct capitalisation, banks also often act as key partners with 
CDFIs in other ways. Such partnerships can take the form of deals where 
CDFI lending fills the gap between what the bank feels comfortable lending 
and the amount of equity a borrower brings to the table. CDFIs often provide 
subordinated debt in a multi-layered deal and/or pre-construction financing. 
Banks can also provide services to CDFIs such as filling board seats, sitting 
on loan approval committees, and providing technical assistance. Such 
partnerships typically occur when banks fund particular CDFIs.  
data from cdfi data project (cdp) at www.cdfi.org
The graph in Figure 14 depicts the sources of CDFIs’ investment capital for 
on-lending over a three year period between 2001 and 2003. A breakdown of 
investment capital data for 2004 and 2005 was unavailable. In aggregate there 
is an increasing trend with 12.5 billion dollars of investment capital in 2004 and 
14.3 billion in 2005. Total investment capital has grown from 4 billion dollars in 
2001. Data for grant funding over this same period is not reported to the CDFI 
Data Project. Information from three of the major US CDFI types is incorporated: 
community development banks, loan funds and venture funds, with data from 
community development credit unions excluded. The ‘Individuals’ category is 
significant because of depositors holding funds at community development 
banks.
Government investment into investment capital for on-lending, from Federal 
and State sources, is substantial but represents a relatively small part of 
CDFIs’ total investment capital.  Banks and other financial institutions make a 
significant contribution, accounting for 1.5 billion dollars in 2003. Corporations 
in the US, representing another private source of investment, commit substantial 
investment that was worth over a billion dollars in 2003. In the UK their 
contribution remains negligible. 
What this table suggests is the important role that the CRA has played, 
provoking significant large-scale investment from private sources.  According to 
the CDFI Fund each investment dollar it provided in 2005 leveraged in $27 in 
private and other non-CDFI funds. The Fund also provides significant grant and 
financial support to assist which is additional to these investment funds.
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growth of the sector
The 1990s was a key period of growth for the CDFI industry in the US. The decade 
saw the largest net increase in the number of new CDFIs, particularly community 
development loan funds. Strengthening CRA regulations and improving the 
implementation of the regulations have been credited as a substantial factor 
spurring this rapid growth.  
Another key factor was the federal government’s establishment of the CDFI 
Fund in 1994 in the Department of Treasury. The Fund provides financial grants 
and technical assistance awards to CDFIs and implements the Bank Enterprise 
Award (BEA) programme. The BEA programme rewards banks and thrifts which 
are active in community development including the support of the CDFI industry. 
In 2006, the Fund in its various programmes awarded over $26 million to CDFIs 
and $12 million to banks and thrifts. The Fund also implements the New Markets 
Tax Credit programme which permits taxpayers to receive a credit against 
federal income taxes for making qualified equity investments in designated 
Community Development Entities (CDEs). Substantially all of the qualified equity 
investment must in turn be used by the CDE to provide investments in low-income 
communities. Charitable foundations have also continued to support the sector 
through the provision of subordinated debt, or patient capital, to assist both CDCUs 
and community development loan funds to build their balance sheets.
A third significant factor spurring the growth of the CDFI industry in the 1990s 
was the increasingly significant role played by CDFI trade associations such as 
the Opportunity Finance Network, the Association for Enterprise Development, 
the Community Development Venture Capital Alliance, the National Federation 
of Community Development Credit Unions and their umbrella organisation, the 
Coalition of Community Development Financial Institutions. These associations 
served to develop policy and best practices around the community development 




















figure 14: sources of investment capital to Us cdfis 2001-2003 ($billions)
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of scale and sustainability to the future of the industry; professionalising the 
management of CDFIs; collecting industry-wide data to document the financial 
condition and impact of CDFIs; developing ways to increase levels of investment in 
CDFIs and diversify sources of capital; and advocating for government policies that 
support the CDFI industry.  
current challenges
The CDFI industry in the US has faced significant challenges recently. Sources of 
capital have been a particular concern. Foundation support, a traditionally strong 
source of funding for the CDFI industry, has waned and become increasingly 
competitive in recent years. Government funding for the CDFI industry from 
sources such as the CDFI Fund and the Small Business Administration have been 
consistently threatened in recent federal budgets. Additionally, CRA regulation has 
been changed to potentially weaken bank support of CDFIs. Changes implemented 
by federal banking regulators put less emphasis on the importance of critical 
community development loans and investments for banks with assets between 
$250 million and $1 billion.28  
We should note, however, that the nature of the financial services industry has also 
changed providing CDFIs with additional competition for markets and resources. 
Technological advances in loan underwriting, product delivery channels and risk-
based pricing have led many mainstream lenders to focus increased resources on 
previously underserved lower-income and minority markets. In some cases CDFIs 
find themselves competing with bank and non-bank lenders in areas such as 
mortgage loans to borrowers with damaged credit, small consumer loans, and small 
business loans of under $50,000.29  Unfortunately, in many cases, these non-CDFI 
loans have abusive features that put borrowers in worse situations than they were 
previously. Often, when these borrowers reach CDFIs, they are much more difficult 
to serve because of foreclosure or bankruptcy situations.  
Another concern for CDFIs is the ability to develop and retain high quality staff, 
particularly management. The increasingly complex and global financial services 
industry now requires that CDFIs increase the level of sophistication of their staff in 
order to access capital markets and finance projects. It is difficult for many CDFIs to 
retain high quality staff, which are often poached by larger banks or other industries 
with the ability to offer better salaries.
These challenges have required the CDFI industry to respond in a number of 
different ways. The increasingly competitive nature of CDFI funding has demanded 
that the industry develop more sophisticated mechanisms for documenting the 
overall state of the industry and the impact created by individual CDFIs. Traditionally, 
CDFIs have relied on first-order impact data showing the number of housing units 
developed or the number of jobs created tied to specific loans. However, these 
measures of impact are becoming insufficient in convincing investors of the social 
impacts of specific CDFI activities, and many are demanding more sophisticated 
and difficult-to-quantify measures of impact including direct benefits to low-income 
households and neighbourhood effects.30 Some believe, however, that it may 
be inappropriate for an individual CDFI to be asked to provide second- or third-
order impact data because of the complexity of those analyses. It is felt that such 
research should be conducted at a field wide level by a major research institute or 
consultant. A larger question is whether it is appropriate to expect major third-order 
impacts from an industry that is small in relation to the powerful exogenous forces 
that impact low-income communities and low-income households.  
The industry has moved to better use data and standardised systems of evaluation 
to document the state and impact of the industry and of specific CDFIs. The CDFI 
Data Project (CDP) is an effort undertaken by a group of CDFI trade associations 
to collect standardised data from CDFIs on their lending activities and financial 
condition. CDP produces an annual report documenting the state of the CDFI 
industry. The CDFI Fund has begun collecting detailed institution-level as well as 
transaction-level data through its Community Investment Impact System (CIIS).  
Additionally, the Opportunity Finance Network has developed a CDFI Assessment 
and Rating System (CARS). CARS uses an independent third party to rate a CDFI 
on its ’impact performance‘ and its ’financial strength and performance’. The intent 
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of CARS is to create a standardised measure of CDFI performance that increases 
transparency for investors.   
Another key challenge for the CDFI industry going forward is the issue of scale 
and sustainability. Scale is critical for both individual CDFIs and for the industry 
as a whole. For CDFIs, scale is a critical component of becoming sustainable 
entities and involves reaching economies of scale through increasing the volume 
of customers served, reducing costs, and enhancing efficiency.31 The ultimate 
goal is for CDFIs to be able to deliver services without a heavy reliance on subsidy 
and to cover costs through programme-related revenue. However, achieving such 
sustainability has challenged some of the fundamental aspects of the industry.  
Many CDFIs in the US that serve hard-to-reach populations are not fully sustainable, 
and continue to rely on grant funding. 
Building economies of scale within CDFIs may require expanding beyond the 
typically tight focus on smaller and difficult-to-serve markets, raising additional 
capital, increasing levels of product standardisation and specialisation, and 
developing products and services that can be delivered efficiently. Staying true to 
the CDFI mission of targeting those markets that are hardest to serve may entail 
taking on more profitable clients and using revenues from those loans to subsidise 
serving less profitable clients.  
The CDFI industry in the US has been successful because of its ability to effectively 
fill gaps in access to financial services in underserved markets. Critical to this 
success have been a government framework through the CRA that provides some 
level of direct financial support, but, more importantly, also provides incentive 
for mainstream financial institutions to support the CDFI industry through direct 
financing and technical assistance. Also critical to the success of the CDFI industry 
in the US has been the presence of trade associations and intermediaries who 
have developed and aggressively promoted best practices around the success 
and sustainability of the industry. Going forward, some of the biggest challenges 
the industry faces include documenting to investors the impact that individual 
CDFIs and the industry as a whole have on economic development in distressed 
communities and efficiently growing to scale and reducing reliance on outside 
subsidy.
The following case studies examine five CDFIs or intermediaries who have been 
successful at reaching underserved markets and filling gaps in access to capital.  
The case studies describe the background of each institution and the products 
and services they offer. They then discuss some of the ongoing challenges each 
institution faces. The objective of the case studies is to illustrate best practices 
and key lessons from the US CDFI field that may be relevant to the UK sector as it 
continues to develop.   
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case study 1: appalachian Regional commission
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is a quasi-government organisation based in Washington DC that 
was created by the US Congress in 1965 to support  economic development efforts in the Appalachian region of the 
United States. Appalachia is a large region in the eastern United States that spans parts of 13 states from upstate New 
York in the north to northern Mississippi in the south. The region is mountainous and largely rural with few major urban 
centres. Appalachia is one of the poorest regions of the US, and economic growth in the region has consistently been 
hampered by a heavy reliance on a declining extractive economic base; relative physical and economic isolation; and 
generally low levels of education and advanced job skills training among the regional population.  
Broadly, ARC is charged with four goals:
1. Increase job opportunities and per capita income in Appalachia to reach parity with the nation. 
2. Strengthen the capacity of the people of Appalachia to compete in the global economy. 
3. Develop and improve Appalachia’s infrastructure to make the region economically competitive. 
4. Build the Appalachian Development Highway System to reduce Appalachia’s isolation.
To reach these goals, ARC provides funding to states for infrastructure improvements, such as highways, sewers, and 
schools. Additionally, ARC funds many local economic development initiatives through grants to revolving loan funds 
(RLFs) and development venture capital funds. The loan funds tend to be public bodies organised at municipal and 
county levels, and the venture capital funds independent, private organisations. These funds are intended to promote 
business development and innovation in the region, to stabilise and grow the regional economy, and to create and 
retain jobs.  
In the area of community development finance, ARC sees itself as having a number of distinct roles as a regional leader. 
While ARC provides funding to regional CDFIs, the agency sees this as a small part of its regional role in filling gaps 
in access to credit and capital for Appalachian entrepreneurs. ARC regularly develops and promotes best practices 
in local economic development. It works with small and inexperienced loan funds to employ nationally accepted 
methods for extending credit to underserved markets. ARC works regularly with national CDFI trade associations to 
help build the capacity and scale of state-wide networks of micro-lenders. It also works to connect regional CDFIs to 
key strategic partners, such as foundations, national intermediaries, and federal agencies. Additionally, ARC acts as 
a leader in researching, developing, and promoting policy.  
A key example of the work ARC has done to promote regional community development finance is through its 
capitalisation of revolving loan funds and development venture capital funds. ARC-funded RLFs use grants to make 
loans to businesses with difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. These RLFs are generally 
operated by quasi-government organisations that oversee economic development in smaller areas, which can be 
as large as multiple counties. Generally, ARC-funded RLFs provide gap financing to start-up or existing businesses 
often in economically distressed parts of the region. Gap financing are loans that help business owners bridge 
the difference between total necessary debt financing on a project and the amount a bank is willing to lend. The 
availability of such financing is an incentive to lenders who may not be willing to take on the total project debt. Since 
the RLF grant programme’s inception in 1977, the 38 ARC capitalised loan funds have made 1,570 loans for over 
$104 million. A fundamental goal of RLF lending is the creation or retention of local employment. Between 2002 and 
the first quarter of 2006, loans from ARC capitalised revolving loan funds helped create over 3,600 jobs and retain 
over 8,300 jobs in the region.
ARC also provides grants to development venture capital funds. An ARC-funded assessment of regional gaps in 
access to capital for small business development identified a dearth of equity investment in the region. In response 
to this, ARC began an entrepreneurship initiative that focused on promoting the growth of CDVCs in the region. ARC 
initiated a partnership-building effort through a series of conferences focused on access to equity capital in rural 
markets that brought together foundations, financial institutions, and economic development organisations. ARC 
also worked with the Community Development Venture Capital Alliance to enhance the capacities of area CDVC 
management teams. Additionally, as of October 2004, ARC had granted $4.4 million to 13 CDVCs (11 active funds) 
in seven states in the region. These funds have a total capitalisation of $96 million and have invested $13.6 million in 
59 regional businesses. These investments have created over 1,000 jobs in the region.32
ARC is an economic development agency coordinating a multi-state effort to revitalise a distressed region of the 
country. This is a multi-faceted effort that in part relies on providing grants that capitalise CDFIs, but also involves 
connecting local CDFIs to best practices and partners outside the region and developing and promoting policy. ARC
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Lessons for the UK 
P	 CDFIs may work best when viewed as one key part of an integrated local 
development strategy.
P	 Regional management of CDFIs can be positive when well-coordinated, 
appropriately resourced and funded, and linked to a broader strategy, 
providing lessons for UK RDAs.
P	 CDFIs may benefit from linking into a broader local economic development 
framework to formalise partnerships and link with established institutions
Case Study 1: Appalachian Regional Commission (cont’d)
sees its key challenges as coordinating efforts among states with different economic development objectives and 
dealing with changes in leadership at state level. Its current priority is to help regional development venture capital 
funds grow through accessing untapped investors outside of the region. 
The ARC is a key example of the importance of a regional economic development intermediary that takes a leadership 
role in facilitating growth and innovation in the community development finance sector. ARC’s role is particularly 
relevant given the significant regional gaps in access to capital from mainstream financial institutions and the relative 
isolation of many local loan funds. While ARC provides funding for local revolving loan funds and development 
venture capital funds, its true value to the regional CDFI industry is its ability to leverage this role as funder to bring 
nationally recognised best practices to the region; to connect local CDFIs to national intermediaries, funders, and 
policy-makers; and to conduct research that is used to develop forward-looking policies. It is in these ways that ARC 
has helped increase the capacity of the regional industry and enhanced economic development in Appalachia.  
case study 2: pacific community ventures
Pacific Community Ventures (PCV) is a community development venture capital fund that began operation in 1999 as 
Silicon Valley Community Ventures. PCV is based in San Francisco, CA. It serves the entire state of California, but has 
a specific focus on the Bay Area, Los Angeles, San Diego and the Central Valley. The organisation’s goal is to invest 
in businesses located in or near low- and moderate-income communities with the intent that these investments 
will generate a social return as the businesses create good jobs and skills training for lower-income individuals. In 
addition to financing business development, PCV also provides advisor services to firms in the Bay Area and in Los 
Angeles. PCV has raised two private equity funds (PCV Investment Partners LLC I and PCV Investment Partners LLC II) 
worth $20 million and has made equity investments of over $10 million in nine active companies. PCV also currently 
provides advisory services to over 20 businesses that it does not directly finance.33
In its initial years, PCV focused its investment on businesses in underserved markets in the early stages of development. 
However, these companies often lacked experienced management structures. PCV refined and tightened its 
investment approach to focus on more proven businesses in the expansion stage. These businesses are located in 
or near low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities and must also hire from LMI communities. These companies 
must have more established products and markets and well-defined growth strategies.
PCV tracks both the financial performance of the firms it has invested in as well as the social returns on investment. 
Financial performance is tracked by looking at metrics such as quarter-to-quarter revenue growth and profitability 
as well as by tracking other performance targets identified by PCV staff and the CEOs of the respective companies. 
PVC recently completed two successful exits of companies in which it has invested and is well positioned for other 
successful exits. As of 2005, PCV LLC I and II had achieved competitive internal rates of return compared to funds 
of similar vintage.
PCV has also worked with a consulting firm to develop a set of criteria it uses to measure social returns on its 
investments. PCV annually interviews employers and analyses quarterly reports to gather data on:
P	 Job training and employee skill development
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Lessons for the UK 
P	 Providing related advisory services may be an effective means of raising 
additional revenue and attracting resources and expertise.
P	 Developing an effective means of social impact measurement is essential to 
demonstrate outcomes and raise additional funds.
P	 Employee retention and advancement
P	 Provision of quality jobs
P	 Wealth-creation mechanisms
P	 Local hiring practices
P	 Company location and economic reach
P	 Employee demographic characteristics   
These metrics are designed to help PCV investors understand how effectively firms are meeting ’double bottom 
line‘ requirements. PCV’s 2005 report on its social returns on investment shows that companies in the PCV-financed 
portfolio have increased their number of ’designated employees‘ from 1,173 to 1,531 between 2004 and 2005. A 
designated employee is one whose starting wage was below a certain level and resides in an LMI community or was 
referred by a welfare agency.  Designated employees at PCV-financed companies earned an average or $13.18 per 
hour, a number well above living wage ordinances designated in the surrounding areas. Additionally, 100 per cent of 
designated employees are offered health benefits and paid vacation and holidays. A growing number of companies 
also offer wealth-building mechanisms, such as retirement plans, stock options, and profit sharing, to designated 
employees.
In addition to direct equity financing of growing enterprises, PCV offers advising services to business in traditional 
industries such as product wholesaling and manufacturing that have the potential to bring significant economic 
and employment gain to LMI communities. Nearly 70 per cent of these businesses have less than $3 million in 
annual revenue and all have fewer than 100 employees. PCV uses volunteer business advisors – senior business 
professionals who typically have over 10 years experience in helping small businesses grow. PCV provides one-
on-one business advising where the advisor helps the company refine areas such as strategic planning, financial 
planning, and sales and marketing strategies. In 2005, PCV advised 23 companies in the San Francisco and Los 
Angeles regions. PCV believes that the success behind its advisory services lies in a number of factors. It considers 
such services ’venture capital with out the capital‘ as advisors invest significant levels of time and expertise instead 
of money. Additionally, PCV has been able to attract senior and seasoned advisors and effectively match advisors and 
advisees. One of the challenges seen by PCV is the significant time commitment required from advisors who serve 
on a volunteer basis and advisees who are running a growing business.34  
PCV is a key example of a development venture capital fund that has cultivated a successful model of delivering 
equity investment to high-growth firms in lower-income communities while documenting the social impacts of these 
investments.  PCV has developed sophisticated metrics to measure social returns so it can clearly communicate the 
impact of its equity investments to funders, and it has done this while generating competitive rates of return. PCV has 
also developed a successful programme for delivering business advisory services to less high-growth-potential firms 
whose success will nonetheless have an impact on economic development in LMI communities.
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Lessons for the UK
P	 Property lending is a key mechanism for sustainability of loan portfolios in the US.
P	 Establishing and exploiting a niche market is fundamental to success.
P	 Building in-depth understanding of target clients can be a competitive 
advantage, providing further business opportunities.
P	 Success in the long term could mean proving the viability of low-income clients 
for mainstream financial institutions.
case study 3: shorebank
Shorebank is an integrated and regulated depository financial institution that is credited as being the first ’community 
development‘ bank. Its focus is on providing investment that stabilises disinvested and underserved neighbourhoods. 
It was founded in Chicago in 1973 and has offices in Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland. The bank currently has nearly 
$2 billion in assets. It specialises in lending to small businesses, real estate lending for multifamily housing, and 
single-family mortgages to lower-income and minority communities underserved by mainstream financial institutions. 
The bank also offers consulting and other services that help promote community development.  
Shorebank’s lending activity in Chicago has focused primarily on making loans to single-family and multifamily 
properties in LMI and minority communities. The bank has traditionally been a smaller player in lending for single-family 
properties. In 2005, Shorebank originated less than 600 of the nearly 295,000 loans on single-family properties in Cook 
County, IL. While Shorebank’s single-family lending volume is small, it has been able to effectively target minority and 
underserved markets for their lending. These borrowers and communities have been saturated with high-cost, often 
predatory, mortgage credit from non-bank mortgage finance companies, and there are few bank lenders making low-
cost mortgages. African-American borrowers accounted for 80 per cent of Shorebank’s single-family loans in 2005 
compared with just over 19 per cent county-wide. Additionally, 92 per cent of Shorebank’s single-family mortgages went 
to communities greater than 50 per cent minority, compared to less than 44 per cent for all loans in Cook County.  
While Shorebank has been a minor player filling a critical niche in single-family-mortgage lending, it is the county’s 
most significant bank lender when looking at multi-family housing in lower-income and minority markets. Shorebank’s 
approach to multifamily lending has been to view it as an entrepreneurial opportunity. It sees ownership of rental 
properties as a way to create a class of business owners who have an investment in the community. The bank has 
also effectively followed borrowers and retained them as they purchase other properties or refinance existing loans.
County-wide in 2005, Shorebank was the fourth-largest multifamily lender trailing only major banks Citibank, Washington 
Mutual and Mid-America Bank. However, Shorebank’s focus is lending to minority communities, and it is far and away 
the largest multifamily lender to neighbourhoods greater than 80 per cent minority. It originated over 13 per cent of the 
total number of multifamily mortgages to these communities; the next largest lender originated just over 5 per cent.
While Shorebank has been a clear leader in multifamily lending and is filling a significant niche in single-family 
lending, it has struggled to find similar success in small business lending and retail accounts. While the bank 
has been an active originator of loans guaranteed by the US Small Business Administration and has in the past 
had success in lending to minority entrepreneurs seeking franchise opportunities, Shorebank generally has had 
difficulty gaining significant market share in the highly competitive small business lending arena. Part of the reason 
for Shorebank’s struggles is the nature of the business community in the area on which the bank focuses. Many of 
these communities do not have a strong commercial retail presence, so the overall market for lending is smaller. 
Additionally, the bank has difficulty lending to suburban and out-of-area businesses with city locations. It also has 
questions about how to develop a successful line of retail banking services. While in 1973, Shorebank was the only 
bank serving its community, now a number of large banks have offices in South Shore. There are returns to scale in 
retail banking which raises the issue of Shorebank’s competitive advantage in this arena.  
Moving forward, Shorebank sees a number of key challenges. It is looking to find a niche in small business lending 
where it can utilise its expertise in serving specialised, underserved markets. It is also looking to expand retail 
services and single-family-mortgage lending. Shorebank has identified a need to expand, but is finding challenges in 
raising the necessary equity capital while staying true to its mission of community development. While there are still 
social equity investors willing to invest, these investors increasingly want clearly defined exit strategies.
Shorebank is one of the most successful examples of a community development bank. It effectively identified a 
niche, multifamily lending in lower-income, minority communities, and successfully became the leader in delivering 
such loans to that market. It has been able to retain that leadership while getting social returns through promoting 
local ownership and investment in multifamily housing, building the entrepreneurial capacity of its borrowers, and 
successfully retaining these borrowers as they refinance or purchase new properties. As it looks to grow, Shorebank 
has been challenged to develop similar success in other niches such as small business lending and retail services.
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Lessons for the UK
P	 Partnership and engagement of banks can be critical to building sustainability.
P	 In-depth understanding of underserved markets can reveal market opportunities.
P	 A successful loan fund can cross subsidise costly social activities such as 
training.
case study 4: community investment corporation
The Community Investment Corporation (CIC) is a Chicago-based non-profit mortgage lender that specialises in 
providing purchase and rehabilitation loans for multifamily rental properties throughout region. CIC was created in 
1974 by some of Chicago’s major financial institutions who were looking for a way to pool risk in order to better target 
lending to Chicago’s underserved markets. In its early years, CIC focused on the rehabilitation of small multifamily 
properties (1–4 units). By the early 1980s, however, CIC identified a significant lack of access to credit for larger 
multifamily rehab projects and began a multifamily lending programme. Although the programme initially served 
only the City of Chicago, CIC has since expanded to cover the entire six-county Chicago metropolitan area. The 
expansion of both CIC’s service area and its loan programme has helped CIC serve its mission to be a leading player 
in neighbourhood revitalisation through innovative financing programmes.
CIC’s lending capital comes from a pool of funds to which major financial institutions contribute. CIC has 48 investors, 
45 of which are banks that have pledged $560 million through 2010. CIC’s loans must be approved by a loan review 
committee. Those who sit on the committee are from investing financial institutions that must represent at least 51 per 
cent of total dollars in the pool. CIC functions as a blind loan pool which eliminates any potential conflict of interest 
between CIC’s lending and that of the investing institutions. CIC originates loans and regularly bundles these mortgages 
into pools. Collateral trust notes are sold to investing institutions up to the amount that the investor has committed and 
equal to the share of the overall pool held by the investing institutions. For example, if an institution has pledged 5 per 
cent of the CIC’s overall loan pool, it would purchase 5 per cent of whatever pools are issued. All interest earned on loans 
is returned to investors.  CIC is able to remain self-sufficient by taking a modest origination and servicing fee.  
CIC offers both standard adjustable rate loan and fixed-rate loan products similar to those offered by mainstream 
financial institutions. Innovation in loan products is driven by changes in market demand, competition, and investor 
insights. For example, the initial adoption of a 3–5-year adjustable rate loan was driven by investors who wanted to 
limit long-term risk. CIC recently adopted a flex fund programme which allocated $100 million for risky projects that 
may exceed standard underwriting criteria, but will allow CIC to price these deals at a market rate. 
In addition to its multifamily lending, CIC offers property management training for owners of multifamily properties to 
ensure that they are well equipped with the knowledge to better market, manage, and maintain their property. Many 
of CIC’s borrowers own only one rental property and lack training and experience in property management. These 
training courses are offered to both clients and non-clients and cover topics such as fair housing laws, property 
maintenance, rent collection, and bookkeeping. These seminars prepare borrowers for many of the challenges of 
property management and are felt to improve loan performance. CIC charges a modest fee for these sessions. In 
2006, 620 attendees participated in property management training through CIC.  
In its history, CIC has made over 1,200 multifamily loans totalling $647 million to rehab 34,000 units of housing. 
CIC’s multifamily lending has provided affordable housing to more than 110,000 Chicago-area residents. In 2006, 
CIC approved 62 loans for $56 million. Of the units financed in these projects, 92 per cent had rents affordable to 
households earning 50 per cent of the area average income. In FY 2006, net return to investors was 4.6 per cent 
– 1.2 per cent above the rolling average three-year treasury rate. Beyond standard measures such as loan volume 
and number of units rehabbed, CIC uses a number of other assessment criteria to measure impact. The importance 
of many of these criteria has changed over time.  For example, in Chicago during the 1980s there was an abundance 
of dilapidated and abandoned buildings in many neighbourhoods, and simply finding owners to take on buildings 
and return them to productive use was considered a success. Today, vacancy is not as big a concern, and impact is 
measured by looking at the ability to keep rents at an affordable level; preserving the existing rental housing stock; 
and the ability to produce quality units. CIC also looks at the number of minority owners and contractors used in the 
rehabilitation, and these are criteria considered for receiving a loan.
CIC is an example of a community development loan fund specialising in multifamily housing rehabilitation. It has 
been able to grow to scale, become sustainable, provide a competitive return on investment, and achieve impact. CIC 
has successfully identified a niche for financing the renovation of smaller, affordable rental properties and has been 
able to effectively engage local financial institutions as long-term partners as both investors in its loan pool and key 
advisors on its loan review committee. It has responded to input from investors and to changes in the market when 
developing and modifying products and services. It has also successfully developed and implemented seminars to 
train borrowers and non-clients in property management. Such training has not only helped borrowers become better 
customers, but adds social impact. 
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Lessons for the UK
P	 Relationship-based lending can be a competitive advantage when done well.
P	 Training and investment readiness improves loan performance.
P	 Higher income clients can cross subsidise service provision to disadvantaged 
groups.
case study 5: community first fund
Community First Fund (CFF) is a community development loan fund that serves a 13-county region of roughly three 
million people in south central Pennsylvania. The area is a mix of smaller urban areas around 100,000 in population, 
and towns and rural areas. The primary focus of the Fund is lending for small business development. CFF estimates 
that 90 per cent of its lending goes to small business development. 
CFF’s primary focus is lending to businesses that have been open for less than two years and expanding businesses 
that have been unable to access capital. Its core clients are those who mainstream banks find difficult to serve. These 
businesses often have difficult accessing loans between $50k and $200k. CFF does more than simple gap financing 
and is considered the senior lender on a number of deals, but on larger deals, CFF provides capital that is leveraged 
to attract bank financing.  
CFF has yet to feel competitive pressure from banks and feels that it is just beginning to tap the market for these 
small business loans. Whereas the old CDFI model might have been to graduate its clients to bank services, CFF 
has recognised a need to keep good clients in order to subsidise the riskier clients. CFF feels that its knowledge of 
the local market gives it a distinct advantage over the larger banks entering the market that are based outside the 
region. Additionally, CFF spends upwards of 20+ hours per client on technical assistance before the loan is made, 
something banks do not do. This high level of technical assistance raises transaction costs, but it prepares business 
owners for the borrowing process and improves loan performance. CFF has built a significant level of loyalty among 
its existing client base and believes these strong relationships combined with good products will help it retain higher 
performance and profitable clients.  
CFF has recently undertaken a major effort to become self sufficient. Its strategy focuses on increasing levels of 
income earned through fees and interest by shifting away from micro-lending towards larger loans. CFF has found that 
there are no economies of scale with micro-loans, and that the more loans it originated the more losses it incurred. 
Over the next five years, CFF hopes to increase its portfolio size by increasing average loan amounts as opposed to 
the number of businesses financed. To accomplish this, however, the Fund needs to raise additional capital.  
CFF’s strategic goal is to raise additional capital with the hopes of quadrupling the loan fund to $25 million by 2010. 
Part of its strategy has been not to solicit donations under $1 million. This is a significant change for CFF. As recently 
as five years ago it had never received a donation of $1 million. Part of the growth and sustainability strategy was to 
get rated by CARS through the Opportunity Finance Network. Being rated through CARS was felt to improve CFFs 
ability to access capital. By going through the CARS process, CFF realised that it did not have an effective way 
to measure social impact. In the past, CFF looked at job creation and business start-up numbers in underserved 
markets, but it is still searching for better ways to measure social impact. The Fund hired a consultant to enhance how 
it views and measures social impact.
CFF foresees one of its largest challenges being difficulty in raising the human resources capital needed to hire and 
retain high quality employees that are necessary for implementing its sustainability model. It continues to compete 
with banks for employees and rarely has the resources to pay higher salaries. 
CFF is a mid-sized community development loan fund that provides small business loans to entrepreneurs in mid-
sized cities in south-western Pennsylvania. It is an example of a CDFI going through the process of reaching scale 
and achieving sustainability. It is doing so by moving away from micro-lending and cultivating and retaining more 
profitable clients who take out larger loans. It does this by offering competitive products, building relationships 
through extensive technical assistance training, and having strong knowledge of local markets. As CFF attempts to 
grow to scale, it has been challenged to establish metrics for effectively measuring social impact and is working to do 
so in order to better attract the large capital investments necessary to reach scale. Scale is also necessary to attract 
and retain high quality staff necessary to effectively develop and maintain profitable lending relationships and lead 
fund expansion. 
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P	 Graduating strong clients to banks will undermine sustainability.
P	 Micro-loans do not offer economies of scale.
P	 Adopting external standards of performance improves ability to raise funds.
conclusion
These case studies illustrate a number of key elements that have led to the success 
of the CDFI industry in the US:
P	 The Appalachian Regional Commission has served as an intermediary leading 
regional economic development efforts and linking local CDFIs with national 
best practices.
P	 Pacific Community Ventures is a development venture capital fund that has 
created a set of metrics to document social returns on investment. It provides 
substantial levels of technical assistance to borrowers and other business 
owners whose success will benefit lower-income communities.
P	 Shorebank is a community development bank that has identified a market niche 
in the community it serves and has become the leading lender in that market.
P	 The Community Investment Corporation has successfully built long-term 
financial and advisory relationships with major area banks while growing to scale 
and becoming sustainable.
P	 The Community First Fund has used its knowledge of local markets to reach 
business owners and to successfully build long-term lending relationships.
These CDFIs are also going through many of the growing pains experienced by 
the industry as it moves forward. As CDFIs attempt to grow to scale, many struggle 
to develop sophisticated measures of social impact that investors are increasingly 
demanding. In attempting to grow, many CDFIs are balancing the need to attract 
and retain more profitable clients while still reaching those most in need yet difficult 
and costly to serve. CDFIs are also challenged to grow through developing new 
products and niches where they can become market leaders. Finally, CDFIs must 
find ways to attract and retain high quality staff to lead institutions and the industry 
to scale and sustainability.       
community development finance in europe
A shift from an industrial-based economy to a service-oriented economy has 
resulted in increased unemployment in Western Europe. Enterprise creation and 
self-employment are seen as powerful tools for employment generation. Micro and 
small enterprises are central to this task given their importance to the economies 
of Western Europe. According to the European Commission, these enterprises 
represent 90 per cent of the two million enterprises created per year35 One-third of 
these start-ups are by unemployed entrepreneurs. Due to high levels of joblessness 
microfinance has become a key mechanism to stimulate development of small 
enterprises in the absence of traditional sources of finance.
In response to these macroeconomic changes, since the 1970s, a wave of new 
finance organisations working for the social economy were established across 
Europe. These organisations operate with a variety of organisational models, 
including banks dedicated to the social economy, such as Triodos Bank in the 
Netherlands, JAK and Ekobanken in Sweden, and Banca Etica in Italy. However, the 
vast majority of social economy organisations have taken the form of associations 
(as in Belgium and France); co-operatives (as in Italy and Belgium); or not-for-
profit organisations and foundations. These forms are a result of the high capital 
thresholds required to become a licensed bank, as well as the combination of the 
social and financial goals of these organisations. 
Among these social economy organisations, an increasingly dynamic microfinance 
sector began operating in Western Europe.36 The majority of the organisations 
operating today are young, making microfinance a fairly new phenomenon in the 
region. According to the 2006 European Microfinance Network (EMN) survey, 
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70 per cent of 110 microfinance organisations have only been in operation since 
2000.37 Microfinance is viewed as a social tool that combines several important 
aims: social and financial inclusion, job creation, economic empowerment, and 
regional development. In Western Europe, microfinance encompasses the provision 
of micro-loans, insurance, savings products, transfer services and non-financial 
services. Clients include entrepreneurs and low-income households who cannot 
access finance from mainstream sources. The bulk of microfinance institutions 
engage in microcredit, which is the provision of very small loans for micro-enterprise 
development, otherwise known as enterprise lending. However, only 16 per cent of 
microfinance institutions focus solely on microcredit, with the remaining 84 per cent 
engaged in a number of different employment and social welfare activities.
This section provides an overview of the characteristics of microfinance in Europe. 
Our analysis pays particular attention to themes of relevance to the UK community 
finance sector, namely: demand and marketing; business support provision; 
results and impact; regulation; funding; sustainability and scale; and the policy 
environment. These themes are reviewed through reference to five key European 
case studies (6–10), including ADIE and the Cigales Network in France, WWB in 
Spain, Network Credit Norway, and the Tante Agaath mechanism in the Netherlands. 
These case studies highlight key features and lessons learned in the European 
context that might shape future policy for the UK community finance sector.
summary findings
Like the UK, most European microfinance organisations are local or regional and 
operate on a relatively small scale. According to EMN, a total of 27,000 micro-loans 
worth e210 million were made by micro-lenders in EU15 countries, involving 48,000 
active borrowers at the end of 2005. Most organisations have an annual loan output 
of fewer than one hundred loans. France is an exception, where microfinance 
institutions are national and achieve the greatest degree of coverage and outreach. 
On the whole, European microfinance has a strong focus on social inclusion and is 
less concerned with profitability to limit recourse to grant funding. Currently many 
microfinance programmes are not sustainable and are not striving to become so. 
This means that government and public institutions are the main source of funding 
for microfinance, with organisations more easily able to obtain access to social 
funds. Other key findings include:
P	 Very few lenders in the EU1538 are operationally self sustainable.
P	 Micro-lenders depend on the public sector to cover costs of operation, while the 
majority of loan capital is provided by both the public and private sectors; 42 per 
cent of micro-lenders receive 76 to 100 per cent of their operating funds from 
public sources.
P	 28 per cent of institutions made less than 20 loans per year, though this number 
reduced from over one-third in 2004. The number of lenders making between 51 
and 100 loans per year is also increasing.
P	 Most European micro-lenders provide loans ranging between e50 and 
e5,000, with an average loan amount of e7,700. This shows that most lending 
institutions are still small and relatively new, continuing to experiment with 
delivery models for their target market. 
P	 The average interest rate charged by European micro-lenders was 10 per cent, 
ranging from as high as 22 per cent to as low as 5 per cent. The UK has a higher 
average interest rate at 14 per cent, in part due to the absence of interest rate 
restrictions that are in place in most countries. 
P	 The majority of lenders provide individual loans, but some also use a group 
lending method. The sector remains dominated by micro-enterprise loans. 
P	 A majority of organisations provide training and technical assistance to clients, 
with 75 per cent providing pre-loan business support  
P	 Western European microfinance is growing but not as quickly as had been 
hoped. The three main constraints for growth identified by European micro-
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lenders were: lack of funding to cover operational costs, a lack of client demand, 
and a lack of institutional capacity
P	 Obtaining clear information on the operational performance of micro-lenders 
remains difficult, particularly with reference to repayment rates, portfolio at 
risk, and loan write-offs. This may be due to under-developed management 
information systems
In Western Europe, microfinance is recognised as an extension of the public sector, 
and is a key tool to achieve social change. A primary goal of microfinance is social: 
to achieve poverty alleviation through the creation of enterprise or employment 
opportunities. As such, there is increasing availability of funding and support 
available for microfinance, particularly through the European Union. In addition, 
in Europe there is a ceiling on the interest rates that microfinance institutions can 
charge. This cap means that microfinance institutions are limited in the extent to 
which they can achieve full cost recovery, controlling expectations of sustainability. 
However, the relative youth and small size of most institutions, with growth rates 
below what might be expected of an emerging sector, is similar to the UK. 
demand 
Entrepreneurship is a secondary option for many Europeans, who prefer employee 
to self-employed status. The most recent Flash Eurobarometer survey reveals 
the citizens of the EU15 countries have a consistently lower preference for self-
employment, with only 45 per cent in favour, as compared to 61 per cent in the US. 
There was a lesser degree of commitment to entrepreneurship amongst EU citizens. 
Almost 60 per cent of EU citizens have never considered setting up a business 
compared with 44 per cent in the US. A recent household survey in England found 
that three-quarters of respondents were not involved in any sort of self-employment 
and were not considering starting a business, buying into one or becoming self-
employed.39 
In Europe there is also less activity to start up new enterprises. The Eurobarometer 
survey reported that 4.5 per cent of EU citizens (compared to 13 per cent in the US) 
are currently taking steps to start a business, have set up a business or have taken 
one over in the last three years.40 The findings range from six per cent in the UK 
and Ireland to less than two per cent in France. There is likely to be less demand for 
enterprise finance in Western Europe, including the UK, than in the US or in Eastern 
Europe.
Western European microfinance institutions are shaped by a structural difference 
in the nature of demand for microfinance. A study carried out by the East-West 
Exchange on Microfinance, found that the potential clientele for microfinance in 
Western countries is a far smaller segment of society than in Eastern Europe, 
given higher living standards and the greater development of mainstream financial 
services generally available.41 In addition, micro-entrepreneurs have more options 
to finance their business projects compared to developing countries, where interest 
rates are much higher and microfinance has thrived as a result.42 This reduces the 
potential volume of lending for microcredit. The demand that is generated is skewed 
towards less viable borrower groups who require greater support and training 
in accessing finance. This resembles the target market of CDFIs in the UK, with 
individuals unable to access mainstream finance requiring additional mentoring and 
support.
outreach 
Reaching clients and stimulating demand has been a challenge for most micro-
lenders in Europe. Some organisations, primarily those that have reached more 
mature stages of development, have been more successful in doing this than 
others. An example of this is the Association Pour Le Droit A L’Initiative Economique 
(ADIE), considered in Case Study 6., The three most commonly used marketing 
tools to mobilise demand are: community outreach, public relations and referrals. 
Other approaches include through contacts, word of mouth, training fairs and 
conferences.
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Business support
The provision of business support in addition to finance is one of the 
characteristics of microfinance in Western Europe, where this is considered 
an essential part of the service offered to clients. In the EMN survey, 75 per 
cent of organisations offer pre-loan support. In most cases this service is fully 
subsidised, and in some cases it is funded through private sector contracts. 
These organisations offer advice on a range of topics including marketing, 
sales, cash flow, bookkeeping, costing and pricing, legal issues, taxation, 
writing business plans, conducting feasibility studies, goal setting, and time 
management. 
case study 6: adie (Association Pour Le Droit A L’Initiative Economique)
adie (Association Pour Le Droit A L’Initiative Economique) is a French network association that provides micro-
loans and business support to long-term unemployed individuals and those on long-term benefits that are excluded 
from the job market and from the traditional banking system, in order to set up new enterprises. Created in 1989, 
it works nationally, with a special focus on deprived areas, adapting the microcredit lending modality to the French 
context. Unlike many other microfinance institutions, Adie has been in operation for 18 years and has significant 
outreach. Strong partnerships at a national level allow it to have maximum impact. Adie also engages very actively in 
advocacy work, using its experience to propose facilitative policy and improvements to the existing regulatory system 
governing microfinance delivery and micro-enterprise in France.
France is one of the European countries where microfinance is most developed in terms of volume of micro-loans, 
and the Adie network is responsible for almost all of this activity. 
As at the end of October 2006 and since 1989, Adie had delivered a total 42,000 loans for a total amount of over             
e100 million, had financed the creation of over 35,000 enterprises, and had created about 42,000 jobs. In 2005 
alone, it loaned 6,740 micro-loans to a total value of e18 million, financing 5,891 enterprises and creating 7,069 jobs, 
at a loss rate of 3.8 per cent and a repayment rate of 93.5 per cent.
In that year, the survival rate of financed enterprises at three years was 64 per cent, and at two years 54 per cent. Its 
‘rate of insertion’ (individuals that have received support from Adie in the past five years that continue to operate their 
enterprises or are engaged in salaried work, without receiving welfare benefits) was 75 per cent.
It is estimated that about 80 per cent of Adie’s clients are referred by its varied pool of partners. 
Adie takes great care in maintaining its relationship with its partners and developing new ones. It has developed 
a guide and an information module for its employees about managing partnership relationships. It also organises 
a yearly microcredit week when it engages in a massive information campaign with about 100 stands in public 
places. 
An essential component of Adie’s work is the provision of free, tailored, one-to-one business support to micro-
entrepreneurs. This includes support in the preparation of business plans through specialist partners and business               
advice organisations, as well as post-loan support in administrative aspects of running an enterprise, management, 
commercialisation, marketing, integration to the financial system, and organisation of exchange circles of micro-
entrepreneurs. It is estimated that the cost of this support per entrepreneur is nearly e2,000, which is fully subsidised 
by national, regional and local governments, as well as by the EU. 
Adie also provides a variety of other support services through negotiations and partnerships with private and public 
sector actors such as a negotiated availability of very-low-cost, second-hand computers and low-cost training in 
specialised aspects of enterprise operations.
Having started with only three volunteers and no start-up capital, Adie’s structure today involves 300 paid employees 
and 1,000 volunteers organised in 22 regional delegations, 110 branches present in all 100 departments (similar to 
but smaller than counties) in metropolitan France and managed by the regional delegations, and 380 contact points 
where credit officers receive clients once every week.
Adie has been able to achieve an impressive scale through patience, pragmatism, and the links it has developed 
with key public and private organisations. Partner banks today represent Adie’s main source of funding with regard 
to loans, and it is its public sector partners, including national, regional and local government organisations, that 
subsidise its business support activities.
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The importance placed on business support in Western Europe is distinct from 
the UK, where there is disagreement as to whether business support is too 
costly or a necessary service for community finance. Business support is a key 
factor that influences the degree of sustainability an organisation can achieve. 
Western European microfinance institutions view business support as essential 
to develop successful micro-entrepreneurs, particularly those from hard-to-reach 
or disadvantaged communities. As the ADIE example highlights, the required 
level of support can cost up to e2,000 per entrepreneur. A key difference in 
Europe is that business support is often fully funded through public sources 
of grants, and institutions are often linked into a network of business support 
agencies through partnerships. As the case study of Network Credit Norway 
highlights (Case Study 7), some microfinance institutions offer business support, 
whilst ensuring the sustainability of their loan fund, by separating these activities 
into two organisations. 
Results and impact
Social impact
Measuring the impact of microfinance activity is challenging for many 
organisations. A recent survey found that the most commonly monitored 
indicator of impact by European microfinance institutions is the number of 
jobs created and sustained.43 Indicators of employment are augmented by the 
number of businesses supported, their survival rate, profitability and change in 
self-confidence among loan recipients. 
The indicators that provide a full view of social impact are the least monitored. In 
Europe, impact measurement is increasingly taking place on an organisational 
basis, given the absence of generally agreed indicators in the region. Some 
case study 7: network credit norway (ncn) 
network credit norway (ncn) was launched in Oslo in 1997 and in Bergen in 2000 under the guidance of the 
Norwegian People’s Aid, the humanitarian organisation of the Norwegian trade union movement. From April 2003, 
it started providing business support, micro-loans and a savings scheme, as a new independent co-operative, to 
entrepreneurs willing and able to repay their loans, among them refugees and immigrants. The micro-loans are given 
through its loan fund, Foundation Microinvest, which was established in September 2003 in partnership with Cultura 
Bank (an ethical savings bank) and the Hordaland County Council, to operate the lending and savings part of the 
programme. 
Although together they are most commonly known as the Network Credit Norway, the NCN and Foundation Microinvest 
operate as two separate legal entities, with a shared Chief Executive but with separate boards of directors (although 
some are shared members), providing respectively business support and finance as separate organisations. The 
original idea behind this separation was to promote the sustainability of the lending operations.
The NCN provides comprehensive free training and business support, and micro-loans. Business support includes a 
choice of evening and day/short and long training courses on aspects of enterprise set-up and management, such 
as business planning, budgeting, and marketing, through a pool of mostly subcontracted specialists. The training and 
business support aspects of NCN’s services are fully-subsidised with public funding.
Once a client is considered investment-ready, the NCN assists him/her in forming a network group of between four 
and seven individuals who are in the process of starting micro-businesses. Each network group is required to save 
10 per cent of the amount they wish to lend to a member, which is deposited in a common account – the Group 
Fund. The savings function as security for the loans given, and the network group has a common liability for all loans 
given to its members. 
Continued business support within the groups is offered through a facilitator, a group member trained by the NCN. 
The facilitator provides advice to the group and is the contact person between the group and the staff at the NCN. 
Additionally, the NCN organises a monthly meeting in the Micro Business Chamber targeted at the members of 
network groups, but also open to any other interested entrepreneurs. These meetings offer an opportunity to exchange 
ideas and experience, with specific business-related themes discussed as part of the agenda.
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organisations have begun to carry out an annual impact evaluation, either through 
the use of client surveys or via external evaluation consultants. 
This is exemplified by the experience of both Adie in France and WWB España 
(Case Study 8). Some of the indicators of performance and impact used by Adie 
include: 1) organisational performance indicators such as default rates, number 
of financed enterprises, enterprise survival rates, number of jobs created, rate of 
insertion; and 2) social impact measures such as socio-professional situation of 
clients pre and post support, level of qualification, and geographical situation. 
Institutions that track impact indicators are those with a broader mission of social 
and financial inclusion. Western European microfinance institutions carry out 
impact surveys less frequently than Eastern European institutions, regardless of the 
indicators used. This may be related to the young age of the sector in the West and 
lack of funds available for this type of work. Linked to international microfinance, 
Eastern Europe has benefited from significant funding, expertise and adoption of 
performance measurement standards as a result. 
The absence of common definitions and the inconsistency of approaches to 
data-gathering in Europe make assessment and comparison of the effectiveness 
of microfinance institutions relatively difficult. While most microfinance institutions 
would like to measure their impact more comprehensively, in practice they face 
many obstacles. These include:
P	 Lack of funds to cover the time and development of tools to measure impact. 
P	 Lack of knowledge and skills.
P	 A diversity of products delivered, markets targeted and sources of funding used 
by an organisation which complicates a clear strategy for impact measurement.
P	 The number and variety of circumstances influencing the economic status of clients.
case study 8: the spanish Fundación Laboral WWB en España (WWB)
the spanish Fundación Laboral WWB en España (WWB) is a not-for-profit foundation that belongs to an 
international organisation, Women’s World Banking, aimed at integrating and promoting women in self-employment. 
Since 1989, WWB has been providing women entrepreneurs who do not have access to mainstream financing with 
comprehensive business support, conventional loans and micro-loans through agreements with public sector bodies 
and partner banks. It works in all 17 regions of Spain with a permanent central office in Madrid.  
WWB assists its women clients in the preparation of finance proposals, while the ultimate decision whether or not 
to approve a requested loan remains with its partner banks. Once a WWB client has taken a loan with one of the 
partner banks, the relationship between the bank and the WWB client becomes direct, and WWB remains involved 
only through on-going business support in the form of capacity building, marketing and commercialisation. 
WWB has started to produce an annual impact evaluation that includes a questionnaire to clients measuring service 
satisfaction. This survey measures the impact of service on individual and household incomes, savings, and family 
relations. It also measures local economy and employment impact using more conventional indicators – for example, 
the number of businesses created and supported, the number of jobs generated, the number of loans granted, and 
the number of supply chains created or reinforced in the local areas where the supported enterprises trade – and 
enterprise survival rates after the end of loan periods.
WWB has provided comprehensive business support in aspects of business planning, marketing and commercialisation, 
to over 3,000 women. Its support is also available virtually through its support website www.autoempleomujer.com. 
The website provides practical advice on setting up a business as well as news of relevant policy and legislation and 
market events; it also offers a direct consulting service via e-mail. Since its launch in 2002, about 23,000 users have 
benefited from this virtual service, including 890 women who have received business and financial support.
WWB’s business support activities are fully subsidised through contracts and agreements with a diversity of public 
and private sector entities (80 per cent/20 per cent respectively).
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operational performance
Microfinance organisations are often reluctant to report on operational performance, 
either because of lack of complete information or concern about use of the data. 
In EMN’s survey, the response rate to questions on operational performance was 
the lowest. This may be due to poor management information systems, along with 
differing methods for recording information. Organisations were more capable (or 
willing) to provide data on their default rate and bad debts, along with the average 
rate of repayment. Fewer organisations provided details of their portfolios at risk, 
rescheduled loans and write-offs. 
Reporting on operational performance is still patchy and relatively weak in Europe. 
The East-West Exchange on Microfinance found that microfinance institutions do 
not generally provide full information on loan portfolio performance. This is often 
because of confidentiality concerns; the difficulty and cost involved in separating 
micro-lending portfolio data from the rest of the institution’s loan portfolio; weak 
management information systems; and insufficient attention to the importance of 
portfolio quality. 
Developing best practice and indicators of impact and performance is a key 
objective for European microfinance. Performance standards are being developed 
by both EMN and the UK-based CDFA. A working group on benchmarks and 
performance measurement as part of the East-West Exchange programme has 
begun to identify the range of performance measurement initiatives in operation 
internationally. This working group seeks to define indicators that are applicable to 
the European context. 
Regulation
Specific banking regulations affect the way in which microfinance institutions 
operate in Europe.44 For the purpose of creating ’a competitive level playing field‘, 
two EU banking directives (1977 and 1989) established the rules for EU Member 
States. They specify that only credit institutions with bank licenses are permitted 
to take deposits. Exemptions from these banking directives were granted to 
selected institutions, provided the member countries introduced a request prior 
to implementation. The first directive lists a series of financial institutions and 
categories – such as the main national public banks as well as credit unions in the 
UK and Ireland – that are exempt from these directives.
Although the EU banking directives impose a banking license for the deposit-taking 
business, more importantly, a number of countries also limit lending to licensed 
banks. This was initially implemented in Germany and was then adopted by France, 
Portugal and Spain. This credit monopoly prevents organisations making loans even 
when they are working with their own funds. This challenge obliges social finance 
organisations in these countries to work with or through a mainstream bank. The 
need to work in partnership with formal banking institutions has shaped the way in 
which microfinance in Europe has evolved. 
For example, WWB in Spain is able to provide finance to its women clients only 
through strong partnerships with licensed banks in the country. To accommodate 
this regulatory context, WWB works in partnership with nine licensed banks, which 
provide conventional loans and micro-loans directly to WWB’s clients. Six of the 
nine existing bank partnerships have been agreed with Cajas de Ahorro (savings 
banks). These are credit institutions subject to the same regulations as commercial 
banks, but organised as private not-for-profit foundations. Savings banks do not pay 
dividends, but rather donate a significant percentage of their profits (25 per cent 
on average) to community projects known as obra social, including microfinance 
programmes. WWB has channelled over 900 loans with a total value of e23 million 
through its partner banks. 
funding
Domestic sources of funding
A significant number of Western European micro-lenders rely on public funds to 
cover their operational costs, with other funding sources representing a relatively 
small proportion. They receive funds from public sources, the private sector and 
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charitable foundations. Some organisations, particularly social banks, generate 
earned income through interest rate charges and other loan fees. Loan capital is 
primarily funded by public sources; private sources of funding that are available are 
focused on loan capital rather than revenue costs of micro-lenders. Public funding 
is expected to play an ongoing role in supporting the development of the European 
microfinance sector.
European funding
Microfinance has increasingly been recognised by the EU member states and 
among European institutions as a key tool for social inclusion and employment 
generation. As a result, there is increasing availability of support and funding 
targeted at initiatives and institutions supporting micro and small enterprises. 
Example of European funding sources
P	 The European Commission has funded a number of microfinance initiatives 
through its DG Enterprise, DG Research and DG Employment and Social Affairs 
Units.
P	 The European Investment Fund has a Microcredit Guarantee Window which 
represents one of the most important EU support programmes for addressing 
microfinance institutions exclusively.
P	 Up to 2006, the European Social Fund (ESF) had been – and will continue 
to be in the budget period (2007–2013) – one of the most important funding 
opportunities for microfinance organisations explicitly addressing social 
exclusion. The EQUAL initiative, which was ESF’s laboratory for testing new 
approaches tackling discrimination and exclusion, will be absorbed by the ESF 
in 2007.
P	 In the 2007–2013 budget period the European Commission and EIF will set 
up a special credit facility focusing on microfinance and SME creation. This 
new initiative, JEREMIE, will be part of the European Regional Development 
Fund (ERDF). It will enable regional and local ERDF managing authorities to 
transform parts of the budget, normally reserved for grants, into loan capital. The 
capital will be assigned to selected ’potential financial intermediaries‘, including 
microcredit institutions, authorised to disburse loans at the local level. JEREMIE 
will also provide financial support for advisory and technical assistance activities.
The typical funding profile of a European microfinance institution is exemplified by 
the case of Adie in France (Case Study 6). In 2005, the operations and institutional 
development of Adie were financed 41 per cent by local governments and 31 per 
cent by state/public entities, of which 8 per cent was through the management 
of a state repayable grant for unemployed and 10 per cent was through specific 
state-funded contracts for young employees. A further 17 per cent was funded by 
the European Commission, with only 11 per cent of funds attracted from the private 
sector. Adie hopes that the margin realised through an increase in the interest rate 
on its loans will cover 11 per cent of its operations in 2007. 
Funding is a main challenge for NCN, as resources tend to be short term (Case 
Study 7). For this reason NCN, and particularly the lending side of its services, 
seeks to become operationally sustainable in the future. NCN is also considering 
charging a small fee for the training it offers. It seeks to continue to increase the 
efficiency of its lending and repayment, and has set up a fund that it hopes will be 
capitalised with contributions from independent social investors as well as from 
private sector organisations. It is also developing a ’package‘ for municipalities 
who want to raise funding locally and use NCN as a service provider for training, 
materials, support services, loan and savings management, networking and follow 
up. However, NCN continues to receive funding from the European Union. It recently 
received funding from ESF to build a national microfinance network of women 
entrepreneurs and to continue its advocacy with the Government to change some 
of the obstacles women entrepreneurs face.
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sustainability 
At present, no microfinance organisation in Western Europe has achieved 
operational sustainability. Although sustainability is a long-term objective for many 
lenders, structural, cost and legal environments create barriers to sustainability. In 
most cases it is also seen as unrealistic because of the high costs of outreach in 
target markets. A strong focus on social mission may preclude sustainability. Policy 
and regulatory constraints, such as interest rate caps in the range of 5 to 8 per cent, 
also limit this option. 
There is an ongoing debate about the meaning of sustainability in Europe; what 
are the full costs of micro-lending; and who should bear these costs and how 
these costs should be borne. For some, sustainability is about ensuring long-term 
presence for individuals in need, while for others it signifies an organisation’s ability 
to cover its operational costs.
The public sector plays an important role in covering these costs. However, many 
organisations fear that public commitment will not be long-term enough to ensure 
their continued presence in disadvantaged communities. Concerns about the 
reliability of public funding echo those voiced by CDFIs in the UK. 
By contrast, Eastern European microfinance institutions have a very strong focus 
on operational sustainability. They follow the notion that sustainability is critical 
for reaching a larger number of target clients. For that reason, Eastern European 
organisations are in most cases operationally self-sustainable; they are able to 
cover the costs of their operations from revenue earned on their assets, mostly 
interest and fee income on loans. 
The case studies reflect the European view of sustainability. Adie believes that achieving    
full sustainability is not realistic in the context of current market factors (Case Study 6). 
These include the low volume of operations and low density of clients relative to the 
volume and density in developing countries; the relatively high cost of staff; the difficulty 
of applying cost-coverage interest rates, and the need for providing business support 
along with finance. Despite this, it is constantly working towards increased operational 
self-reliance, particularly of its lending activities. Adie has recently increased the interest 
rates it charges, and will attempt to separate its lending and business support activities 
with two different cost centres. This reflects the step taken by NCN to separately cost its 
lending and business support activities (Case Study 7).
Spanish WWB business support activities are fully subsidised through contracts 
and agreements with a range of public and private sector entities (80 per cent/20 
per cent respectively). It believes that, while achieving sustainability is unrealistic 
for an organisation of its kind in Spain, its full reliance on public sector funding 
for its operations makes it vulnerable. That is why WWB is presently seeking and 
designing new products and services that will generate income and make it more 
able to respond to changes in public sector priorities (Case Study 8).
scale
The scale of microfinance operations in Western Europe is relatively small; the sector 
is comparatively young. However, despite its youth, the sector is not growing as fast 
as one would expect from an emerging industry in the initial phase of development. 
When compared to the international microfinance industry, largely based in 
developing countries, growth rates are below average. This highlights the different 
context for international microfinance operations, which can tap into a large pool of 
latent demand for business loans in the absence of a well-developed banking sector. 
Despite this distinction, the growth rates in Europe have increased year on year 
in terms of numbers of loans issued. In 2005, there was an increase of 15 per 
cent in the number of loans disbursed in EU15 countries. In Europe, there has 
also been increasing interest on the part of governments and the private sector 
to support microfinance development. There is still further room for the private 
sector, and commercial banks in particular, to play an active role in increasing the 
scale of European microfinance organisations. The private sector could participate 
more directly in the funding and institutional capacity building of microfinance 
organisations in the region.
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policy environment
Europe provides a constructive policy environment for microfinance. Most European 
countries now have policy recognition of small and micro-enterprises and have 
included enterprise support programmes in their national action plans. The European 
Commission has also launched a number of initiatives through its DG Enterprise, DG 
Research and DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, and has been 
stimulating member states to move towards new funding strategies, to move away 
from grants as a sole means of financing the sector.
However, the degree of friendliness of these policies to microfinance varies 
between countries in the region. Some policy contexts are conducive to 
microfinance but rather unstable, while others are not conducive to the 
maximisation of impact of the organisations working in the sector. To provide 
an overview of the type of policy instruments available to support microfinance 
institutions in Western Europe, we review a selection below:
P	 Guarantees. There are national guarantee schemes for small firms in Germany, 
Finland, the Netherlands and the UK, with the Dutch being particularly 
successful. At EU level, EIF also issues guarantees to national schemes that in 
turn provide guarantees or loans to entrepreneurs. There is also a very strong 
culture of mutuality particularly in Italy, where businesses join together to form 
a Mutual Guarantee Society in order to pool their savings thus enabling them to 
attain better terms on external finance.
P	 Special regulatory and policy frameworks allow for the creation of specific 
financial instruments for the social economy. In France, for example, specific 
legislation allows for the creation of local investment clubs (CIGALES) in which 
members save a regular monthly amount in a common fund from which they 
agree to invest in projects they have identified (Case Study 9).
case study 9: clubs d’investisseurs pour une gestion alternative et locale 
de l’epargne solidaire (cigales)
The French Clubs d’Investisseurs pour une Gestion Alternative et Locale de L’Epargne Solidaire (cigales) 
comprise groups of individuals (cigaliers) in a locality involved in the provision of ‘solidarity risk capital’ through the 
mobilisation of savings. The clubs support new and existing small and micro-enterprises that are economically viable 
and that contribute to employment creation, local and cultural development, and the protection of the environment. 
Most of the supported enterprises lack access to finance from the traditional banking sector, and so the CIGALES 
also contribute to their financial inclusion. Additionally, they provide invested enterprises with business advice and 
mentoring which are considered key components of their support. 
Each club is comprised of 5 to 20 individuals (on average 12) from a locality; they come together to save collectively 
for investing locally. While economic viability is one of the criteria used in selecting an enterprise for support, the 
expectation of return is not necessarily. In fact, only around 20 per cent of investments on average receive financial 
returns during the life of a CIGALES – generally between 5 years and no more than 10. What therefore mainly moves 
a CIGALES investment is a sense of solidarity with the locality as well as the knowledge or expectation that at least 
eventually the invested enterprises will be profitable.
The first CIGALES club was created in 1983. Today, about 100 CIGALES are active throughout the country each year 
under the aegis of the Federation of CIGALES, which was created in 1985. The Federation holds the right to the 
‘CIGALES’ name and therefore all such clubs must be members either individually or, where a regional association 
exists, through that body. 
Clubs are formed according to article 1873 of the French Civil Code and governed by two 1970’s laws, which allow a 
group of individuals to voluntarily come together for the purpose of saving, to produce an ethical investment. These 
laws also allow an investment club to open a joint bank account in the name of the CIGALES and to deposit its 
collective savings in the expectation of placing the funds in selected enterprises according to the Charter and ethical 
code of the CIGALES. 
A favourable fiscal disposition has also been in place since 1995 to encourage individuals and investment clubs to 
invest in the formation or to increase the capital of a local enterprise. It provides for a tax deduction equal to 25 per cent of 
the financial investment/payment during a fiscal year. The deduction cannot be used jointly with other similar facilities.
Reconsidering community finance 63
CIGALES is a potentially viable model of financial solidarity that could be 
implemented in the UK. However, a number of contextual factors require 
examination. 
P	 The tradition of community and financial solidarity in the UK, keeping in mind 
that for a CIGALES to work, all members must be equally committed and willing 
to contribute their finance and knowledge with invested enterprises.
P	 Existing policy incentivising the activity (for example, in France the presence of a 
fiscal incentive).
P	 Existing suitable legislation and regulation/legal structure(s) allowing for the 
creation of groups coming together to engage in collective savings and invest 
locally.
P	 The best financial support to provide (loans/risk capital) based on an analysis of 
the small and micro-enterprise culture in the UK and whether these welcome or 
are reluctant to welcome external sources of capital/sharing ownership of their 
businesses.
P	 Partnerships between microfinance and support organisations/programmes 
with commercial banks. In some countries, links between commercial banks 
and micro- and small-enterprise-minded organisations are very strong. This is 
particularly the case of organisations in France, Spain, and Portugal where non-
banks are restricted or not allowed to extend loans.
P	 Interlinking policy, such as in Ireland, is considered to have the most helpful 
social benefits structure permitting a gradual change in the benefits status of 
borrowers. This involves a four-year tapering welfare support programme to 
assist a person move from unemployment into self-employment. There is a need 
to explore similar flexibility for the UK benefits system to allow individuals to 
maximise enterprise opportunities.
P	 Fiscal incentives. In some countries, such as in the UK and the Netherlands, tax 
incentives are provided to individuals or corporations that invest in small and 
micro-enterprises either directly or through intermediaries. Some tax incentives 
are more targeted than others, for example, the UK CITR which specifically 
targets enterprises in deprived areas, as compared to the Dutch TAR. (Case 
Study 10) which targets SMEs and micro-enterprises more generally. 
case study 10: the Tante Agaath Regeling (taR.)
the Tante Agaath Regeling (taR.) is a Dutch fiscal measure that stimulates business angel and private investor 
financing in new and up to 8-year-old enterprises or private companies (called BVs) in the Netherlands. It was 
introduced in January 1996 as part of a tax plan package of measures to encourage entrepreneurialism, of which the 
TAR represented the key component. The scheme was modified and broadened in 2001 with the new Dutch income tax 
regime (IB 2001), becoming Regeling Durfkapitaal.
This fiscal measure was devised with the aim of creating employment through increased entrepreneurial start-ups and 
of filling a market gap in the provision of start-up capital for first-time entrepreneurs. It was also the result of research that 
suggested that there were a high number of private individuals willing to invest in third-party entrepreneurial projects. This tax 
incentive sought to facilitate the connection between private individuals as lenders and financially excluded enterprises.
An investor can be any private individual or ‘business angel’ who wishes to invest in new firms, except for the spouses 
or business partners of supported enterprises. The scheme can be used by any one enterprise for up to five years.
A private individual is encouraged to make finance accessible to starting entrepreneurs in two ways. In the ‘direct variant’ 
of the scheme, taxpayers can loan money directly to start-up entrepreneurs. In the ‘indirect variant’, they can invest money 
in an officially recognised TAR fund (appointed commercial banks), which in turn finances start-up entrepreneurs.
The scheme consists of three fiscal instruments: (1) a tax exemption for the capital yield tax with maximum of e52,110 
applying to both direct and indirect investments; (2) a tax deduction of 1.3 per cent for direct investments, and (3) a 
personal tax deduction for losses on direct investments which acts as a partial guarantee on investment. The overall 
budget has been around e16 million every year.
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conclusion
European microfinance differs from UK community finance in several respects. In 
Western Europe, microfinance is viewed as an extension of the public sector with 
the primary objective of achieving social change. Organisations predominantly have 
a social mission to reach low-income and unemployed individuals by fostering 
opportunities for enterprise. As part of this, there is a strong emphasis on business 
support, networks, and training that microfinance institutions offer. Support services, 
while costly, are recognised as valuable in reaching target communities, and are 
well-funded accordingly. Significant local, national and regional public funding is 
available to support microfinance in Western Europe. 
A further distinction from the UK is the approach to sustainability. Sustainability in 
Western Europe, while important to ensure efficiency of operations, does not imply 
independence from grant funding. No microfinance institution in Western Europe 
has achieved operational sustainability. While sustainability may be a long-term goal 
for many microfinance institutions, there are barriers in the form of cost structures 
and the regulatory context. The case studies we have considered highlight the need 
for a more realistic approach to sustainability in the UK. Many of the organisations 
reviewed have adopted the pragmatic assessment that sustainability is not realistic 
at this stage in their development. As such, micro-lenders rely on public funds to 
cover their operational costs. Unlike in the UK, public funding is expected to play 
an ongoing role in the development of the microfinance sector, particularly as 
constraints such as interest rate caps limit full cost recovery. While measures to 
attract private finance are in development, public funds are the dominant form of 
support, and a range of EU initiatives exist to support the sector.
At the same time, both Western European and UK institutions continue to struggle with 
similar issues of scale, how to expand outreach, generate client demand, and build 
institutional capacity. With less appetite for enterprise start-up or self-employment, 
microfinance institutions have to work harder to generate demand and build an 
enterprising culture. Clients are drawn from amongst less viable or ‘unbankable’ 
borrowers who require additional mentoring and support. As a result, growth has been 
slower in both regions as compared to Eastern European or other international contexts. 
Social impact measurement has also been difficult in both regions. This capability has 
not been well-funded. Individual European microfinance organisations are beginning 
to carry out individual audits of organisational social outcomes, but this is still quite 
patchy in the UK. The development of common standards for performance and impact 
measurement would benefit both the UK and European contexts.
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conclusions
This study set out to address four key questions. The findings from UK and 
international interviews and case studies provide significant insights into the issues 
raised.
Have UK cdfis effectively addressed issues of access to finance?
The evidence from our interviews and the policy survey of stakeholders for CDFIs in 
the UK indicates two important points about CDFI effectiveness: 
1. CDFIs have a positive impact on disadvantaged communities by enabling 
access to finance. They meet the need of a target community for loans 
combined with training and support.
2. In the face of current challenges, the sector is not achieving its full potential. 
CDFIs are not as effective as they could be. 
CDFIs are considered effective institutions. There is a strong conviction that CDFIs 
have a positive impact on disadvantaged communities and that they are critical 
institutions to address issues of access to finance. The policy survey found that 
the enterprises supported by CDFIs can make a real difference in revitalising 
disadvantaged communities. Evidence of under-investment in disadvantaged 
communities indicates that access to finance is an ongoing problem for small and 
micro-enterprises. CDFIs have a key role to play in meeting the needs of excluded 
individuals, particularly women, minorities, and those requiring additional support to 
become investment-ready. 
But most CDFIs remain small and are growing slowly, struggling to make a 
significant contribution to enterprise development. Impact is hampered by small 
scale and limited resources. Most CDFIs remain local or regional in scale. CDFIs 
involved in micro-lending to enterprises have not reached sustainability. 
The sector’s achievements, particularly in terms of committing capital, are largely 
dependent on a small group of national CDFIs that make social-enterprise 
loans. These well-established CDFIs have had the most success in developing 
institutional capacity, moving towards operational self-sustainability, establishing 
robust loan portfolios and relationships with providers of funding, investment and 
referrals. 
Judging CDFIs’ organisational effectiveness is difficult. Generalising across the 
sector is inappropriate because of the diversity of CDFIs. It is clear that there is 
weakness in the current capacity of CDFIs, but organisational performance varies 
greatly. There are currently no performance standards in place. Few organisations 
can demonstrate their full impact upon clients and the communities served. A 
4: conclusions and recommendations
CDFIs are at a point in their development where the future of 
the sector is uncertain. CDFIs are increasingly under review to 
determine whether they are effective in creating enterprise-led 
regeneration. The findings from our research have highlighted the 
characteristics of enterprise-lending community finance in the UK. 
We have considered the operational context and policy environment 
for CDFIs, identifying the challenges and opportunities they face.
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barrier to developing better performance measurement is the limited resources 
endemic to the sector. Funders are contributing to this fragmented situation by 
overlooking support for this function and imposing different reporting requirements 
in an uncoordinated manner.
Lack of transparency is a problem that CDFIs have to address urgently. Currently 
the information that the CDFA gathers on its members is inadequate to make robust 
funding or investment decisions. Data is limited to aggregate information reported 
by the CDFA. Individual organisations each approach data-gathering and reporting 
differently. A standard performance framework, such as the one in development by 
the CDFA, could provide the evidence of social gains created by community finance. 
can cdfis be sustainable, and what size of organisation is appropriate for 
the communities they serve? are expectations for the sector appropriate?
Sustainability and scale have to be judged as part of a broader framework of 
objectives. CDFIs lend in the most challenging of circumstances. By definition, 
CDFIs have a social mission to serve hard-to-reach individuals that banks have 
deemed unprofitable. In many cases, these operating conditions limit sustainability. 
Sustainability is determined by a number of different factors, including markets 
served, loans offered, and type of services provided. 
There is acknowledgement within the sector of the importance of sustainability as 
a long-term objective, but currently it is not achievable for most CDFIs. In reality 
most CDFIs may only be able to cover less than 20 per cent of their operating 
costs. Many CDFI business models will not achieve sustainability. Small personal 
and micro-enterprise loans are costly to administer and generate less income. 
International evidence indicates that many CDFIs in the US and in Western Europe 
remain dependent on grant support. Sustainability may only be possible for CDFIs 
involved in larger, secured loans for property or social enterprises.
Business support enables entrepreneurs to realise their potential when credit 
is accompanied by training. The availability of business support is crucial to the 
viability of many loans and therefore to the sustainability of CDFIs. At the same time, 
business support is costly to provide. Business Link and other existing business 
support mechanisms are largely inadequate for the highly specialised needs 
of CDFI clients. There is an opportunity for CDFIs to provide tailored advice with 
microcredit specific to micro-enterprises, sole traders and the self-employed.
In this context, public funding is necessary to support the activities of CDFIs. This 
has been recognised in Western Europe and in the US, where robust mechanisms 
exist to support the sector. The funding environment has become increasingly 
challenging in the UK. 
New sources of private finance may also help to support the sector. However, 
significant capacity building will be required to ensure that CDFIs are ready to 
absorb and to manage these funds. Currently many CDFIs do not have the 
management expertise and business model to absorb private investment. Even 
some of the most financially robust institutions that utilise commercial funding still 
rely on public guarantees to attract it.
Scale is not a panacea; it is suggested as a strategy to improve outreach, impact 
and sustainability. Many CDFIs seek greater scale for these reasons. However, 
operating on a larger scale may not realise those goals due to the low investment-
readiness of demand, the high transaction cost of lending and the specialised 
needs of target clients. Lending to disadvantaged individuals does not produce 
economies of scale. The section of society served by CDFIs does not respond to 
orthodox banking practices; CDFIs are targeting the unbankable. As such, plans to 
build scale should be considered on an organisation by organisation basis. CDFIs 
will increasingly need to consider their competitive advantage in meeting the needs 
of their target clients. Specialisation, combined with effective partnerships, may be 
more effective than simply targeting larger-scale operation.
High initial expectations for CDFIs have resulted in some disillusionment with 
the sector among donors, policy-makers and investors. However, some of these 
expectations have proven to be unrealistic. 
The needs of the target market render the demand for enterprise lending very 
costly to meet. Expectations for CDFIs to grow revenue and to increase scale while 
simultaneously deepening social impact may be too ambitious. CDFIs operate 
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in diverse environments which do not respond to a single model. Pressure to 
improve revenue can limit resources to develop capacity, implement performance 
measurement and provide the business support that is integral to most CDFIs’ 
operations.
Government policy has not supported community finance sufficiently to allow many 
expectations to be addressed. Funding has been short term and patchy. Support 
from the financial sector has also been inconsistent and often limited. The CDFI 
sector is still very young. Key steps, such as developing social impact indicators, 
establishing performance standards, and building partnerships with other local 
institutions, are only just beginning to emerge. In the absence of future funding, the 
sector will weaken and many CDFIs will disappear. 
What are the implications of the current direction of policy for cdfis? How do 
they fit within the broader approach to enterprise and regeneration?
The current policy context is challenging for CDFIs. While early initiatives were 
supportive of the sector’s development, the policy environment has become 
unstable and short term in focus. Policy cycles have shifted, and CDFIs are no 
longer at the top of the agenda. Enterprise lending is no longer emphasised as a 
core solution to disadvantage. 
Government funding for enterprise lending was too short-lived. The devolution of 
strategic oversight to RDAs has meant that experience and knowledge at national 
level has been lost. CDFIs are now further fragmented, with different approaches 
in each of the regions. Future funding has not been confirmed and CDFIs are 
struggling to cope as a result.
CITR has had limited impact. It has not functioned to promote the growth of small 
and younger CDFIs, which make up the bulk of the sector. It has been inflexible 
and difficult to administer for all but the most established organisations. Reform 
is necessary to enable it to be a more effective method to attract investment into 
community finance. The steps the Treasury is taking to revise CITR are welcome 
in this respect. As the CDFA has argued, CITR could be expanded to foster further 
development of the sector and attract much needed additional funds. New initiatives 
such as the Commission for Unclaimed Assets’ proposed Social Investment Bank 
could be positive measures to ensure ongoing development of the sector.
The emergence of personal financial exclusion as a policy priority has shifted the 
focus away from enterprise’s contribution to disadvantaged communities. Issues of 
personal financial exclusion and enterprise finance often overlap, particularly when 
target communities are the same. However, this policy shift has altered the ‘road 
map’ for many CDFIs. The availability of funding for personal financial products that 
combat predatory lending means that some CDFIs have adjusted their business 
models. Funding for enterprise lending is increasingly scarce in this environment.
There appears to be a diminishing importance of CDFIs in government approaches 
to exclusion and deprivation. Their lack of sustainability means CDFIs still depend 
on grant funding. The policy cycle means priorities continuously shift. The 
community finance sector is struggling to develop in the absence of sustained 
support from either government or private funders. Unlike the US, there is not a 
positive framework like that of the CRA to drive strategic bank partnership and 
investment in the sector. Without sufficient funding, there will be rationalisation 
within the CDFI sector.
CDFIs make a positive impact on disadvantaged communities. But community 
finance is not high growth or the sole solution for unemployment. Some micro firms 
and forms of self-employment can provide flexibility, additional sources of income 
and skill development for individuals excluded from formal work. Even micro-
enterprises that fail can develop business skills and build an enterprising culture, 
contributing to an area’s regeneration.
CDFIs can build upon their links to hard-to-reach groups by taking on partnerships 
with other institutions confronting these challenges. There is a clear opportunity for 
CDFIs to work with housing associations to meet the needs of micro-enterprises 
and the self-employed. 
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DTAs, local authorities and RDAs are seeking to promote regeneration. CDFIs have 
specific skills and knowledge that they can bring to these organisations. 
CDFIs can be effective service delivery partners. Where scale and revenue are 
limited, CDFIs could consider specialisation into niche markets, while working in 
coordination with other service partners to maximise impact. Alternatively, multiple 
CDFIs in a region could partner with each other to rationalise some costs and 
present a united face to potential partner institutions and funders. The model of a 
Community Banking Partnership championed by nef has been effective in bringing 
together a range of organisations providing complementary services.
What do the lessons learned in other international contexts tell us about 
future policy choices for cdfis in the UK? 
UK community finance has regularly referred to international examples to inform 
policy development and consider best practice.
Expectations for CDFIs in the UK were largely based on US models of community 
finance. With three decades of development, the CDFI sector in the US has grown 
to be of significant size. The sector plays a significant role in filling gaps in access 
to finance for underserved markets. CDFIs in the US have a diversified range of 
products, including an important focus on property lending. The-second largest 
activity is lending for small business development. Increased specialisation and 
an in-depth understanding of niche markets have resulted in successful lending 
models. CDFIs have learned how to cross subsidise less profitable activities 
with fees or revenue from successful products. CDFIs are well integrated into 
regeneration strategies, forming key partnerships with other local or regional bodies. 
Banks have engaged with the CDFI sector, providing a critical source of investment 
and expertise, largely as a result of CRA legislation. Long-term government support, 
in the form of the CDFI Fund, has also helped to develop the sector.
However, CDFIs in the US continue to face challenges. They struggle with issues 
of sustainability, capacity, and scale. The funding environment has become more 
challenging. New methods of performance measurement are increasingly required 
by donors to demonstrate effectiveness. CDFIs struggle to recruit and maintain high 
quality staff. In addition, where they have proven that low-income markets can be 
profitable, they face increasing competition from formal banks. Many CDFIs in the 
US that serve hard-to-reach populations are not fully sustainable, and continue to 
rely on grant funding. 
Lessons for the UK from the US context include:
P	 The CRA has played a significant role to develop a robust commitment from 
banks. It has provided the foundation for investment and partnership of banks 
with CDFIs in the US.
P	 Long-term funding support from the CDFI Fund was a key factor in development 
of the sector. The Fund provides financial grants and technical assistance 
awards to CDFIs.
P	 Specialisation in niche markets to build expertise can be a competitive 
advantage.
P	 Mechanisms such as the New Markets Tax Credit programme have helped to 
drive investment into the sector.
P	 Larger loans for property, affordable housing and financing neighbourhood 
redevelopment are often key to sustainable loan portfolios. Cross subsidy 
through a balanced portfolio of broader and more secure lending can facilitate 
micro-loan provision.
P	 CDFIs serving hard-to-reach markets continue to require grant funding.
P	 CDFIs may benefit from partnerships with regional or local institutions as part of 
a broader regeneration strategy.
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P	 Developing an effective means of social impact measurement is essential to 
demonstrate outcomes and raise additional funds.
Western Europe presents a different model of community finance. Like the UK, 
the sector remains small and of relatively limited scale. The sector is comparatively 
young, with the majority of organisations in operation since 2000. Microfinance is 
viewed as an extension of the public sector with the primary objective of achieving 
social change. Organisations predominantly have a social mission to reach low-
income and unemployed individuals. As such, microfinance has a strong focus 
on social inclusion and is less concerned with profitability. Many microfinance 
organisations recognise that sustainability is not possible with current lending 
models, and very few lenders in Western Europe are operationally self-sustainable.  
Micro-lenders rely on the public sector to provide funding and there are significant 
funds available to support operating costs. The European policy environment is 
very supportive. European institutions have partnered with savings banks and other 
formal financial institutions. They have recognised the importance of business 
support provision, and a majority of CDFIs in Western Europe offer these services. 
They have increasingly specialised and focus on targeting specific disadvantaged 
communities. At the same time, they are often involved in providing a range of 
employment and social services in addition to microcredit.
The sector is facing challenges of slow growth, limited capacity, and small scale. 
Most organisations have an annual loan output of fewer than one hundred loans. 
European microfinance institutions struggle with social impact and performance 
measurement. They are still limited in their reporting on financial details, such as 
portfolio at risk and loan write-offs. 
Lessons for the UK from the Western European context include:
P	 Recognising the social value of community finance for hard-to-reach 
communities limits unrealistic expectations of short-term sustainability.
P	 A supportive policy environment with access to a range of funding and support 
mechanisms is conducive to the long-term development of the sector.
P	 Formalising partnerships with banks helps to develop effective operating 
models.
P	 Separating lending and business support activities can be an effective way to 
build a sustainable loan portfolio.
P	 Appropriate sources of public funding are necessary to promote a robust 
community finance sector.
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UK cdfis sWot analysis
strengths
P	 CDFIs reach excluded individuals who are not served by the formal financial sector.
P	 CDFIs are able to target specific needs not met by existing business support services.
P	 CDFIs can be effective in disadvantaged communities.
P	 Micro-enterprise has positive outcomes through development of business skills and encouraging an 
enterprising culture.
Weaknesses
P	 The scale of CDFIs in the UK is still small.
P	 CDFIs have grown more slowly than expected.
P	 The current capacity of most CDFIs is inadequate. 
P	 Funding has been short term and project driven.
P	 Policy environment is increasingly unsupportive.
P	 Few CDFIs have achieved operational self-sustainability, and this may be unrealistic for many. 
P	 Most CDFIs are unfamiliar and/or unprepared for private investment.
P	 CDFIs do not report transparently on their outcomes.
P	 Sector-wide performance standards are not in place.
opportunities
P	 Partnerships with the financial sector could increase referrals, investment and expertise.
P	 CDFIs could be better integrated with DTAs, housing associations, and local authorities.
P	 A programme of awareness would expand general knowledge of CDFIs. 
P	 Revision of CITR could improve flexibility and drive future investment.
P	 A programme of long-term public funding would kick-start the sector.
P	 CDFA performance framework will bring new credibility to CDFIs.
P	 Creation of a Social Investment Bank to coordinate funding and investment in the sector.
threats
P	 An excessive focus on sustainability may cause the social mission to be undermined.
P	 Absence of appropriate funding will result in weakness and rationalisation of the sector.
P	 Excessive focus on private investment will exclude majority of small CDFIs.
P	 Ongoing lack of transparency of CDFI performance could undermine credibility.
P	 Policy-makers lose interest in CDFIs resulting in the deterioration of current organisations.  
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Recommendations
cdfis
P	 Performance measurement must be developed and linked to common 
standards for the sector.
P	 CDFIs should be more transparent about their operations in order to demonstrate 
their effectiveness. 
P	 Developing social impact measurement would allow CDFIs to communicate 
outcomes more effectively.
P	 CDFIs should look to private investment as a long-term goal but should not 
expect it to replace other forms of funding support.
P	 They should develop deeper partnerships with the private sector, whether banks 
or other businesses with an interest in disadvantaged communities.
P	 CDFIs should consider a wider range of local partnerships with housing 
associations, development trusts and local authorities.
P	 Strategies to improve revenue and lower costs need to be explored further, such 
as property lending, generating advisory fees, and sharing back-office functions.
P	 CDFIs should separate the costs of different activities to determine their impact 
on the business model and allow for different funding sources, whether grant 
funding or investment.
P	 CDFIs should consider separating activities into different but associated entities, 
such as a for-profit loan fund and a charitable enterprise. 
government
P	 Original expectations for the CDFI sector were unrealistic. These should be 
revised to focus on the ongoing development needs of this sector.
P	 DTI should establish a central point of information to ensure that RDAs are able 
to make use of previous policy experience.
P	 CITR should be expanded to enhance property lending for regeneration, social 
housing development and personal lending activities. CITR funds could also be 
used to support the operating costs of CDFIs.
P	 CITR needs to be better publicised to encourage greater take-up by investors. 
P	 Banks should be mandated to engage actively with community finance, along 
the lines of the CRA in the US. 
P	 Government should consider an ongoing fund to support capacity building of 
CDFIs.
Regional development agencies
P	 RDAs should facilitate strategic partnerships for CDFIs so that they can more 
effectively address issues of enterprise finance.
P	 RDAs should provide funds for capacity building, and focus on the development 
of smaller CDFIs.
P	 RDAs should work with CDFIs to develop a model of business support tailored 
to the specific issues affecting entrepreneurs in disadvantaged areas.
funders
P	 CDFIs still need grant funding to carry out much of their work. Without this they 
will wither and many will disappear with serious consequences for people in 
disadvantaged communities.
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P	 Funders, in partnership with the CDFA, should coordinate reporting requirements 
to ease the burden on CDFIs.
P	 Funding should be made available over a long-term timeframe to enable CDFIs 
to grow and increase their impact. 
P	 Funding for CDFIs needs to support revenue as well as capital costs.
P	 Funding for capacity building of CDFIs is critical.
Banks
P	 A formal strategy of long term engagement with CDFIs should be implemented 
to promote referrals from mainstream banks, knowledge transfer and investment 
in CDFIs.
P	 Banks should move away from ad hoc grants through CSR budgets and 
develop significant, long-term programmes of investment.
P	 They should disclose the amount and pattern of their lending in disadvantaged 
communities to identify where partnership with CDFIs would be more effective.
P	 Banks should seek out opportunities to partner with effective CDFIs to better 
serve the needs of unbanked individuals and enterprises.
community development finance association
P	 The CDFA should continue its positive work on the development of common 
standards for CDFIs through the performance framework to improve 
measurement systems.
P	 It should develop an awareness and education strategy to inform and attract 
new private funders to CDFIs.
P	 The CDFA should encourage greater transparency from CDFIs through the 
development of a common information point for performance indicators, similar 
to the Microfinance Information Exchange.
P	 It should aim to develop an independent rating mechanism in the long term to 
encourage best practice, perhaps adapting models in use in the US. 
conclusion
nef’s research shows that CDFIs are having a positive impact on disadvantaged 
communities. But CDFIs have not met the initial expectations and are not living 
up to their full potential. Many of their shortcomings are due to an unsupportive 
policy environment. Limited funding, a short-term outlook and inflexible policy 
mechanisms have all stunted development of the sector. Ten years after their 
emergence in the UK, CDFIs are now at a critical juncture. Unless action is taken 
they are at risk of becoming victims of the ever-shifting policy cycle.
To develop an effective CDFI sector, a long-term approach to funding and support 
is required. Expectations need to be more realistic and shift to a longer time 
horizon in keeping with the nature of the social change CDFIs are designed to 
support. Policy mechanisms should be redesigned to maximise flexibility. CDFIs 
should be encouraged to develop partnerships with existing local institutions in 
the communities they serve. Banks should be pushed strongly to invest in the 
sector on the basis of the pivotal role this has played in the US and elsewhere. 
The CDFA has a continued role to play in increasing the rigour of reporting and 
performance measurement for the sector. Above all, policy-makers and practitioners 
should understand that CDFIs are social enterprises that are unlikely to be entirely 
independent of grant support if they are fulfilling their purpose and maximising their 
social outcomes.
Without renewed support for the sector, it will become increasingly fragmented and 
weak. CDFIs will likely wither and many may disappear, providing another set back 
to disadvantaged communities.
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UK Research
The findings are a product of extensive secondary research on the UK and 
international context. To develop our UK findings, we completed in-depth interviews 
with CDFIs and carried out a policy survey. Through the interview and survey 
process, we collected the views of representatives from 43 different CDFIs.
We developed the policy survey to seek the views of a wider group of CDFI 
practitioners as well as other significant stakeholders in the sector, including: 
policy-makers, banks and related financial institutions, charitable foundations, and 
government representatives. We sent the survey to 143 recipients and received a 
response rate of 38 per cent with 54 respondents. Survey participants comprised 22 
non-practitioners and 32 CDFIs. Of the non-practitioners seven were drawn from the 
banking sector, two from Government, four Charity representatives responded and 
nine participants were drawn from other supporting institutions.
We completed interviews with 19 CDFIs in the UK. We selected CDFIs for interview 
on the basis of their ability to represent experiences typical to the sector while 
ensuring a sufficient breadth to reflect its diversity. The organisations interviewed 
provide one or a combination of products, with ten (52 per cent) organisations 
providing micro-loans; five (26 per cent) SME loans; five (26 per cent) social 
enterprise loans. One organisation also provides housing loans in addition to social 
enterprise loans, and three others provide personal loans in addition to micro-
loans. The proportion of personal lending by volume and value for two of the three 
organisations is greater than that of micro-enterprise lending.
Ten (52 per cent) of the interviewed organisations also provide some kind of 
business support, from formalised training and one-to-one tailored advice to more 
informal support through the life of the financial commitment. 
Three organisations (16 per cent) work nationally (with focus on England); three 
work regionally (16 per cent); eight work sub-regionally (42 per cent); and one 
works locally. One organisation works solely in Scotland, and one in just one region 
of Scotland. In terms of regional spread, three work in London; three in the West 
Midlands region; two in the east of England; one in the North East; one in the South 
West; one in Yorkshire and the Humber, and one in the North West. 
Most of the interviewed organisations use a group company structure, with 52 per 
cent registered as Companies Limited by Guarantee and 26 per cent as Industrial 
Provident Societies (IPS). Some of these operate with charitable status as well, and 
one organisation is registered only as a charity.
All interviewed organisations have been financing for at least one year, with the 
majority (59 per cent) having been established during the 2000s; 24 per cent in the 
1990s; 6 per cent in the 1980s, and 12 per cent in the 1970s.
international review
In addition, we conducted a review of the US and Western European community 
finance sectors. We carried out interviews with selected US and European 
organisations involved in their respective community finance sectors. These 
interviews incorporate first-hand experience of the local operating environments 
and help to identify the issues or practices that are particularly effective and relevant 
to this analysis. Eight to ten interviews were carried out in each region. In total, we 
carried out over 40 interviews with UK, US and European CDFIs.
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international case studies
The report also includes ten case studies of community finance initiatives in 
the US and the EU. These highlight the different features of community finance 
organisations, their target group and their core activities in order to identify what 
aspects of their operation are integral to creating successful interventions in 
deprived communities. The objective of these case studies is to highlight particular 
aspects of their activities and operating environment that are instructive for CDF in 
the UK. 
To carry out a review of the US community finance sector, we enlisted the support 
of the Woodstock Institute, a Chicago-based think tank with significant experience 
of the sector. In addition, with the CDFA, we visited over 30 US-based CDFIs in 
Chicago and New York in October 2006 to explore the current themes and issues 
relevant to this sector. The findings of these in-depth, face-to-face interviews were 
incorporated into our analysis.
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P	 Aston Reinvestment Trust (ART)
P	 Black Country Enterprise Loan Fund
P	 Bridges Community Ventures
P	 Bristol Enterprise Development Fund
P	 Change
P	 Co-operative & Community Finance 
P	 DSL Business Finance
P	 East London Small Business Centre
P	 The Enterprise Fund
P	 Fair Finance
P	 Foundation East 
P	 London Rebuilding Society
P	 Pembrokeshire Lottery
P	 The Prince’s Trust
P	 Social Investment Scotland (SIS)
P	 Street North East
P	 Street UK
P	 The West Yorkshire Enterprise Agency Limited
P	 Women’s Employment, Enterprise and Training Unit (Weetu)/Full Circle
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demand and marketing
1. How would you characterise the level of demand for the product(s) you offer? 
2. What is your estimate of demand for the next 1, 3 and 5 years?
3. Has your organisation carried out market research? If so, what did this indicate about your target client group? 
4. Do you think your organisation has a good understanding of demand issues? What are these and how do they affect 
your business model?
5. How many applications for finance has your organisation received since start-up? In the past 12 months?
6. What marketing strategies have/do you use? Do you feel that they are effective?
Business support and investment readiness
1. Is investment readiness of enterprises an issue? Explain.
2. Do you provide business support?  If yes, at what stage and what type?
3. How is business support funded? How does this affect your business model?
funding
1. What are your organisation’s principal sources of revenue and capital funding?
2. What are your main challenges in fundraising?
3. Do you feel funders and policymakers understand the products, services and methodologies you use to reach your 
target market(s)? Explain.
4. What impact if any will the closure of the Phoenix Fund and other Government sources of funding have on your 
operations? 
5. What impact, if any, will the transition of funding and strategy to the RDAs have on your operations?
6. Are you CITR accredited? If not, why not?
P	 If so, 
p	 Have you raised any investment under CITR?;
p	 Are you planning to raise investment in the future?
P	 How effective is the CITR in incentivising investment in the sector? 
7. What role will commercial sources of finance play in your fundraising? Is commercial finance an option you would 
consider, why or why not?
8. How easy or difficult has it been to fund your institutional development & capacity building? Explain. 
Results/impact
1. How do you measure your social impact? 
2. Do you have a system for performance measurement? Describe.
3. Do you think the sector has common measures of performance? Are these effective?
4. How effective is the sector to demonstrate the social outcomes it achieves?
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Regulation & Reporting
1. Is existing legal and financial regulation sufficient for the community development finance sector? 
2. What form should regulation take, if any? What impact would this have on the sector?
3. Are there sufficient standards for regular reporting in the community development finance sector?
4. How effective is the CDFA to review and report on the performance of its members?
5. Could transparency for the sector be improved, if so how?
6. Is there a common understanding of best practice for the sector?
sustainability
1. To what extent do you think effective community finance institutions should be operationally sustainable? Why is it 
important or not?
2. What factors determine how achievable sustainability is?
3. How does the provision of business support and training (if applicable) affect your ability to achieve sustainability?
4. How does meeting the needs of your particular target market affect your ability to achieve sustainability?
5. What are the biggest constraints your organisation faces to achieve operational sustainability?
6. What sustainability strategies have you considered e.g. market diversification, income generating activities, 
partnerships, cost-sharing, increased cost-efficiencies?
7. How does the policy environment in the UK affect (or not) your potential sustainability?
8. In your opinion, how much importance the government and funders give to the operational sustainability of CDFIs? Is 
this justified?
9. Is achieving scale important to you? What strategies have you considered to make it happen? 
10. How reasonable is the focus on scale? Is there a limit to the scale a CDFI can achieve without losing its roots in the 
community? What are the advantages and disadvantages of scale? How will achieving scale affect your ability to 
achieve social outcomes?
11. What are the main challenges your organisation will have to face in the next 5 years?
policy environment
1. How would you describe the present policy environment for community finance in the UK? 
2. Generally, are CDFIs seen as effective institutions by funders and policymakers? Why or why not? 
3. What could Government do better to promote the CDFI sector?
4. Are there any aspects of policy that are lacking at the moment which would facilitate CDFI activity?
5. Does the CDFA represent its members effectively at a policy level?
6. How would enhanced bank disclosure on lending into disadvantaged areas affect your operations?
7. What role do commercial banks play for the community development finance sector?
8. Do you work in partnership with commercial banks, and if so, how? 
9. Are commercial banks sufficiently active to meet the needs of disadvantaged communities? 
10. How could UK banks better engage with issues of financial exclusion generally, and with CDFIs in particular?
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The policy survey contained a set of statements regarding community development finance, grouped in thematic sections. 
First, respondents were asked to indicate whether they agreed with the statement. Second, respondents were asked to 
rank the level of importance of the issue in question to community development finance in the UK. 
Answers were chosen from: Disagree; Somewhat disagree; Neutral; Somewhat agree; Agree; and Don’t know
1. vision
Q1 Community Development Finance (CDF) is recognised as an important part of the UK financial 
system.
Q2 CDF is recognised as an effective means to address access to finance and bring about regeneration 
and local development.
Q3 Community development finance institutions (CDFIs) are viewed as social enterprises balancing their 
social mission and business activities.
Q4 Key actors understand that entrepreneurs in deprived areas want and need rapid, simple access to 
financial and non- financial services.
Q5 Key actors recognise that the socially and financially excluded are good clients, repaying their loans 
on time.
Q6 Key actors use common standards for measuring CDF performance.
Q7 Key actors recognise the importance of the diversity of CDFIs in order to respond to local market 
conditions.
Q8 Key actors recognise the need for a balance between economies of scale and the ability to retain 
genuine local/community links.
Q9 Key actors recognise that business support, along with finance, is a key component in ensuring a 
CDFI’s success in achieving its mission. 
2. policy
Q1 The UK policy environment is supportive of CDF.
Q2
CDFIs, their goals, diversity of structures and finance delivery mechanisms are well understood by 
policymakers.
Q3 The CDFA is a strong trade association that effectively represents its members’ interests.
Q4 Appropriate tax treatment is provided to encourage the development of CDF.
Q5 The Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) is well designed to provide finance to CDFIs.
Q6 The CITR helps CDFIs to achieve sustainability.
Q7
CDFIs can and are willing to charge the interest rates needed to cover the high costs of making 
small loans.
Q8
The structure of the benefits system facilitates the work of CDFIs to encourage disadvantaged 
individuals to engage in enterprise.
3. effectiveness
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Q1 CDFIs are effective institutions for the provision of finance and non-financial services to enterprises in 
disadvantaged areas.
Q2 CDFIs have a positive impact on disadvantaged communities.
Q3 CDFIs are critical institutions to address financial exclusion.
Q4 The enterprises CDFIs support can make a real difference to revitalise disadvantaged communities.
Q5 CDFIs have strong links to their local communities.
Q6 CDFIs are now of a scale to make significant impact on enterprise in disadvantaged communities.
4. cdfis
Q1 Board members of CDFIs have the vision, capacities and clarity needed to support CDFIs in becoming 
strong institutions with significant reach and impact.
Q2 CDFIs are scaling-up and are mobilising resources to develop the sector.
Q3 CDFIs are strengthening their institutional capacity and are training their staff to build a business-like 
organisational culture.
Q4 CDFIs have agreed common financial & operational performance standards that serve as the criteria 
for government and donors in providing financial support.
Q5 CDFIs have agreed common social impact standards that serve as the criteria for government and 
donors in providing financial support.
Q6 CDFIs that are not able to meet the industry standards for successful operation stop their activities.
Q7 The CDFI sector has a strong core group of institutions that represent best practice.
Q8 As CDFIs develop they offer a wider range of services to their target markets.
Q9 CDFIs serving high-risk entrepreneurs have built organisations and loan-delivery systems that enable 
profitable operations.
5. sustainability
Q1 With the right support, CDFIs could be of a scale to make significant impact on enterprise in 
disadvantaged communities.
Q2 Greater scale is critical to achieving a higher degree of sustainability.
Q3 It is important for CDFIs to achieve operational sustainability.
Q4 A CDFI’s sustainability should be judged against its social outcomes, which may justify some level of 
use of grants and subsidies.
Q5 In the future CDFIs will increasingly adopt non-grant forms of finance.
6. Regulation
Q1 Legal and regulatory structures exist to ensure soundness and stability of CDFIs. 
Q2 A self-regulating legal system for CDFIs would be appropriate.
Q3 There are sufficient and appropriate reporting requirements for the CDFI sector.
Q4 Guidelines exist on good governance and management of CDFIs to generate 
needed credibility.
Q5 The legal and supervisory framework for CDFIs responds well to the different sizes 
and structures of the organisations.
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7. government
Q1 Government bodies responsible for financial sector policy-making assist CDFIs by providing supportive 
policies and financial resources.
Q2 Government funding of CDF has been positive and effective.
Q3 Government has given appropriate attention to increasing the institutional capacity of CDFIs.
Q4 The Phoenix Fund was well designed and effectively met the needs of the sector.
Q5 The Growth Fund is well designed and effectively meets the needs of the sector.
Q6 The devolution of oversight to RDAs has been a positive step and will improve the sector’s ability to 
address problems of access to finance.
Q7 In building policies, regulations and incentives CDFIs that serve the financially excluded, policymakers 
encourage a wide range of institutions-large and small, traditional and untraditional, existing and new-to 
build sound, responsive financial services for the financially excluded.
8. Banks
Q1 Commercial banks and other traditional financial intermediaries are committed to CDF and to the 
development of this market.
Q2 Traditional financial institutions increasingly recognise CDF as a potential market, and try to serve it.
Q3 Commercial banks have undergone the significant changes in attitudes, organisation and lending 
technologies that enable them to play major roles in CDF.
Q4 Commercial banks are proactive in seeking to partner with CDF initiatives.
Q5 Commercial banks provide significant funding and support to the CDF sector.
Q6 Commercial banks keep and disclose sufficient information about the markets they serve.
9. funding
Q1 Funders see that CDF is about long term investment in people and institutions, rather than short term 
projects.
Q2 CDFIs are able to access appropriate funding to allow increased outreach and growth.
Q3 CDFIs are now moving towards non-grant forms of finance.
Q4 Funders understand that many different methodologies and legal structures provide effective CDF 
services to the financially excluded.
Q5 Funders have in place cost-effective, non-bureaucratic mechanisms that enable support for institutions.
Q6 Funders provide financial and other support in a form that fosters increased institutional capacity.
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Tackling climate change: We are living beyond our 
means. Conventional economic growth based on the 
profligate use of fossil fuels threatens to bankrupt both 
the global economy and the biosphere during this 
century. nef believes that improving human well being in 
ways which won’t damage the environment is real growth. 
Only that can ensure the planet is a fit place to live for 
generations.
One of the other things we do
nef works for the environment by 
promoting small-scale solutions 
such as microrenewable energy. 
nef is also working to challenge the 
global system. At the moment the 
rich become richer by using up more 
than their fair share of the earth’s 
resources, and the poor get hit first 
and worst by consequences such 
as global warming. nef pushes for 
recognition of the huge ‘ecological 
debts’ that rich nations are running up 
to the majority world. 
nef works to confront the destructive 
reality of climate change in many 
ways: building coalitions to halt 
climate change and get those under 
threat the resources they need to 
adapt; proposing legal and economic 
action against rich countries who 
refuse to act; calling for protection 
for environmental refugees, and 
for a worldwide framework to stop 
global warming based on capping 
dangerous emissions and equal per 
person entitlements to emit. With 
original research we expose new 
problems and suggest solutions.
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